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In philosophical metaphysics, speculation is often seen to have value as an 
ontological concept referring to rational contemplation on the fundamental 
yet unobservable nature of reality. In philosophy of science, on the other hand, 
speculation is commonly taken as an epistemological notion to mean that a 
proposition regarding the nature of reality can be possibly either true or false, 
and that the veracity of that proposition can be tested against empirically 
observed facts. This simplistic division into speculation as a matter of 
metaphysics and a matter of empirics also pertains to archaeology where 
(archaeology being a characteristically empiricist discipline) speculation has 
had little value as an ontological concept pertaining to the unobservable. 
Instead, speculation—as well as the ambiguity and uncertainty introduced 
with it—have been treated as provisional resorts and as epistemological points 
of elimination. 
Many epistemological strategies have been adopted in archaeology to 
eliminate speculation in favor of proof and certainty. These strategies range 
from the inductivism of traditional archaeology to the deductivism of the New 
Archaeology, and more recently to views of archaeological reasoning as 
inference to the best explanation. In reviewing the history of archaeology in 
terms of these common conceptualisations of the form and constituents of 
archaeological inference, and in drawing philosophical inspiration from a 
range of speculative philosophies as well as contemporary archaeological 
theorising, this thesis argues that the desirable strategy in the epistemology of 
archaeology is not the commonly adopted systematic elimination of 
speculation. In contrast, the thesis takes speculation seriously and contends 
that it has significance in the epistemology of archaeology as both an 
epistemological and an ontological notion. The thesis holds that in order to 
develop an empirically sensitive, ontologically considerate, and ethically 
sustainable epistemology of archaeology, speculation should be cultivated and 
cared for as a systematic consideration of the multiplicity of experience. In 
other words, speculation is to be preserved as a method of thinking otherwise; 
a countermeasure to the methodological (and the ensuing ontological) 
simplification risked by adhering to eliminationist strategies. 
The practical possibilities towards a speculative epistemology of 
archaeology are discussed in terms of methodological and theoretical 
deceleration, a matter that has become increasingly relevant with the recent 
natural scientific revolution in archaeology. Slowing down, in this context, 
aims towards a historical understanding of the discipline—and science at 
large—as a community of practitioners with possibly conflicting concerns. In 
this way, the principle of speculative epistemology becomes the perpetual 
anticipation of the possible practical effects of pursuing truths and realities on 
epistemologies that entertain different notions of those concepts.
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We may sacrifice years to thankless study in order to hunt some golden 
unicorn glimpsed one day in the library, even though it may never enter our 
grasp and no one else may even believe that we ever saw it. (Harman 2005, 
141) 
 
The work of an individual is always collaborative and social. Countless people, 
conversations, places, institutions, lectures, travels, encounters, and 
happenstances have contributed towards the unfolding of this work. I am 
grateful for the kind support I have always received from the scientific 
community, in Finland and elsewhere. 
Special thanks are due to my supervisors Prof. Mika Lavento, Prof. Visa 
Immonen, and Prof. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen for guidance, comments, and 
collegial support. 
I wish to thank the following people for personal support over the years 
and, I should hope, in the future: Jeff Benjamin, Johanna Enqvist, Eero 
Muurimäki, Milton Núñez, Timo Salminen, Anna Sivula, Tim Flohr Sørensen, 
Santeri Vanhanen, and Suvi Tuominen. 
Also, I would probably never have managed to become an archaeologist if 
it were not for my family. Their continuing support has allowed me to take the 
time needed to become a researcher. 
The research for this thesis was done with financial support from the 
Research Foundation of the University of Helsinki (Grant for Young 
Researchers) between 2012 and 2013, and from the University of Helsinki 
Doctoral Programme in History and Cultural Heritage, where I worked as a 
salaried PhD candidate for three years between 2016 and 2019. The work was 
further supported by a three-month grant (spring 2019) from the University 
of Helsinki Doctoral School in Humanities and Social Sciences. The majority 
of the thesis was written in Helsinki. However, some parts of it were written 
while staying at the Saxo Institute at the University of Copenhagen in the 
autumn of 2017, a visit that was likewise generously funded by my home 
institute.
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This thesis is based on four previously published peer-reviewed research 
articles and one article manuscript. Each article is referred to in the text by its 
number. The first version of Article 5 manuscript was written by Marila and 
the text was jointly edited over the course of a year. In the current version both 
authors claim equal ownership of the text. 
Article 1 
Marila, M. 2015. Pragmaticism—the new possibility of a scientific 
archaeology as seen in the light of the history of archaeology. In Today I 
Am Not the One I Was Yesterday: Archaeology, Identity, and Change. 
Papers from the Fourth Theoretical Seminar of the Baltic 
Archaeologists (BASE), Archaeology and Identity, Held at the 
University of Helsinki, Finland, October 8th–10th, 2009, and the Fifth 
Theoretical Seminar, Archaeology Today: Things to Be Changed, Held 
at the University of Tartu, October 27th–29th, 2011, edited by A. Haak, 
V. Lang, and M. Lavento. Interarchaeologia 4. 
Article 2 
Marila, M. 2014. Things in action—interpreting the meanings of things in 
archaeology. In Sounds Like Theory. XII Nordic Theoretical 
Archaeology Group Meeting, 25–28 April 2012 Oulu, edited by J. 
Ikäheimo, A.-K. Salmi, and T. Äikäs. The Archaeological Society of 
Finland. 
Article 3 
Marila, M. 2017. Vagueness and archaeological interpretation: a sensuous 
approach to archaeological knowledge formation through finds analysis. 
Norwegian Archaeological Review 50(1), 66–88. 
Article 4 
Marila, M. 2018. Finnish reactions to New Archaeology. Fennoscandia 
archaeologica 35, 19–47. 
Article 5 
Marila, M. and Sørensen, T.F. Between the facts: speculation in the history 
of archaeological thinking. Unpublished article manuscript.
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We must be systematic; but we must keep our systems open. In other words, 
we should be sensitive to their limitations. There is always a vague ‘beyond’, 
waiting for penetration in respect to its detail. (Whitehead 1956, 8) 
Since the beginning of my studies in archaeology I have been fascinated with 
how attempts to provide a conclusion to an archaeological problem only tend 
to unleash further questions. This peculiarity has led me to develop an interest 
in the theoretical and philosophical aspects of archaeology. What interest me 
about archaeological theory in particular are archaeologists’ attempts to 
conceptualise the intellectual process by which we expand our knowledge from 
the observation of archaeological facts to accounts of the unobserved lived past 
realities. At times this step from ‘mere observation’ of the archaeological 
record to the ‘explanation’ or ‘understanding’ of what happened in the past can 
appear as a speculative leap of faith. The speculative nature of this leap has 
been a cause for epistemological anxiety in archaeology for as long as the 
discipline has existed. In this sense, I have also developed a specific interest in 
the study of the history of archaeology from the viewpoint of the speculative 
leap of faith, and I find myself fascinated by how archaeologists have dealt with 
the anxieties introduced with speculation. 
This thesis, then, is a product of my interest in the history of archaeological 
speculation. In the historiographic sense, the thesis is a comparison of the 
many conceptualisations of the nature and limits of archaeological knowledge, 
the process and logical form of knowledge formation, and the role of 
speculation in it. Some refer to this area of research vaguely as archaeological 
theory, while sometimes the terms ‘metamethodology’ or ‘metaarchaeology’ 
are used in referring to archaeologists’ critical self-reflection on those 
philosophical and practical aspects that are relevant for archaeological 
knowledge production (Embree 1992; Klejn 2001). For this purpose, I, 
however, have chosen to use the term ‘epistemology of archaeology’ 
throughout the thesis. Partly, then, this thesis is an exercise in the history of 
the epistemology of archaeology. In order to fulfil its objective to become a 
comparative study in the epistemology of archaeology, the thesis provides both 
a historical and a philosophical take on the changing epistemologies of 
archaeology from the empiricism of 19th century culture historical archaeology 
to the positivism of New Archaeology, and to the semiotic approaches of the 
late 20th century interpretive archaeology. 
The material used for this study consists of the archaeologists’ own 
published reflections on their discipline. In this sense, following the 
distinction between archaeology proper and metaarchaeology, one should 
distinguish between archaeological research and archaeologists’ 
epistemological reflection on their research. Especially in Finnish archaeology, 
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epistemological reflection is rarely incorporated in research reports or 
publications and, as result, the epistemological positions of individual 
researchers has had to be deciphered from a narrow body of theoretical texts—
that is, from what archaeologists say they do rather than from what they have 
done. This is also to say that the ‘real’ history of archaeological speculation 
(how specific archaeological ideas are born and become verified or falsified) 
would be a huge undertaking and therefore falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
In addition to its emphasis on matters of the history of archaeology, the 
thesis, more importantly, sets out to formulate a speculative epistemology for 
an archaeology to come. In this contemporary and anticipatory sense, the 
views presented in the thesis can be seen to connect with so-called neo-
empiricist archaeological theory and the ensuing speculative attitude. While 
the history of the epistemology of archaeology is to a large extent a history of 
separation between ontology and epistemology, in recent archaeological 
theory epistemological questions have come to be replaced with ontological 
concerns and the idea that metaphysical speculation can be empirically 
relevant. To some extent, this ‘ontologisation’ of archaeological theory has 
taken place with the expense of epistemology. Therefore, in using the 
ontological discussions in recent archaeological theory as its main impetus, 
the thesis aims to both explore the epistemological relevance of speculation in 
archaeology and to formulate a speculative epistemology of archaeology that 
is faithful to the history of the epistemology of archaeology, hence the term 
‘speculative epistemology’ in the title of the thesis. In terms of philosophical 
inspiration, the type of speculative epistemology of archaeology argued for in 
this thesis draws mainly from two intellectual traditions, continental 
metaphysics and classic pragmatism. Recent continental metaphysics 
provides a philosophical background for much of the ontological 
considerations presented in the thesis, while the epistemological extent of the 
thesis draws heavily from classic pragmatism. As a historical and philosophical 
synthesis, the aim of the thesis is to present an ontologically responsible and 
empirically sensitive account of the epistemology of archaeology for the 21st 
century. 
The epistemology of archaeology, and philosophy of archaeology in 
general, occupy a peculiar space in the topology of the humanities (e.g. Wylie 
2013, 107). On the one hand, the epistemology of archaeology draws very 
liberally from a host of different philosophical traditions. At times, this 
freedom in choosing approaches or philosophies as food for theoretical 
inspiration can make the epistemology of archaeology appear internally 
conflicted to scholars viewing it from within discrete philosophical schools or 
systems of thought. The rigour or level of detachment that is characteristic of 
much of analytical philosophy, for instance, cannot necessarily be found in the 
philosophy of archaeology. On the other hand, as part of archaeology rather 
than philosophy of science, the epistemology of archaeology can appear as an 
antithesis to the practices of archaeology. The very concrete nature of 
archaeological materials and the pragmatic hands-on character of its 
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methodologies can render theorising redundant or distant for the concerns of 
the practising archaeologist. The immediate aim of this thesis, however, is not 
the construction of a systematic philosophy fit for the purposes of established 
forms of archaeology. Because philosophy can exclude nothing, it should never 
start from systematisation (Whitehead 1956, 2; Debaise and Stengers 2017). 
Following this sentiment, the thesis aims to highlight that a priori 
conceptualisations of what archaeology is or should be are epistemologically 
and ontologically untenable positions. 
For the very same reason, the thesis does not aim to validate any of its 
necessarily eclectic theoretical and philosophical arguments against an 
existing body of factual archaeological evidence, material or literal. Rather, as 
belonging to the primary stage of investigation, the thesis is a collection of 
speculations and ‘partly-baked ideas’ (Good 1962; 1970), a clearing of 
conceptual ground for more fruitful ideas to flourish. As such the thesis should 
be read as an assemblage of fragmentary and introductory notes towards a 
speculative attitude in the philosophy of archaeology, hence, again, the choice 
of words in the title of the thesis. However, the fragmentary style should not 
be read as an apology for intellectual half-heartedness or theoretical 
undecidedness. Rather, the fragmentary style of the thesis highlights the fact 
that philosophies or theories are not monolithic systems or schemas that have 
to be followed dogmatically. Theorising as process—as opposed to theory as 
form or representation—always comes as weak and disjointed, mobile and 
decentred, or unfinished and fragile (Stewart 2008; Lucas 2015; 2019; 
Pétursdóttir and Olsen 2018; Sørensen 2018). 
Although this thesis is first and foremost an exercise in theorising about 
theory, unfinishedness is also the capacity through which theories find their 
connection with things of a more concrete nature. “Like things, theory doesn’t 
simply add up and make sense” (Pétursdóttir and Olsen 2018, 113). I would 
feel worried if, in the end, theories, any more than things, did add up and made 
sense. Insofar as the aim of this thesis is the examination of the gap between 
archaeological things and archaeological practices on the one hand and 
archaeological knowledge and archaeological theorising on the other, it does 
so by highlighting that the archaeological process, whether practical or 
theoretical in nature, is characterised by an intimate sense of unfinishedness, 
uncertainty, wonder, and speculation. This is to say that the uncertainty and 
unfinishedness introduced by speculation are not to be taken as 
epistemological shortcoming that have to be compensated for by accumulating 
more data or by inventing increasingly rigorous procedures of 
experimentation and falsification (c.f. Achinstein 2019). There is, then, no 
clear distinction between facts-based knowledge and non-evidential 
speculation. 
Ultimately, this thesis argues for a conception of speculation beyond its 
pertinence for either metaphysics or evidential reasoning. Speculation does 
not only address the past as the object of archaeological research but, through 
the examined pasts of the discipline, its imagined futures as well. The 
insecurities introduced by speculation and unfinishedness have to be seen as 
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opportunities for a more sensitive and considerate archaeology. The job of 
speculation in this context is to intensify the feeling that archaeology deals 
with a multiplicity of actual and possible matters of concern, both past and 
present.
  9 
 
 
 > ! 
Any great new theoretical framework has an epistemological and an 
ontological aspect to its philosophy as well as an axiological one, and one 
needs to understand all three aspects in order to grasp the deep aspiration 
and idea of the theoretical framework. (Sørensen et al. 2011, 213) 
-7'-40-2%6='328)<8%2(%-173*8,)8,)7-7
In the history of the epistemology of archaeology, the archaeologists’ 
conceptualisations of the nature and limits of archaeological knowledge are 
often contextualised within a framework of successive paradigms or 
intellectual traditions (Hill 1991; Lucas 2017). In the historiography of 
archaeology, the common rundown of these intellectual traditions often 
sounds like this: 
For about a hundred years since the birth of modern archaeology in the 
1830s, archaeologists mainly felt that archaeological knowledge is 
ultimately dependent on the careful collecting, description, and 
classification of archaeological material. For these so-called ‘traditional 
archaeologists’, knowledge of the past would follow as a matter of course 
with no need for a clearly formulated theory of knowledge or a method of 
explanation. Therefore, in epistemological terms, much of traditional 
archaeology was naively empiricist (Lucas 2012). 
In the course of the 1950s, a group of young archaeologists started to 
question the naive empiricism of the traditional archaeology. For these 
‘new archaeologists’, traditional archaeology’s lack of a clearly defined 
method of explanation rendered it a matter of subjective impressions 
rather than objective (scientific) knowledge. In epistemological terms, 
New Archaeology aimed to be positivist rather than empiricist, and 
mainly subscribed to the principles of Hempelian philosophy of science. 
The principal goal of the new archaeologists, then, became the 
establishment of law-like regularities that would allow the causal 
explanation of past processes with a new level of certainty. David Clarke, 
one of New Archaeology’s most famous proponents, has characterised 
the emergence of New Archaeology as the loss of disciplinary innocence 
and theoretical naivety (Clarke 1973). 
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, as result of the emergence of 
postmodernism, the New Archaeology was superseded by what is 
generally referred to as ‘interpretive archaeology’ (Hodder et al. 1995). 
Members of the interpretive archaeology movement argued that the 
methodological purism, and the linked idea of objectivism, of the New 
Archaeology had led to a simplification of the subject matter. For 
interpretive archaeology, the task of the archaeologist was the 
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understanding of cultural diversity rather than the explanation of it by 
recourse to a specific method of inference. In epistemological terms, 
interpretive archaeology turned to a host of structuralist and 
poststructuralist theories—as well as phenomenology and 
hermeneutics—rather than philosophy of science for aid in 
understanding the diversity of past meanings. Those who did engage in 
matters of epistemology mainly argued that archaeological knowledge is 
result of a special kind of dialectics between archaeological facts and 
archaeological theories. In some sense, then, the interpretive 
archaeology can be seen as a return to the subjectivism of traditional 
archaeology (Harris 2018, 86). 
Although this highly cliched view of archaeology as a succession of 
monolithic programs with possibly conflicting epistemological principles and 
research objectives is becoming increasingly less appealing as result of more 
nuanced and detailed research into the history of the epistemology of 
archaeology (Article 4, p. 37; Lucas 2019 is a good example), the division 
nevertheless highlights an important aspect to the discipline’s history. Most 
importantly, the division reflects archaeology’s fundamental epistemological 
anxieties ranging from the epistemic pessimism of traditional archaeology to 
the epistemic optimism of the New Archaeology and, ultimately, to the 
epistemic pessimism of the interpretive archaeology. In this sense, the division 
reflects the changing attitudes towards the relationship between 
archaeological materials and archaeological theorising, or observation of 
archaeological facts and knowledge of the past. And this is where the source 
for the oscillation between archaeology’s epistemic pessimism and epistemic 
optimism lies. The aim of archaeology as a scientific discipline is to make 
knowledge claims that are based on facts, but because the observed 
archaeological evidence is contemporary rather than ‘in the past’, knowledge 
claims about the past become inferential rather than facts-based. In the 
epistemology of archaeology, this discrepancy between archaeological 
evidence and archaeological knowledge is commonly referred to as the 
‘interpretive dilemma’ (Wylie 1989a; 2002; Lucas 2012; Chapman and Wylie 
2016). If this dilemma is taken seriously, all archaeological knowledge can be 
deemed speculative rather than facts-based. 
In the epistemology of archaeology, different strategies have been adopted 
to solve this dilemma or to compensate for it (c.f. Chapman and Wylie 2015; 
Lucas 2019). In the course of the history of archaeology, the compensation has 
taken place on two levels which could be called the epistemological level and 
the ontological level. The ontological level consists of the construction of 
cosmological regularities or ontological superstructures, a “metaphysical 
pathos” (Lovejoy 1964) through which the past and the present can be seen as 
metaphysically connected—or detached. If we return to our simple but useful 
division of the history of archaeology, for traditional archaeology the idea of 
an unchanging cultural ethos on the one hand and that of cultural evolution 
on the other provided the means of extracting knowledge from the 
archaeological material (Article 4; Pohjola et al. 2019, 27). In addition, 
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historical knowledge of the nature or character of a contemporary culture was 
taken as the reliable starting place for reaching into the past which, both in the 
ontological and the epistemological sense, was considered more or less 
fragmentary and partial (c.f. Lucas 2012). As result, the past became to be seen 
as an extension of history, albeit paradoxically simultaneously metaphysically 
detached from it due to the material nature of the archaeological evidence (as 
opposed to the textuality of historical sources), a fact that tended to render 
traditional archaeology a matter of subjective speculation (Smith 1955; 
Thompson 1956; c.f. Wylie 1989a, 19; Article 5). 
For the New Archaeology, the interpretive dilemma was only an issue if one 
were to hold on to the empiricism of traditional archaeology. For New 
Archaeology, then, the major bridging concept between the activities in the 
past and the observation of archaeological facts in the present was that of 
process. Whereas traditional archaeology had largely hinged on the concept of 
Darwinian evolution, both in terms of natural and cultural change, the New 
Archaeology adopted a more detailed view of evolutionary processes. In 
particular, New Archaeology saw the identification of spatially specific yet 
universally causally determined processes as the prerequisite to 
understanding cultural change temporally. With the help of natural laws, and 
the observation of formation processes in the present, processual theory aimed 
to establish behavioural laws that could be used as covering laws in explaining 
the peculiarities in the archaeological material. The irony (and aporia) was 
that those laws that were supposed to explain the observed data were 
empirically derived from it, a shortcoming that brought the positivistic New 
Archaeology as an epistemological program to an end in the course of the 
1970s (Article 4). 
For interpretive archaeology, the ontological connections between the past 
and the present were human language, human cognition, and the human body 
as universal structural frameworks through which humans have rendered 
their experience meaningful and through which the ideas and experiences of 
past individuals can be recovered (see, especially, Leroi-Gourhan 1986; 
Articles 2 and 3). Although more recent iterations of interpretive archaeology 
have come to place increasing emphasis on the materiality of artefacts as the 
connecting medium, early interpretive archaeology in particular can be viewed 
as a return to principles of the idealist strand of traditional archaeology. In 
both, material culture is seen as an expression of ideas rather than as a means 
of adaptation to a natural environment, as was the case with New Archaeology. 
The thing that sets interpretive archaeology apart from traditional archaeology 
is the idea that, although we share a cognitive, intellectual, and bodily basis 
with the individual of the past, the past is simultaneously ontologically 
detached from the present because our experience, cognitive or bodily, is 
necessarily coloured or biased by the social and political realities of our time. 
For much of interpretive archaeology, then, this ‘situatedness’ of the 
researcher makes the past a matter of the present; a construction that is only 
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meaningful in the context of present ideological, political, social, or cultural 
realities (Article 2).1 
Some strands of contemporary archaeological theory can be seen as 
extensions of this anti-historicism of interpretive archaeology, and a number 
of authors have come to support the view that the past exists as a mode in and 
of the present rather than as the past (e.g. Hodder 2001; Lucas 2005; Harrison 
2011; Olivier 2011). In this sense, the present can be seen as an unfolding of 
every moment in time; of every “material past” (Witmore 2015, 52), of each 
fleeting presence, and of all imagined futures. Recent iterations of interpretive 
archaeology therefore also share the empiricist standpoint of traditional 
archaeology, only with a somewhat different understanding of what 
empiricism means (see below). 
It is important to notice that the uniformitarian constants presupposed in 
the ontological level by the respective archaeologies have been directly aimed 
to compensate for the uncertainties and insecurities that plague the 
interpretive dilemma on an epistemological level. The epistemological level, 
then, concerns conceptualisations of the nature of the intellectual or 
inferential process that takes place at the archaeologist’s end. In the course of 
the history of archaeology, these conceptualisations have tended to follow, in 
broad terms, the tripartite division into inductive, deductive, and abductive 
reasoning (Part Three; Article 3, pp. 72–73). The predominant form of 
inference in traditional archaeology is often seen as inductive (inference of rule 
or generalisation from observation of individual cases) whereas New 
Archaeology’s model of inference—fashioned along the principles of 
positivism—is fundamentally deductive (inference to the veracity of a 
hypothesis from observation and rule). Compared to New Archaeology, 
epistemological concerns were not central to the theoretical considerations of 
interpretive archaeology. However, those who did continue the epistemology 
program initiated by the New Archaeology mainly came to conceptualise the 
common forms of archaeological inference as variants of abductive inference 
(inference from observation to possible explanation, or inference by analogy) 
(Articles 1, 3 and 4; Part Three). Be that as it may, in general, interpretive 
archaeology marks the beginning of a widespread marginalisation of interest 
in matters of epistemology in archaeology, a trend that has brought the 
epistemology of archaeology to near extinction in the 21st century (Chapman 
and Wylie 2016, 30; Lucas 2019, 57). 
The marginalisation of the epistemology of archaeology has mainly 
happened as result of the so-called ‘ontological turn’. The ontological turn 
forms a distinctive turning point in the intellectual history of anthropology and 
social sciences at large (Figure 1; Alberti and Bray 2009; Alberti et al. 2011; 
Alberti 2016a; Heywood 2017; Holbraad and Pedersen 2017; Domanska 
2018). As a movement that mainly developed as a counterpoint to modernist 
                                               
1 Following this line of thinking, one can characterise the idealism of interpretive archaeology as a 
form of subjective idealism, against which the idealism of some strands of traditional archaeology 
appears as a form of objective idealism in which ideas are seen as habits in and of the world rather than 
as residing in individual consciousnesses. 
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or colonialist notions of culture and identity in indigenous studies and 
anthropology (Kohn 2015), the ontological turn has come to denote a more 
widespread appreciation of the uncanny, unexpected, and irreducible nature 
of the real and, by inclusion, of the objects of scientific research. Therefore, the 
movement is driven by the notion that the objects of research always remain 
irreducible to the researcher’s adopted strategies of sense-making. In general, 
then, the ontological turn has resulted in increasing interest in forms of 
speculation rather than ways of knowing (Part Two). 
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In archaeological theory in particular, the ontological turn has resulted in 
the need to revise the discipline’s established notions of ontological constants 
as well as its theories of knowledge production, signification, and meaning-
making, but most importantly the dualist and modernist train of thought that 
these theoretical formulations are often founded on (Alberti et al. 2011; Harris 
and Cipolla 2017). In this sense, the ontological turn’s shift in theoretical focus 
from representation to ontological sovereignty has challenged the pertinence 
of the highly formal approaches to archaeological inference that came to form 
the backbone of the epistemology of the New Archaeology, but also the 
inherently anthropocentric semiotic and hermeneutic approaches of the 
interpretive archaeology. After the ontological turn, the common critique has 
become that these theoretical positions are based on an unnecessarily clear 
distinction between the objects of knowledge (ontology) and the methods of 
knowing (epistemology) (Articles 2–4). 
Moreover, although archaeology has always been a discipline of things, the 
recent interest in ontology has challenged the anthropocentrism of these 
epistemological approaches. The common argument in archaeological theory 
has become that the reductive anthropocentrism of archaeology ends up 
simplifying the variety of the past by treating it as an entity that can come to 
be objectively known or represented through established scientific methods or 
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theoretical concepts. The common notion in archaeology after the ontological 
turn, then, has become that, rather than resulting in increased levels of 
understanding, methods like excavation and typology or concepts like 
stratigraphy and origin may, paradoxically counter to their objective to make 
sense, turn out to be antithetical to understanding because the messy state is 
part of the very nature of the existence of the materials of archaeology 
(Gonzalez-Ruibal 2006, 121; Bogost 2012; Pétursdóttir 2017; Sørensen 2017). 
These concerns have mainly been voiced as part of the research on 
contemporary and emerging archaeological materials, such as nuclear waste 
and ocean drift matter (e.g. Holtorf and Högberg 2014; Pétursdóttir and Olsen 
2018; Pétursdóttir 2019; c.f. Harrison and Breithoff 2017). 
As already noted, the ontological turn marks a radical marginalisation of 
epistemological concerns in archaeological theorising, but rather than having 
resulted in total extinction of epistemology in archaeology, its questions have 
had to be rethought or redesigned. The epistemology of archaeology, in terms 
of direct relevance to the concerns of the ontological turn, has mainly taken 
form as a ‘return to empiricism’ (Articles 3–4; Hillerdal and Siapkas 2015; 
Witmore 2015; c.f. Marila 2018; Lucas 2019, 57–59). This return, however, is 
not a return to the empiricism of traditional archaeology, but is characterised 
by the idea that, unlike for traditional empiricism, knowing is not an operation 
between a knowing subject and a knowable object. Instead, the new 
formulations of empiricism in archaeology highlight that knowing also takes 
place between objects in the broader sense of the term, and that as much as 
our knowing of the world depends on its constituents it also hinges on 
speculations as to how the objects of our attention interpret each other.  
To understand speculation as a form of empiricism is not necessarily an 
unanticipated twist. The meaning is apparent in the late Latin noun speculatio 
(observation) and the classical Latin verb speculari (observe, explore), both of 
which suggest an empirical rather than metaphysical meaning for the term 
speculation. However, the critical addition is a move from the descriptivism of 
traditional empiricism towards viewing empiricism in terms of its creative 
capacity. This entails a rethinking of epistemology as a form of anticipatory 
world-making; an entanglement of matter and meaning in which the two 
terms participate and co-constitute each other (e.g. Barad 2007; Kirby 2011). 
For new empiricism, then, the epistemological practices of archaeology are 
seen not simply as descriptive of its evidence but also creative of its ontologies. 
This becomes evident in the sense in which new empiricism sees knowledge 
and interpretation as distributed operations in the world rather than simply 
limited to the relationship between being and thinking. As result, 
archaeology’s theorists have come to question the pertinence of developing 
increasingly objective methodologies and instead underscore the importance 
of theoretical and methodological naivety and a sense of wonder in front of 
archaeological things in the hope that they can challenge or alter our 
established conceptualisations of them (e.g. Harrison 2011; Pétursdóttir 2012; 
2014; Witmore 2012; 2014; 2015; Alberti 2016b; c.f. Lucas 2019, 58–59; see 
also Articles 3 and 5 for references and discussion). 
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The following statement characterises the entanglement between 
ontological and epistemological concerns in this position well: 
The differences in the ways an archaeologist and a stream of melt water 
negotiate an abandoned mining town are of degree, not kind. Rushing 
water washing against concrete pillars will ‘interpret’ or ‘feel’ the 
concrete surface as well as any hermeneut or phenomenologist. (Olsen 
et al. 2012, 10) 
In other words, the return to empiricism is marked by the idea that, in order 
to remain ontologically sensitive, the epistemology of archaeology has to 
include as meaningful not only those modes of experience and interpretation 
that characterise human experience of the surrounding world but also those 
which take place between archaeologically relevant materials and lifeforms 
devoid of human presence. Hence the term ‘new materialisms’ that is used 
later in the thesis to refer to the type of speculatively oriented and ontologically 
sensitive archaeology outlined here (Witmore 2014; Moffat 2019). Because 
object-object relations are characterised by similar degrees of uncertainty and 
underdetermination to human interpretation, our understanding of these 
modes of interpretation remains speculative rather than explanatory. By 
extension, then, the return to empiricism also marks the beginning of a 
speculative epistemology of archaeology—hence the term ‘speculative turn’ 
discussed later in the thesis as a reference to the increasing centralisation of 
speculation in philosophy and archaeology after the ontological turn 
(Edgeworth 2016). 
If the return to empiricism represents one half of archaeology’s 
epistemology after its marginalisation in the wake of the New Archaeology’s 
demise, the other half of it is directly linkable to those discussion in the 
epistemology of archaeology that brought down the New Archaeology as an 
epistemological program in the first place (e.g. Kelley and Hanen 1988; Wylie 
2002). Whereas the new archaeologists argued that the most efficient method 
of archaeological inference follows the certainty of deductive reasoning, 
deductivism’s critics highlighted that archaeological inference takes place in a 
variety of forms of inductive and abductive reasoning. In particular, the view 
that the epistemology of archaeology is fundamentally inductive and 
abductive, rather than deductive, highlights that, instead of following a clearly 
laid out logical schema, archaeological inference takes place as a form of 
dialectics between materials, theories, and scientific practices (c.f. Chapman 
and Wylie 2015; 2016). In this sense, the objective of those scholars who stayed 
with archaeology’s epistemology has been to reconcile between the extreme 
forms of objectivism characteristic of New Archaeology and the extreme forms 
of relativism characteristic of interpretive archaeology (e.g. Hodder 1991, 10; 
VanPool and VanPool 1999; c.f. Wylie 1992). In this sense, recent engagements 
in evidential reasoning in the epistemology of archaeology are inherently 
linked to the concerns of the ontological turn through their interest in matters 
of multivocality, indigenous ontologies and epistemologies, and the 
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pragmatist view of knowledge as a matter of values and interests (e.g. Alberti 
and Marshall 2009; Nicholas and Markey 2015; Chapman and Wylie 2016; 
Domanska 2018). In general, then, this epistemological position can be 
characterised by the notion that “using a method of multiple working 
hypotheses that incorporates traditional knowledge-derived evidence can 
push archaeologists towards unanticipated conclusions, which thus increases 
objectivity” (Nicholas and Markey 2015, 301–302, emphasis original). 
This thesis situates itself within and in response to the two recent strands 
of the epistemology of archaeology sketched above; the return to empiricism 
and the tradition of evidential reasoning. The primary sense in which the 
thesis should be seen as belonging to the ontological return to empiricism is 
that the thesis takes many of the philosophical considerations of the 
ontological turn as starting points for a speculative epistemology of 
archaeology. In general, these include, for instance, the idea that the materials 
of archaeology are inherently irreducible to the methods of archaeology, as 
well as the idea that archaeological knowledge is ‘emergent’, that is, more than 
the sum of its parts, of the materials, methodologies, theories, and practices of 
archaeology. However, whereas the return to empiricism is driven by the 
realisation that the commonly adopted epistemological strategies of 
archaeology can possibly end up simplifying or concealing the complexities of 
the past, the criticism is often put forward in ways that do not remain sensitive 
to the history of the discipline itself. The ontological turn, then, more often 
than not, is characterised by the dismissal of the deep history of the 
epistemology of archaeology. This is to say that attempts to reformulate the 
epistemology of archaeology along the principles of speculative thinking 
should also remain sensitive to the history of the discipline itself.  
In connecting with the history of evidential reasoning in archaeology, much 
of the thesis aims to analyse the history of the epistemology of archaeology, 
but it does do by remaining critical of the tendency in the history of the 
epistemology of archaeology to see speculation as a point of elimination. 
Whereas the history of the epistemology of archaeology is essentially a history 
of the elimination of speculation in hope of greater degrees of certainty, this 
thesis aims to highlight speculation as a force of creation. The task of 
speculation in this context is to remain sensitive to the idea that the effects of 
pursuing a particular hypothesis or upholding a particular epistemological 
position are possibly partial to the creation of the past, not only representative 
of it. In this sense, this thesis seeks a position between scientistic conceptions 
of objectivity and constructionist commitments to relativism. As pointed out 
by Moffat (2019, 4), speculation, although an important method to think 
beyond the immediately experienced or the commonly sensed, is not some 
positivist “miracle tool for messy issues”. There is therefore a continuing need 
for discourse on archaeological logic even within a speculative archaeology. 
The central objective of this thesis, therefore, is to work towards an 
epistemology of archaeology that at the same time remains empirically 
sensitive to both the history of the discipline and the ontological concerns 
brought forward after the ontological turn. As such, the thesis explores the 
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role, nature, and limits of archaeology’s epistemology after the ontological 
turn. The aim of the thesis is to sketch an epistemology of archaeology that is 
conservative enough to be rooted in the familiar but also radical enough to take 
speculation seriously as an epistemological notion. As pertains to these aims, 
the central question explored in the thesis is as follows: 
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Contrasting against the paradigmatic genealogy of archaeology briefly 
outlined above, and in sketching an answer to the interpretive dilemma, this 
thesis argues that the future of archaeology is a speculative one. A speculative 
archaeology, in this vaguely paradigmatic sense, stands on the one hand as 
asymmetrical to the naturalism, scientism, and methodological monism of 
New Archaeology and its positivistic idea of symmetry between explanation 
and prediction (Article 4). On the other hand, speculative archaeology forms a 
clear counterpoint to the reductive anthropocentrism, social constructionism, 
and representationalism of interpretive archaeology (Articles 1–3, and 5). The 
starting point for the critique placed by speculative archaeology against 
preceding traditions of thought, however, is not a complete denial of reduction 
but rather the realisation that, to a large extent, the reductive strategies have 
been founded on clear cut dichotomies between world and mind, real and 
represented, or material and ideal. A speculative epistemology of archaeology 
wishes to avoid these ontological divisions as starting points (Articles 2 and 3). 
Rather than to simply distinguish itself from the intellectual histories of 
archaeology, speculative archaeology, like all successive paradigms or 
disciplinary traditions, also combines elements from them. As a genealogical 
lineation, speculative archaeology is deeply sympathetic to the empiricism and 
impressionism of traditional archaeology (most importantly to its assumed 
theoretical naivety), but it also subscribes to some of the ideals of the 
epistemologically driven and methodologically ambitious New Archaeology 
(Article 4). The concept of process for instance is as central to speculative 
archaeology as it was to New Archaeology, but in a somewhat different sense 
of the term (Part Two; Article 2). Most importantly, speculative archaeology is 
also strongly affiliated with the ways in which interpretive archaeology has 
developed into during the recent ten or fifteen years with its methodological 
freeness oriented towards the ‘mere description’ of the diversity of the past 
rather than ‘explaining it away’ (Article 3). The concept of interpretation, for 
instance, albeit in a radically extended form, is as important for speculative 
archaeology as it was, and still is, for interpretive archaeology. 
In explicitly philosophical terms, the thesis draws its inspiration from two 
traditions of thought: (1) the very broad genre of speculative philosophy, and 
(2) American pragmatism. The first, speculative philosophy, can be roughly 
divided into two schools. One is the type of speculative process philosophy put 
                                               
2 Fast forward to Conclusion for the short answer. 
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forward most notably by Alfred North Whitehead in the early 1900s and 
developed further in the course of the 20th and the 21st centuries by the likes of 
Gilbert Simondon, Gilles Deleuze, Isabelle Stengers, and Didier Debaise 
(Article 5). This so-called ‘constructivist’ approach to speculation as creation 
of concepts, ideas, techniques, practices, and other speculative devices, rather 
than speculation as metaphysical analysis, should be distinguished from the 
‘speculative realist’ approaches that have come to dominate much of 
continental thinking during the recent 10 or 15 years (Article 3; Kouw and van 
Tuinen 2015; Wilkie 2018; c.f. Bryant et al. 2011a; Harman 2018b). While the 
designation ‘speculative realism’ can be a bit of a misnomer, this thesis draws 
much of its speculative inspiration from those strands of thought that can be 
loosely grouped under it. In addition to the various forms of new materialism 
and object-oriented ontology, Graham Harman’s object-oriented take on 
speculative realism in particular forms an important philosophical frame of 
reference. Article 3 in particular references Harman’s work and explicitly 
argues for an empirically sensitive philosophy of archaeology fashioned along 
the ontological principles of Harmanian speculative realism. Furthermore, 
although the constructivist Whiteheadian process philosophies and the object-
oriented speculative realisms are no doubt very different in many respects, for 
example in their view of the relationality of the object, the intention of this 
thesis is not to seek out the ways in which the positions conflict. More 
important for a fruitful take on the importance of speculation in the context of 
the epistemology of archaeology is to emphasise the individual strengths of 
and possible similarities between these seemingly conflicting philosophical 
systems (c.f. Shaviro 2011; Ivakhiv 2014). 
The second tradition of thought which forms an important philosophical 
backdrop for this thesis, and perhaps more so in terms of epistemology than 
ontology, is classic American pragmatism, especially as formulated by Charles 
Peirce towards the beginning of the 20th century. Peirce’s systematic 
philosophy has provided an important frame of reference for discussing the 
nature of archaeology as a science after the marginalisation of the 
epistemology of archaeology in the wake of New Archaeology’s decline 
(Articles 1–4). In outlining the scientific attitude for archaeology, Article 1, for 
instance, draws heavily from Peirce’s pragmaticism, and the concept also 
receives increasing attention towards the end of this thesis (Parts Three and 
Four). Again, given that during the recent couple of decades, the ontologies 
and epistemologies of archaeology have been inspired largely by the 
aforementioned forms of speculative philosophy as well as pragmatism, and 
keeping in mind that these philosophical schools are connected in many ways, 
the underlying objective of the thesis has from the start been to seek out 
common ground rather than points of difference between these philosophical 
traditions (c.f. Crossland and Bauer 2017; Newell 2018). This is mainly 
achieved by an exposition of how the processes of inference and interpretation 
have been conceptualised in these philosophies. Whereas much of analytical 
philosophy of science has conceptualised scientific inference as either an 
inductive or deductive logical schema, speculative realism, process 
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philosophy, and pragmatism have emphasised the importance of open-ended 
philosophical systems. In terms of outlining the epistemology for a speculative 
archaeology, a critique of induction and deduction has been necessary to a 
certain degree. As an alternative, I have emphasised the relevance of abductive 
logic in the process in which things around us are made sense of, an approach 
that finds much of its impetus in pragmatism and speculative process 
philosophy, both of which have contributed to the emergence of archaeology’s 
new empiricism (Article 3). 
In contrast to induction and deduction, then, abduction highlights the need 
for an open-ended conceptualisation of knowledge production as process 
rather than form, a view that is well-established in pragmatism, process 
philosophy, new materialisms, and contemporary theories on the 
epistemology of archaeology. While the traditional positivist view of the 
epistemology of archaeology has tended to treat propositions or speculations 
as subject to testing, verification, or falsification against an observed factual 
reality, speculative archaeology sees speculation as the creative force behind 
scientific inquiry (Articles 4 and 5). This means that the whole process 
commonly referred to as science should be understood as partial to producing 
its own materials and its own facts rather than as a process separate from the 
object of research, and that the establishment of scientific facts remains a 
matter of anticipation. This, in turn, highlights the epistemic relevance of 
future anticipation rather than past explanation (Articles 1, 2, and 5). The 
result is not an epistemology in search of causal explanations or a theory of 
understanding, but one that sees both explanation and understanding as 
inherently anticipatory and uncertain. This view has become well established 
in archaeological theory and heritage discourse, mainly in the context of so-
called Anthropocene thinking, a concept that highlights human history as an 
emergence or an unfolding between various forms of materials and 
processes—none of which are purely cultural or natural—with longstanding 
but inherently uncertain and unpredictable effects (González-Ruibal 2006; 
2018; Dawdy 2009; 2010; Solli 2011; DeSilvey 2012; Holtorf and Högberg 
2013; 2014; Edgeworth et al. 2014; Wurst and Mrozowski 2014; Harrison 
2016; Harrison et al. 2016; Högberg and Holtorf 2016; Dawney et al. 2017; 
Högberg et al. 2017; Olsen and Pétursdóttir 2017; Pétursdóttir 2017; 2019; 
Ståhl et al. 2017; Brewer and Riede 2018; Domanska 2018). 
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This thesis is based on five research articles, written between 2011 and 2018 
and published between 2014 and 2018. Written over a period of eight years, 
the articles also reflect the personal development that has taken place during 
that time. Work that began in early 2012 as a monograph on abductive 
inference in archaeology and developed into a more general exposition of 
pragmatist philosophy and semiotics in archaeology finally saw light in form 
of individual articles that address those topics from different perspectives. In 
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order to further highlight the processual nature of the research, the five articles 
are presented in the chronological order in which they were originally written. 
Article 1 was prepared as a conference presentation for the 2011 Baltic 
Archaeological Seminar held in Tartu, Estonia, while Article 2 was prepared 
for the 2012 Theoretical Archaeology Group organised in Oulu, Finland. Both 
articles were later published in their respective conference proceedings. It 
should be noted that at the time of the completion of these articles, the thesis 
was still being prepared as a monograph. Nevertheless, most of the ideas 
presented in the articles are still relevant five years after their publication. 
Articles 3–5 were prepared as journal articles intended for inclusion in the 
thesis, and they therefore better reflect the overall ambitions of the thesis. Like 
parts of the thesis, Articles 3–5, or parts of them, were presented at workshops, 
seminars, conferences, lectures, and other formal meetings throughout the 
writing of the thesis. Parts of Article 3 were presented at a workshop on 
abduction organised in Tallinn and Helsinki in 2014, at a conference on 
vagueness in Copenhagen in spring 2017, and at the 2017 meeting of the 
European Association of Archaeologists in Maastricht. Parts of what became 
Article 4 were presented in Helsinki in late 2016, as well as in Cambridge, UK, 
in the summer of 2018. Article 5 was originally prepared as a long talk for the 
Saxo Institute’s archaeology Friday seminar series in Copenhagen in late 2017, 
and the paper was developed into an article manuscript together with Tim 
Flohr Sørensen during 2018. 
In terms of contents, Article 1 lays the foundations for a scientific attitude 
and an open-ended conceptualisation of the epistemology of archaeology. 
Drawing heavily from Charles Peirce’s philosophy of science, the article argues 
that, in light of the history of archaeology, a scientific attitude rather than a 
strict conceptualisation of a preferred scientific methodology is needed in 
order to retain an empirical openness that at the same time allows new 
observations to make sense (be meaningful) but also allows them to shape or 
alter pre-existing theories. It is argued in the article that a narrow 
conceptualisation of the scientific methodology ends up leaving a host of 
phenomena outside the scope of archaeology, and that instead an empirically 
sensitive philosophy and a fallibilistic and melioristic attitude are needed to 
compensate for methodological narrowness. While some of the ideas 
presented in the article have become less appealing to me over the years 
(especially Peirce’s at times almost aseptic view of scientific inquiry), the 
overall argument for fallibilism and meliorism in science fashioned along the 
lines of Peircean pragmaticism remains extremely important (Part Four, 
Chapter 15). Some of the article’s main points are discussed further in Part 
Four of the thesis. 
Article 2 similarly draws from Peirce’s philosophy but concentrates more 
explicitly on his semiotics. The article reviews archaeological 
conceptualisations of meaning as a semiotic concept. Again, in accounting for 
the history of archaeology, the article argues, through a discussion on what has 
come to be termed Hawke’s ladder, that the empirical attitude of traditional 
archaeology, contrary to the charges from its critics, retains a certain empirical 
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sensitivity towards the archaeological. The article argues that both the 
positivist view of the past as a collection of materials and events and the 
structuralist notion of meaning as an extra dimension added onto the material 
are based on the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter. Most 
importantly, the article argues that, to a large extent, the usefulness of 
semiotics for archaeology has been too hastily dismissed as anthropocentric 
by scholars subscribing to the philosophical principles of speculative realism 
and object-oriented ontology (c.f. Crossland and Bauer 2017; Newell 2018). In 
attempting to save semiotics from the charge of anthropocentrism, the article 
highlights that not all semiotics is semiology (cf. Saussure 1990). The article 
then proposes that the semiotic concept of habit as an evolutionary concept is 
critical for conceptualising semiotics as a valuable approach for an 
ontologically responsible epistemology of archaeology. Habit as anticipated 
rather than actualised and materialising rather than ideal forms an important 
ontological concept in the article and, it is suggested, an alternative to the 
synchronicity and hidden structuralism of the relationist strands of 
speculative thinking in archaeology. In other words, the article argues that 
materials are not expressions of ideas or a canvas to be filled with meaning, 
but rather that both materials and meanings exist as anticipatory. The 
philosophical considerations behind the article are discussed further in Part 
Two of the thesis. 
Article 3 goes further into outlining an ontologically responsible 
archaeological empiricism after the speculative turn (see also Part Two). It is 
argued in the article that fundamentally intellectual conceptualisations of the 
process of archaeological research end up dismissing an important aspect of 
inference and knowledge formation, namely the role of senses and 
corporeality. The article therefore argues that much of archaeological 
knowledge is personal and tacit and therefore beyond logical evaluation or the 
intellectualism of critical analysis. In providing a take on ambiguity and 
vagueness as both ontologically and epistemologically relevant aspects to 
phenomena, the article proposes that an abductive ‘logic of vagueness’ is 
needed in order to create empirically sensitive but epistemologically 
systematic accounts of the past. While Article 1 laid some foundation for the 
role of abduction as part of the epistemology of archaeology, Article 3 further 
elaborates on the nature of abduction as an aesthetic and creative logic of 
vagueness. The article should therefore be read as a call for a return to 
empiricism in archaeology, only fashioned along some of the principles of 
speculative philosophy. In order to advance the attempts towards an 
empirically sensitive epistemology of archaeology, and keeping in mind that, 
in general, references to actual archaeological materials presented in the thesis 
are scarce, special effort is made in the article to showcase the relevance of 
tacit or bodily forms of knowledge in the analysis of Finnish Neolithic 
ceramics. The role of abduction in archaeology as a creative logic is further 
discussed in Parts Three and Four of the thesis. 
Of all the articles, Article 4 is the most detailed foray into the history of 
archaeology, and should be read as a historical contextualisation of the 
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theoretical and philosophical considerations presented in the other four 
articles. Although the thesis in general aims to steer away from the tedious but 
common case study as an attempt to verify the proposed theoretical ideas 
against a specific concrete body of materials, Article 4 can be considered such 
a case study. By reviewing the few explicitly epistemological reactions by 
Finnish archaeologists to New Archaeology, the article argues that the 
common view of Finnish archaeology as atheoretical is misguided. The article 
highlights that the epistemological principles and objectives of the explicitly 
theoretical New Archaeology had already been considered in traditional 
Scandinavian and Finnish archaeology (or the Scandinavian variant of new 
archaeology) at the time of Anglo-American and British New Archaeology’s 
introduction and dissemination in the late 1960s. Furthermore, regardless of 
the charge of naive empiricism by the proponents of New Archaeology, the 
article argues that not all traditional archaeology is theoretically naive in its 
view of the process of knowledge formation, but that the empiricism 
characteristic of traditional archaeology is to some extent congruent with some 
of the principles outlined for a speculative archaeology in this thesis. It is 
argued in the article that the relative slowness of Finnish archaeology in 
matters of archaeological theorising should be seen as a form of deliberate and 
systematic openness or empirical sensitivity that resists theoretical 
reductionism and methodological simplification. In light of the recent 
developments in archaeological sciences, the addressed theoretical sensitivity 
can contribute towards a more epistemologically sensitive and ontologically 
inclusive archaeology. The social implications of the results of this article are 
discussed in Part Four of the thesis. 
Article 5 is an explicit call for the conceptualisation of the methodology of 
archaeology as intimately speculative rather than based on hypothesis-testing. 
The article is theoretical and speaks for the deep irreducibility of speculation 
in archaeology by highlighting the discipline as a practical, material, and 
empirical philosophy in itself. In order to highlight archaeology as a material 
philosophy, special reference is made to the speculative philosophy of 
Whitehead and, more importantly, to recent new materialist archaeological 
theorising. Through the concept of the possible, the article argues that 
speculation should be considered as a force of creation rather than as fuel for 
hypothesis-testing, and that the job of speculation is to keep the 
epistemological system of archaeology open to possibility rather than 
elimination and/or proof. Speculation in this sense can be seen as a method of 
“questioning, doubting and wedging in other possibilities than those 
canonised or currently verifiable” in archaeology (p. 4 of Article 5 manuscript). 
The considerations presented in the article are discussed in further detail in 
Part Two (in regard to the ontological considerations), Part Three (in regard 
to the history of the epistemology of archaeology), and Part Four (in regard to 
the broader social implications of speculation in archaeology and science) of 
the thesis. 
The contents of the original articles and the implications of their results for 
the future of archaeological theory are elaborated, discussed, and summed in 
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the course of three parts and a short conclusion. In light of the views expressed 
in the original articles, some concepts have resisted the oscillations of 
academic trends better than others during the nearly ten years in which the 
articles were written, and may appear today as more important than others for 
the task of outlining a speculative epistemology of archaeology. While the 
concept of speculation was not initially central to the work, it came to serve as 
an umbrella term for the ideas presented in the individual articles. In addition 
to serving as a connecting concept for the articles, speculation, as well as other 
connected concepts such as causality, emergence, and aesthetic interpretation, 
also mark a gradual shift in narrative focus from ontological to epistemological 
concerns in Part Two and Part Three, and finally to their more explicit 
synthesis in Part Four. These parts, then, take the concept of speculation as 
both a point of departure as well as a point of connection in discussing the 
many perspectives raised in the five articles. In this sense, the thesis seeks to 
move beyond simply repeating the arguments presented in the articles, and 
special effort is made to contextualise the articles in a broader narrative 
framework of both philosophy and archaeology, but also to discuss the 
relevance of their results in the more general context of science. 
Part Two is a general exposition of the important ontological (but also 
epistemological) considerations of archaeology after the ontological turn, most 
importantly in terms of the new materialisms’ and speculative realism’s 
impact in archaeological theorising, but the part also explores the common 
ground between new materialisms, speculative realism, and the process 
philosophies of Whitehead and Peirce, most importantly in terms of 
Whitehead’s speculative philosophy and Peirce’s semeiotic. The part begins by 
introducing the effects of the emergence of new materialisms and speculative 
realism in archaeology, and explores the nature of interpretation in light of 
such central concepts as causality, emergence, and aesthetics. The part argues 
that, contrary to the uniformitarian conceptualisations of the ontological 
constants in the epistemology of archaeology, interpretation is an 
undetermined and emergent process. Interpretation, then, both in terms of 
material and immaterial relations, is understood as a process of aesthetic 
causation and aesthetic translation rather than as either a form of mechanical 
causality (material) or an activity of the mind (immaterial). The ontological 
concept of ‘transduction’ is introduced in elaborating on the nature of causality 
as an interpretive operation in the ontological sense, but the concept is also 
explored in order to highlight the interrelatedness of ontology and 
epistemology as fundamentally aesthetic. It is argued in the part that the sense 
in which transduction is understood in speculative realism and process 
philosophy as an aesthetic force of creation is actually an ontologised version 
of Peircean abduction. The part then also argues that the sense in which the 
object of inquiry withholds itself in Peirce’s conceptualisation of semiosis 
connects his philosophy with particular aspects of Harmanian speculative 
realism, a point that has been missed in the 21st century critique of the 
applicability of semiotics in archaeology (Article 2). 
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Part Three turns from the ontological discussion more explicitly to matters 
of epistemology and is an exposition of the history of the epistemology of 
archaeology. The main objective of the part is to demonstrate that the general 
thrust of the epistemology of archaeology has been to treat speculation as a 
point of elimination. In particular, the part reviews the history of 
archaeological inference from the viewpoint of the common conceptions of the 
process of knowledge production, namely induction, deduction, and 
abduction. Again, rather than reiterating the arguments made in the original 
research articles, the part focuses on topics that remain inadequately exposed 
in them. In addition to providing a more informative account of the history of 
the epistemology of archaeology, the differences between induction and 
abduction in particular receive special attention in the part. As a conclusion, 
the part introduces a general typology of archaeological inference. 
Part Four is a synthesis of the considerations presented in Part Two and 
Part Three. By remaining faithful to the ontological considerations presented 
in Part Two, the objective of Part Four is to argue for the relevance of 
speculation in the epistemology of archaeology beyond hypothesis-testing. 
Following the ontological principles set in Part Two, and in expanding on the 
epistemological discussion provided in Part Three, Part Four explores the 
epistemological significance of speculation beyond its metaphysical relevance. 
The part then argues for a correspondingly loose, vague, and open-ended 
understanding of the epistemology of archaeology. The part includes a general 
closing discussion on the implications of adopting a speculative attitude in the 
epistemology of archaeology. Most importantly, the part argues that a science 
founded upon the principles presented in the thesis is an inclusive science that 
can take into consideration those alternate modes of existence and 
understanding that tend to fall outside the scope of the narrow scientistic 
understanding of the real. In particular, the part discusses the concept of 
epistemological open-endedness, but in order to avoid common sense realism, 
the part argues that a sense of epistemological hesitation is needed. The part 
then makes a case for a ‘slow archaeology’ and proposes practical 
countermeasures for the increasing reliance on the testimonial power of 
natural scientific methods in archaeology, a development that has tended to 
render the methods of the humanities unreliable and speculative, unless 
corroborated or verified by scientific methods. The resulting slow archaeology, 
it is argued, is a civilised archaeology that moves beyond dominant 
conceptualisations of the methodology of proper science as the prerequisite 
for reliable knowledge as well as the ensuing forms of epistemological and 
ontological dominance in the politics of science. 
Finally, the main parts are followed by a Conclusion that briefly 
recapitulates the main arguments and results of the thesis.
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There is no such thing as an isolated fact: [...] Hence any experience, however 
factual, is saturated with interpretations, ideas and multiple links. (Debaise 
and Stengers 2017, 15) 
#-8,(6%;22)773*3&.)'87
The views expressed in this thesis should partly be seen in the context of the 
wider development that has taken place in the sciences and the arts during the 
end of the 1900s and the early 21st century. This development, generally placed 
under the wide and vague umbrella term ‘new materialisms’, is marked by a 
renewed interest in the material rather than the ideal (e.g. Dolphijn and van 
der Tuin 2012; Witmore 2014; Hodder and Lucas 2017; Cipolla 2018). As such, 
new materialisms can be seen as a reaction to the development that took place 
in the humanities in the latter half of the 20th century as result of 
postmodernism. Counter to the idealism and social constructionism of 
postmodernism, the new materialist conviction in archaeology entails that 
archaeology should develop ways of theorising that do not reduce phenomena 
to signs, text, discourse, or other inherently human, ideal, or social constructs, 
as was common in the archaeological theory of the 1980s and the 1990s (Olsen 
2003). Furthermore, the criticism from new materialisms is not limited to the 
constructionism of interpretive archaeology. The scientism and logical 
formalism of New Archaeology has similarly been subjected to critique by 
those archaeologists who seek to develop materially sensitive ways of 
conceptualising knowledge in archaeology. As result, the positivist 
epistemologies of New Archaeology and the structuralist or poststructuralist 
theories of signification and representation characteristic or interpretive 
archaeology have become replaced with ontologically sensitive, non-
anthropocentric, and non-dualist ontologies (see especially Harris and Cipolla 
2017 for an introduction to the history of dualist thinking in archaeology, and 
González-Ruibal 2013 for a collection of essays that outline an archaeology 
beyond the tropes of modernity). In broad conceptual terms, new materialisms 
in archaeology, like in philosophy, can be seen as a shift from epistemology to 
ontology, or rather as an increasing acceptance of the deep entanglement of 
these concerns. 
In the epistemology of archaeology, the material turn, with its idea of 
entanglement between epistemology and ontology, has entailed a need for 
novel conceptualisations of the distinction between the material and the ideal. 
As an attempt to move beyond predominantly hierarchical conceptualisations 
of the relationship between the object of knowledge and the process of 
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knowledge production, the relationship between the material and the ideal has 
in the new materialist archaeological theory in the early 2000s been discussed 
partly in terms of a ‘relational ontology’. Although relational ontology has a 
much deeper pedigree (Benjamin 2015), important philosophical influences 
for early relational thinking in archaeological theorising have included, for 
example, Bruno Latour and Manuel DeLanda. The philosophies of Latour and 
DeLanda have challenged the modernist idea of science as an ontologically 
neutral epistemological activity. Instead Latour’s and DeLanda’s conceptions 
of relationality have emphasised the entangled and inseparable nature of 
technologies, societies, things, and knowledge practices. Latour’s Actor 
Network Theory (e.g. 1987) and DeLanda’s assemblage theory (e.g. 2006), in 
particular, contributed towards the emergence and development of a variety 
of so-called ‘symmetrical’ approaches in archaeology during the early 21st 
century (Olsen 2003; 2007; 2010; Witmore 2004a; 2006; 2007; Normark 
2006; Ingold 2007; Webmoor 2007; 2012; Shanks 2007; Webmoor and 
Witmore 2008; Hodder 2012; Lucas 2012. See also, for example, Harrison 
2011; Hamilakis 2013; Barrett 2014; Harris 2014; Alberti 2016a; Bille and 
Sørensen 2016; Miller Bonney et al. 2016; Hamilakis and Jones 2017). 
Although initially, symmetrical archaeology developed as a branch of social 
archaeology, it has, somewhat ironically, been marked by increasing interest 
in the material rather than the social. Nevertheless, the objective of 
symmetrical archaeology has been to reconsider the material extent of the 
social. Whereas earlier studies of materiality in social archaeology tended to 
treat the material as an expression or mediation of the social, or people and 
things as a type of agential dialectics (e.g. Gell 1998; Meskell and Preucel 
2004; c.f. Knappett 2012), symmetrical archaeology wanted to dissolve the 
idea of mutual intentionality that was built into these early theories on 
materiality (Olsen 2003; Webmoor and Witmore 2008). The crucial step, 
then, was to avoid the bifurcation between things and people in the first place. 
As result, material relations became seen as symmetrical to rather than as a 
function of social relations. In this sense, symmetrical archaeology as social 
archaeology sought to formulate an ontologically responsible 
conceptualisation of materiality as an element of the social realm, a point that 
is also crucial to outlining the backdrop of this thesis (see also Article 3).  
Nevertheless, in trying to conceptualise human-thing relations from a flat, 
non-hierarchical perspective, symmetrical archaeology was charged for 
flattening out other important distinctions such as animate/inanimate, and 
intentional/non-intentional (see Olsen and Witmore 2015 for a recap of the 
critique). According to the critique, conceptualising humans as yet another 
category of things risked rendering notions such as change, power, or ethics 
redundant. In order to react to the critique, more recent iterations of 
symmetrical archaeology have adopted a somewhat altered conception of 
relational ontology. Whereas symmetrical archaeology was initially fashioned 
on Latour’s early relational ontology that saw things as relational through and 
through, more recent formulations of symmetrical archaeology draw partly 
from the speculative realism of Graham Harman and especially his idea of 
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‘withdrawnness’, meaning that objects retain an inner reality that remains 
withheld from all relations (e.g. Harman 2002; 2005; Olsen and Witmore 
2015; For the distinction between early and late Latour see, for example, 
Harman 2009; 2014).  
When Harman (2002) argues that things are not simply sums of relations 
between their constituents but withdraw or withhold from these relations to a 
certain degree, he makes an ontological distinction that is as critical for the 
objectives of symmetrical archaeology as it is for the aims of this thesis. 
Because all objects remain to an extent withheld from relations, they resist 
reduction to their social effects, such as ethics or politics for instance. On the 
contrary, according to some proponents of symmetrical archaeology, we have 
a special kind of epistemological mandate to care for things by resisting their 
very humanisation (Domanska 2006; Olsen et al. 2012; Pétursdóttir 2012; 
Webmoor 2012; Witmore 2012; c.f. Sørensen 2013). 3  In this sense, 
withdrawnness as the inexhaustible source of ontological novelty is an 
important concept for outlining an epistemology that can account for novelty 
as an ontological notion. 
In many ways, the evolution of symmetrical archaeology reflects the 
development that has taken place in new materialist and speculative 
philosophy from the material semiotics (Law 2004) or material hermeneutics 
(Ihde 1998) of science and technology studies to speculative realism during 
the recent 15 years (c.f. Bryant et al. 2011a). Whereas the early 
(post)structuralist currents of new materialist philosophy emphasised 
relationality with the expense of essence, recent speculative attempts to think 
about relationality have attempted to avoid this distinction altogether (Article 
2; Fowler and Harris 2015).4 Contemporary symmetrical archaeology then 
adopts the idea of the withdrawnness of things as a counterstrategy and argues 
that, although there may be things that do not concern themselves with ethics, 
there is no realm of ethics that is free from material entanglements (e.g. Olsen 
et al. 2012; Olsen and Witmore 2015; see also Edgeworth 2016; Campbell et 
al. 2019). Olsen and Witmore (2015, 191) elaborate on this position: “Humans 
are thingly beings among others, but that, of course, does not imply that we 
deny the differences that distinguish us from other beings.” And they continue: 
For the record, symmetrical archaeology embraced, from the beginning, 
the irreducibility of things—no thing can be exhausted by any other 
thing—and this was closely connected to the notion of manifestation, of 
translation, as a counter to reductive understandings of representation. 
                                               
3 It should be noted that, unlike early Latour, DeLanda’s take on relational ontology does not reduce 
its constituents to relations (e.g. DeLanda 2011; c.f. Fowler and Harris 2015; Hodder and Lucas 2017). 
4 Interestingly for the epistemology of archaeology, this development also parallels the oscillations 
between natural sciences (essence) and humanities (relation). While archaeology as a balancing act 
between humanism and scientism has tended to adopt structuralism and positivism as its theoretical 
framework, the humanities have tended to draw much of their inspiration from poststructuralism. 
Speculative philosophy interestingly inherits fragments of poststructuralist thought, mainly in form of 
the critique of the network, and symmetrical archaeology has followed suit. It would, however, be 
misguided to characterise symmetrical archaeology as poststructuralist; a more fitting term would be 
‘posthumanist’. See also Articles 2 and 3. 
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It has always emphasized how all entities in the world are equally 
thingly, but this is not a denial of difference. Quite the opposite, in fact. 
Both relationality and non-relationality are to be held in symmetry. 
(Olsen and Witmore 2015, 194) 
Or, as Chris Witmore writes in a more recent recapitulation of symmetrical 
archaeology, 
[s]ymmetrical archaeology radically recomposes the definition of 
things, not as objective matter against subjective qualities, not as the 
relational opposed to nonrelational, not as the nonhuman 
counterpoised to the human—things have no opposites—but rather as 
autonomous entities or units that cannot be broken down into their 
components or reduced to their effects. (Witmore 2019, 2) 
In this sense, the object-oriented ontology (OOO for short) version of 
symmetrical archaeology is not only motivated by seeking ontological 
symmetry between humans and things, but also the asymmetries and 
inequalities that haunt the relationships between all things (see for example 
Harman 2018a, 112–113; Campbell et al. 2019). An archaeology fashioned 
along the principles of speculative realism then asks “how much do we really 
know about the objects we think we are familiar with? What further as yet 
unknown aspects will one day reveal themselves, or recede, or remain forever 
untapped and buried in the object’s withdrawn inner core” (Edgeworth 2016, 
96)?5 
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Before further discussing the principles introduced by new materialist or 
speculative realist archaeologies, it is worth noticing that they find much of 
their impetus in the so-called ‘speculative turn’, a term that part of the multi-
faceted new materialist and object-oriented speculative philosophies of the 21st 
century are often grouped under. In terms of the historical significance of the 
speculative turn, Bryant and his colleagues (2011b, 1) see the term as 
equivalent and reactionary to the linguistic turn of early 20th century. As such, 
the speculative turn seeks alternatives to both the analytical tradition, most 
notably logical positivism, as well as structuralism, poststructuralism, and 
other traditions that centre around text and discourse, but also 
phenomenology due to its centralisation of the human body (e.g. Avanessian 
and Malik 2016). The shared objective in the arts after the speculative turn, 
                                               
5 One distinction to be kept in mind at this point is that between speculative realism and scientific 
realism. Although the two share the conviction that reality exists as independent of observation, they are 
separated by the degree to which they see reality as knowable. Whereas scientific realism holds that the 
real can be modelled, constructed, and approached by using scientific methods, speculative realism 
claims that the only way to orient towards the real is through metaphor, even though it can never be 
directly encountered (c.f. below). 
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then, has become the decentralisation of the human agent, as we have seen has 
been the case in the corresponding strands of archaeological theorising as well.  
In addition to Graham Harman’s object-oriented speculative realism, a 
similarly influential figure in contributing to the speculative turn has been 
philosopher Quentin Meillassoux (Articles 2 and 3). In After Finitude, 
Meillassoux (2008) coins the term ‘correlationism’ to refer to the view 
characteristic of Western philosophy that thought and existence are 
inseparable. According to Meillassoux, 
one could say that up until Kant, one of the principal problems of 
philosophy was to think substance, while ever since Kant, it has 
consisted in trying to think the correlation. [...] During the twentieth 
century, the two principal ‘media’ of the correlation were consciousness 
and language, the former bearing phenomenology, the latter the various 
currents of analytic philosophy. (Meillassoux 2008, 6) 
These correlationist philosophies, in Meillassoux’s view, have failed in 
thinking the essential and instead have sought to seek out whether 
mathematics, natural laws, logic, language, divinity, history, thought, the 
body, or some other superstructure could be considered as the most originary 
correlation. Avoiding correlation, therefore, has become the uniting objective 
for the speculative turn, and speculation in this context means more than 
simply hypothesising; it refers to thinking beyond human finitude 
(Meillassoux 2008). 
The defining question for Meillassoux’s speculative philosophy becomes 
how to think that which lies beyond thinking, how to think about the essential 
independently of the relation between being and thinking? Although the 
question appears paradoxical and sophistic at first, Meillassoux ties it to the 
questions of modern science by problematising correlation in relation to what 
he calls ‘ancestral questions’. Broadly speaking, the subject matter of ancestral 
questions predates human consciousness altogether. In effect, the questions 
posed by cosmology, geology, or palaeontology that deal with matters of 
extreme temporal distance belong to this category. The problem of ancestrality 
then entails whether ancestrality can ever be thought of as meaningful in-itself 
rather than as ultimately meaningful only for the cosmologist, for the 
geologist, or for the palaeontologist. In the context of archaeology, the problem 
of ancestrality entails a division between being able to think of the past either 
on its own terms or as reductive to or as representational of the ‘for us’. For 
Meillassoux, this ‘for-us’ is the codicil or addendum that prevents the 
correlationist from breaking free from the ‘correlationist circle’ which is held 
together by the idea that, even if we do believe in a reality that exists 
independent of our thinking, we can only grasp that reality by thinking it. In 
other words, we cannot think something existing outside thought without 
turning it into a thought, thereby committing a pragmatic contradiction 
(Meillassoux 2012). 
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However central to the speculative turn, the views put forward by 
Meillassoux have by no means been generally accepted. One central argument 
in the criticism has been that correlationism is a straw man, and that the 
problems identified by Meillassoux have been widely acknowledged and 
addressed in post-Kantian philosophy, equally in hermeneutics and 
phenomenology as well as within the analytical tradition. As Peter Hallward 
(2011, 137) notes, even for an idealist there is little difference in principle 
between thinking what happened six billion years ago from thinking what 
happened yesterday. The same is undoubtedly true for archaeology. 
“Geologists and archaeologists need to infer independent and prior existence 
of things irrespective of the date of the evidence they happen to be working 
with, whether or not it contains traces of humans or other living things” 
(Edgeworth 2016, 105). The real problem, then, is not that the correlationist 
would not be able to think that which predates thinking. “[U]ntil Meillassoux 
can show that we know things exist not only independently of our thought but 
independently of our thinking them so, the correlationist has little to worry 
about” (Hallward 2011, 138, my emphasis; c.f. Meillassoux 2012). In other 
words, part of the critique aims to point out that thought can mean two 
different things. On the one hand, to think of something is to make it present 
to the mind, but on the other hand to think something is “to point at its reality 
insofar as it lies beyond its presence to the mind” (Harman 2011, 67).6 
Whether correlationism is a straw man or not is of little consequence. The 
potency of Meillassoux’s philosophy lies elsewhere. In his attempt to break free 
from the correlationist circle, Meillassoux reconsiders the concept of 
contingency. Meillassoux argues that the ‘finitude’ of thought postulated by 
correlationism is result of thinking of necessity as absolute; necessity is what 
gives rise to the idea of the intellect as finite (see, also, Whitehead 1956). For 
the correlationist, then, the laws of nature or of logic are determined by the 
idea of the necessity of a superior law while, for the anticorrelationist, 
[e]verything could actually collapse: from trees to stars, from stars to 
laws, from physical laws to logical laws; and this not by virtue of some 
superior law whereby everything is destined to perish, but by virtue of 
the absence of any superior law capable of preserving anything, no 
matter what, from perishing. (Meillassoux 2008, 53) 
Meillassoux thus argues that only contingency is absolutely necessary, and he 
suggests that the chief concern of philosophy should not be what must be, but 
instead what may be (Hallward 2011, 130). As Hallward again teaches us, in 
Meillassoux’s philosophy, 
                                               
6 The criticism is partly misleading because Meillassoux also contends that we cannot break free of 
the correlationist circle even if we wanted to (e.g. Harman 2018b, 124–125). See also Kouw and van 
Tuinen (2015), who charge Meillassoux for upholding a type of scientism. This charge is based on the 
fact that Meillassoux, following his teacher Alain Badiou (2004), considers mathematics as the method 
for attaining the absolute (c.f. Harman 2018b, 139). Whether After Finitude, or Badiou’s Infinite Thought 
for that matter, can really be read as a glorification of hard sciences remains an open question. 
  31 
 
 
[r]ational reflection encourages us to posit the absence of sufficient 
reason and to speculate about the potentialities of this absolute time: it 
is only our experience, precisely, that holds us back. Our ordinary 
sensory experience discourages us from abandoning a superstitious 
belief in causality. (Hallward 2011, 133) 
The main question for a speculative philosophy then becomes, how one could 
become free of the confines of experience in order to speculate on what 
experience could entail beyond its imagined confines?7 
An important implication of Meillassoux’s philosophy for the type of 
speculative archaeology outlined in this thesis is that phenomena can and 
should be thought of as radically underdetermined. Because any particular 
cause could give rise to a multitude of different events, an event cannot be 
explained with recourse to a particular general cause (Meillassoux 2008, 88). 
This asymmetrical conceptualisation of causality, founded upon the principle 
of absolute contingence and the conversion of Hume’s problem of induction 
into an opportunity, positions Meillassoux within the realm of speculative 
realism (Hallward 2011). Furthermore, in this context, the term realism in 
Meillassoux’s speculative realism is not a reference to that which predates 
thinking, but rather to what comes after thinking: a fact can only be described, 
not founded (Meillassoux 2008, 39). 8  I will return to the implications of 
radical underdetermination for the epistemology of archaeology in Part Four. 
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The idea of radical underdetermination goes right to the core of modern 
science and challenges one of its underlying ontological principles, the idea of 
causation. All scientific (or scientifically credible) thinking can be said to hinge 
on the idea of the cosmos as a Newtonian machine-like system where the turn 
of one cog results in corresponding degrees of revolution in others. In this 
sense the system is governed by a rule of causation; any effect can be reduced 
or tracked to a particular cause, and, furthermore, that cause will have similar 
effects in the future. Causality is therefore also a central ontological concept 
for the epistemology of archaeology (c.f. Marila 2013). The importance of 
causality in archaeology’s epistemology has mainly been researches as a 
component of archaeological explanation, and in this respect, especially in 
New Archaeology, explanation has relied on the law-likeness of causal 
                                               
7 Arguments similar to Hallward’s have been made by Harman (2018b, 139–140), who notes that 
Meillassoux treats correlationism as a matter pertaining to time rather than space. In other words, 
whereas Meillassoux sees contingency and the evolution of the laws of nature as an event, Harman 
contends that there is no reason why, at any given instance, different laws could not govern different 
parts of the cosmos. This view is in accordance with Harman’s anticorrelationist philosophy where real 
objects exist independent of their shared relations. 
8  Furthermore, Meillassoux’s insistence on causation as an aesthetic register that calls for 
description rather than explanation connects Meillassoux in part to the speculative philosophy of Alfred 
North Whitehead (Shaviro 2011; Thomas 2017). See also Whitehead (e.g. 1956) for the myth of finite 
facts as the basis for the idea of the finite intellect. 
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processes as the connecting ontological constant between the present and the 
past (Salmon 1982; Gibbon 1989; Wylie 1989a; Articles 2, 4, and 5). The cause, 
then, in order to be necessary rather than probabilistic, would have to be 
‘natural’ rather than ‘cultural’ because cultural causes can be regionally 
specific and arbitrary. In this sense, causal necessity or universal law-likeness 
is an ontological rather than an epistemological claim. In Article 2, I explicitly 
argued that those universal constants that we normally tend to conceive as 
laws of nature are nothing more than habits of acting, however slow-changing. 
This is an important cosmological notion that should be kept in mind when 
considering how novelty is possible in the first place and how interpretation, 
in the widest sense of the term, has to be anticipatory in respect to this novelty. 
What correlationism highlights is that modernist dualist ontologies are 
founded on a distinction between causation and interpretation, or the idea that 
reality is a system governed by the immutable rules of physical causality, while 
the human subject or the human interpreter gradually comes to know these 
laws through empirical observation, and devices causal explanations 
accordingly. Interpretation in this sense is seen as fallible in a way that the 
physical reality is not, and interpretation is seen to be governed by different 
rules than the mechanical universe.  
This is the context in which Artur Ribeiro (2018a; c.f. 2018b) has criticised 
the use of causal explanations in archaeology and instead calls for a type of 
anthropological holism. Anthropological holism sees explanation not as based 
on mechanistic causation or a priori conceptions of the law-like causes behind 
action. Instead, anthropological holism accounts for the historical delineation 
of discrete or particular social habits. The starting point for this view is that all 
action is oriented towards producing some sensible effect. Being able to 
understand these future-oriented causes behind particular activities requires 
knowledge of the context and conventions that are connected to that particular 
activity. It is, for example, possible to explain the production of specific shapes 
in rock art with reference to particular physiological or neurological states, but 
this reference to some quasi-mechanical causation is only part of the 
explanation. It does not, as such, explain why the rock art was done, it only 
connects them to one process, dismissing the cultural and social histories that 
gave rise to the possibility of producing rock art in the first place. If an activity 
is to be explained, the explanation should include these historical 
particularities (Article 2). Needless to say, these historical particularities 
include not only the social, cultural, or political context under study, but also 
the understanding of the mental states of the individuals that belong to, have 
developed with, and make sense in that particular historical context (Articles 
3, and 5).9 
                                               
9  Interestingly, Simmel, in his philosophy of history, referred to understanding (in contrast to 
explanation) as a form of empathy, a method characteristic of the humanities, but especially of arts and 
in the process of relating oneself to the object of the aesthetic experience because our bodies retain the 
acquisitions of many thousands of years of evolution (c.f. Schwartz 2017). In Georg Henrik von Wright’s 
view (1971), the Simmelian differentiation between explanation and understanding introduces 
intentionality as a causal register different from how causation is usually understood in explanation. 
Note that, in the context of archaeology, Binford (1977, 1), for instance, saw archaeological explanation 
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Following this line of thinking, Ribeiro (2018a) gives an account of the 
difference between causal and intentional causation. If, as in Ribeiro’s 
example, the feeling of danger that the presence of a tiger, for instance, incites 
is attributed not to the inherent quality of the tiger to be dangerous but instead 
to the relation between the tiger and another subject that capacitates the 
feeling of danger to take place, then we can say that the relation is an 
intentional one; the tiger is only dangerous to something or someone in 
particular. “Therefore, all intentional actions like fear, hate, love, etc. must be 
actions towards an external object, and not the product of the subject itself” 
(Ribeiro 2018a, 111). This is why Ribeiro refers to the relation between subject 
and object as triadic. In addition to the subject and the object, the relation 
includes what Ribeiro calls ‘context of intelligibility’ (Ribeiro 2018a, 113). This 
triadic relation then concerns not only the relationship between the object and 
the subject, but the historically meaningful context of the activity (c.f. Ribeiro 
2018b, 105). The subject itself, whether the mind or the agentual organism, 
are composed of multiple triadic relations. Ribeiro, in reference to Vincent 
Descombes (2014) refers to these relations as ‘institutions of meaning’. In this 
sense societies consist of multiple centres of experience that nevertheless form 
a superior centre of experience, such as the human individual. It makes no 
sense to assign meaning or causal or intentional agency to any one centre of 
experience as superior in relation to other parts. Rather, these centres make 
sense as relational, or, to account for the aspect of intelligibility, more precisely 
as habitual (Article 2). They are brought or bound together by habits of action: 
The key difference between anthropological holism and a priori theories 
of human sociality [...] lies in the role the past has in relation to a given 
present—with anthropological holism, a discrete group of people 
behave in a certain manner because their history led them to that 
behaviour, while a priori theories establish the behaviour of discrete 
groups of people regardless of their past. What this means is that a priori 
theories ignore particularities—they are merely the results of other 
social forces and not considered as social forces themselves. A social 
archaeology that does not analyse particular history and the events that 
might have changed the course of history of a given group of people will 
inevitably equalize economic and social-cultural individuals across the 
board [...]. (Ribeiro 2018a, 117) 
The concerns expressed by Ribeiro echo the well-established distinction 
between essence and relation, subject and object, or being and becoming, 
which in turn partly constitutes to the troubles in being able to think of the 
object of archaeological inquiry as a process similar to the actual process of 
knowledge production. It is therefore important to notice that Ribeiro’s 
processual view of meaningful human action, as well as its meaningful study, 
is based on a rather unorthodox understanding of the term subject.  
                                               
as a prerequisite for understanding the past subject, whereas the main motivation behind interpretive 
archaeology was to sidestep the problem of explanation by stressing the prehistorian’s obligation to 
understanding. 
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The sense in which Ribeiro understands the subject as processual-
historical rather than static can be clarified by Didier Debaise’s (2017b) 
distinction between two meanings of the term. On the one hand, Debaise refers 
to subject as subjectum, that extent of the term which underneath all of the 
changing appearances and relations retains itself. This is the core of 
subjectivity from which the relational emanates (Debaise 2017b, 54). The 
subjectum, then, is that which feels and comes to form ‘superimposed 
subjectivities’, or societies in Whiteheadian terminology (Debaise 2017b, 56 
refers to Whitehead). These societies are what Ribeiro, in reference to 
Descombes, refers to as institutions of meaning. On the other hand, Debaise 
(2017b, 57) refers to subjectivity as superjacio; the subject not as a fully 
realised subject, but rather as an unrealised tendency or becoming. Debaise, 
however, in a pragmatic fashion opts for the concept of ‘manner’. Manner, 
then, is an evolutionary tendency to feel or witness in a prehensive fashion. 
Debaise writes that the manner is how a subject ‘prehends’ the anterior world 
or how it captures or integrates the anterior world in what it is to become.  
The sense in which Debaise refers to the subject as an unrealised tendency 
follows Whitehead’s idea of the ‘eternal object’, or the ‘how’ of becoming into 
relation (Whitehead 1978; c.f. Harman 2010, 38). In Whitehead’s cosmology, 
there are two types of objects, actual entities, and eternal objects (Whitehead 
1978, 25). While actual entities can be characterised as singular occasions of 
becoming, eternal objects provide the universal qualities and relations and in 
doing so are also fundamental creative causes for actual entities (Whitehead 
1978, 40, 166). “At each ‘moment,’ the universe contracts into a multiplicity of 
points of perspective that are these new subjectivities” (Debaise 2017b, 63).  
This starkly distances Debaise’s position from the conceptualisation of 
causation as bifurcated into interpretation (or what we may term vague or 
uncertain causality) and causation (or mechanical and law-like causality).10 By 
the same token, Debaise also provides a reading of Whitehead’s society as the 
mediation between simple forms of causality and interpretation. As Isabelle 
Stengers contends, the “role of Whiteheadian societies is to produce this 
mediation, that is, to provide the environment that ‘our’ creative experiences 
require, while at the same time avoiding any dualism between ‘habit’ and 
creativity” (Stengers 2017, xviii). Article 2 further elaborates on the concept of 
habit as a form of anticipation. In the article, I argued that meaning as habit 
of action is oriented towards the future (esse in futuro) rather than reducible 
to material parts, causal explanations, or actualised effects. In other words, I 
argued that it is possible to approach things as bundles of habits. Similar 
arguments have more recently been advanced, for example, by Antczak and 
                                               
10 The most commonly cited legacy of Whitehead concerns his critique of the bifurcation of nature 
between the causal, objective nature and a free, subjectively perceived nature (Kouw and van Tuinen 
2015). Whitehead’s concept of bifurcation is often conflated with the concept of dualism, most commonly 
with Cartesian dualism. In his reading of Whitehead, Debaise (2017b, 6), however, makes a further 
distinction between bifurcation and dualism, and states that bifurcation denotes a more fundamental 
concept by which the emergence of dualisms like the Cartesian one can be analysed (c.f. Stengers 2011b). 
Bifurcation, then, is characteristic of the relationship between actual entities throughout the universe, 
but this relationship is not characterised by stability or structure, but by a dynamism, a becoming. 
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Beaudry (2019) under the conceptual framework of the ‘assemblage of 
practice’. 
In steering away from the dualisms of correlationism, speculative realism 
adopts a very different understanding of relations and causality and states that 
a type of ‘global dualism saturates every corner of the universe’, not only the 
traditional relationship between subject and object (Harman 2010, 47, my 
emphasis). In the context of archaeology, I have characterised this 
philosophical move as the ‘pluralisation of interpretation’ (Article 3). This 
pluralisation, in turn, leads to the dissolution of the distinction between 
mechanical causality and contingent interpretation. In this context, 
interpretation is not thought of as a contingent operation between the real and 
the ideal but as a universal mode of relation. What the pluralised conception 
of interpretation then entails in terms of causality is a move from the atomistic 
view of causal relations as mechanistic and necessary towards regarding them 
as arbitrary and ambiguous, unfolding and unexpected. If relation should not 
be thought of as causal in the atomistic sense, the important question becomes 
how exactly do objects relate to each other? In order to answer this question, I 
will argue that a type of open-ended and anticipatory ‘aesthetic causation’ 
characterises interpretation as a pluralised mode of relation. In other words, 
aesthetic causation gives rise to withdrawnness and contingence, but it is also 
the chief operation behind the emergence of novelty. I will below discuss 
aesthetic causation in terms of interpretation, translation, and transduction, 
and I will later return to the topic of emergence. 
After having formulated the principles of his speculative realism in Tool-
Being (Harman 2002), namely the idea of the withdrawnness of objects, 
Harman has to extend his metaphysics to account for object interactions. The 
central question for Harman (2005) becomes how the objects that he 
envisioned as utterly isolated and vacuous can come to form relationships, 
change, and therefore also come to form objects that are more complex than 
their constituents. Harman’s answer is a take on phenomenology. Because 
traditional phenomenology in Harman’s view has been inherently 
anthropocentric, he aims to liberate phenomenology from its carnal 
constraints. In order to do so, Harman visions a novel form of causation that 
he comes to call ‘vicarious causation’. For Harman, vicarious causation alludes 
that 
inanimate causation is trapped in the same puzzling middle ground as 
human perception itself—a no man’s land belonging neither to qualities 
nor to objects, but which is only oriented towards objects, even while 
inhabiting a mysterious plane of tangible elements. All vicarious 
causation unfolds in this elemental sphere, whose inner workings 
remain a riddle. (Harman 2005, 170, emphasis original) 
In other words, Harman contends that the real object is mediated by the 
relational sensual object—which he calls vicar—while the real object remains 
withheld from these relations. In Harman’s OOO, an object is fourfold, 
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consisting of the withdrawn real object, the sensual object that is experienced 
as a distinct durational object, the object’s real qualities that are necessary for 
the object to retain its identity, and the object’s sensual qualities that are 
experienced at any given moment by other individual objects (Harman 2011). 
The question then becomes how an object can understand the inwardness of 
another object and its qualities if those are only indirectly represented by the 
sensual object and its sensual qualities? For Harman (2005; 2018a), the 
central operation that enables sensual objects to mediate real objects is 
metaphor. In this context, metaphor highlights that any attempt to understand 
an object’s experience by recourse to literal description, exhaustive 
explanation, or other reductive strategies will only further alienate us from the 
experience of that object (c.f. Armogida 2018). Harman contends that in 
metaphor, for instance, “wine-dark sea”, we assign to an object (sea) qualities 
(wine-dark) which are not normally associated with it in literalist treatments, 
and that this creative association results in new ways to orient towards the real 
object (sea). The real object, however, remains withdrawn and is replaced by 
the only real object that does not withdraw in the situation; the (in this case 
human) experiencer of the metaphor (Harman 2018a, 84).11 
A similar take on metaphorism is provided by Ian Bogost in his Alien 
Phenomenology (2012). Bogost states that the understanding of an object’s 
perception of the world is only achieved by analogy. In reference to Thomas 
Nagel (1974) famous essay on bat phenomenology, Bogost argues that the way 
a bat navigates cannot be understood from the viewpoint of the bat itself but 
by analogy to, for instance, a submarine. In other words, metaphors function 
in ways similar to how models succeed in conveying something hidden about 
their objects. The heuristic power of the model, or the objective of devising 
models to begin with, is not based on close similarity between the model and 
the object, but instead relies on their differing from each other in some respect. 
In differing from its object, the model allows us to find out something new 
about the object. We then never understand two objects through their 
relationship, like the bat and a cave, or the submarine and the deep sea, but 
through our relationship to the relationship between those two objects (Bogost 
2012, 78; c.f. Armogida 2018).12 In this sense, metaphor connects to what was 
above discussed in terms of the intelligibility of historical meanings. Subject-
object relationships are not intelligible unless they are examined against the 
triadic relationship between them and the world. 
                                               
11 This metaphorical view of orienting towards objects also turns understanding and interpretation 
into matters of what could be termed ‘inter-material empathy’. Consider, for instance, how the concept 
of flow conveys how water—as an omnipresent hyperobject—feels (c.f. Strang 2014). 
12 See also Lucas (2015; 2019) who contends that metaphors are powerful in archaeology precisely 
due to their looseness and mobility. 
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In a somewhat similar fashion, Timothy Morton (2012; 2013) refers to 
material interpretation, material translation, or material transformation of 
information as ‘transduction’. In transduction, information inherent to one 
thing is transduced (translated and transformed) into information pertinent 
to another. A signal perceived by a light sensor, for example, can be 
transformed into sound waves by a transducer loudspeaker.13  There is an 
important insight embedded in this characterisation of material relations as 
transductive. From the viewpoint of the light wave (the transduced) it makes 
no difference whether it is picked up or whether the information it carries is 
translated into sound waves by the loudspeaker (the transducer). The 
transduced remains unaffected by the act, while to the transducer everything 
looks like information (Morton 2013, 158).14 Morton (2013, 157–158) then 
points out that mechanical or ‘clunk causality’, as he terms it, is only one form 
of causality, while the common form is that of transduction. In light of 
transduction, information is not ideal but physical. Furthermore, perception 
is only one aspect of the transduction. As Harman, Bogost, and Morton teach 
us, transformation of information in this fashion is possible because 
perception is only oriented towards objects instead of exhausting their inner 
workings in interpretation: 
Philosophy has perpetually thought causality to be at work ‘behind’ the 
scenes. Perhaps there is a deep existential reason why it does this. It 
does seem to parallel the long history what Heidegger calls the 
forgetting of being, the long march toward objectified lumps. But why? 
There is also an uncanny parallel with what in psychiatry is properly 
called the schizophrenic defense, in which the schizophrenic imagines 
all kinds of causal chains and threads to be at work behind his back. 
What this is blocking is how causality takes place ‘in front of’ things. 
This ‘in front of’ doesn’t mean spatially a few inches away from an 
objective thing, closer to our eyes. It means that causality is the way 
objects talk to one another, apprehend one another, comprehend one 
another: causality is the aesthetic dimension. Some forms of speculative 
realism imagine an abyss of dynamism churning beneath things. OOO, 
by contrast, imagines the abyss to be in front of things. When I reach for 
the coffee cup, I am reaching into an abyss. (Morton 2013, 66–67) 
In thinking of the abyss as the locus of causation, the concept of 
transduction is even more important than Morton implies, and the concept 
                                               
13 Also compare transduction to Gell’s (1998) abduction of agency, where objects acquire agency by 
abducting certain practical properties from humans. 
14 Consider a further case of transduction: the musical record, for instance, cannot be experienced 
in any objective sense. Take any record player and it will repeat (‘represent’) the musical contents of that 
record differently. And even if one could predict the exact qualities of the sound experience, it would not 
undermine the fact that each and every component in the assemblage makes a difference, whether it is 
the stylus, the spinning wheel, or the inner wirings of the loudspeakers. Each component will result in a 
novel entity that is the musical experience in the ontological sense. 
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comes to form an important point of connection between speculative realism 
and process philosophies in terms of their conceptualisation of the nature of 
inference, as we will come to realise. In tracing the genealogy of the concept of 
transduction, we find it in the sociological philosophy of Henri Lefebvre. Much 
to the speculating archaeologist’s delight, Lefebvre treats transduction not 
simply as characteristic of object-object relations, but as a method belonging 
to the realm of the absent and the possible. For Lefebvre (1996, 156), cultural 
absences in particular are the places of the possible and therefore give rise to 
speculative thinking in general. According to Lefebvre, we deal intellectually 
with these absences by the very method of transduction. Transduction, for 
Lefebvre, then, is 
an intellectual operation which can be methodically carried out and 
which differs from classical induction, deduction, the construction of 
‘models’, simulation as well as the simple statement of hypothesis. 
Transduction elaborates and constructs a theoretical object, a possible 
object from information related to reality and a problematic posed by 
this reality. Transduction assumes an incessant feed back between the 
conceptual framework used and empirical observations. Its theory 
(methodology), gives shape to certain spontaneous mental operations 
of the planner, the architect, the sociologist, the politician and the 
philosopher. It introduces rigour in invention and knowledge in utopia. 
(Lefebvre 1996, 151) 
Lefebvre treats transduction as a counterpoint to the classical forms of 
inference, namely induction and deduction. Induction, as inference by 
enumeration and probability, generalises from a series of observations related 
through some type of iconicity or similarity while deduction, as inference by 
necessity, simply states the necessary consequences of a given set of 
arguments. 15  Transduction, in contrast, speculates on the possible 
consequences of a given set of arguments: it is a model for development 
proceeding “from the (given) real to the possible” (Lefebvre 2002, 117–118, 
195–196; Stanek 2011, 168). Transduction, as opposed to induction and 
deduction, is open-ended; it is the intellectual process of relating empirical 
observations to conceptual frameworks in a productive fashion. Lefebvre 
writes that “[transductions] go from the present to the virtual and from the 
given to the possible in a never-ending prospective operation which the usual 
psychological ideas of achievement, prediction and uncertainty cannot 
exhaust” (Lefebvre 2002, 118). Transduction, then, “is a history, a dialectical 
process of becoming” (Lefebvre 2002, 196). 
Lefebvre makes good use of transduction as a heuristic method, but we can 
trace the history of the concept even further back in the history of philosophy. 
                                               
15 Throughout the thesis, I refer to deduction in the narrow logical sense. Deduction denotes a logical 
schema, and I make no distinction between different forms of deductive inference in the sense that 
Hintikka (1998, 512–513), for example, distinguishes between definitory (the set of possible deductions) 
and strategic deduction (which deductions are good or bad). This leads me to state that any reference to 
deduction as inference to something other than logical necessity is a confusion between deduction and 
inductive or abductive inference. 
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Lefebvre’s idea of transduction as a whole history of becoming echoes the 
sense in which Gilbert Simondon (1992), in his general philosophy of 
individuation, treats transduction as a central operation that governs the 
emergence of novelty (c.f. Stengers 2011a; Debaise 2017a).16 For Simondon, 
transduction is the force that ‘dephases’ parts of reality into existence. 
Transduction breaks a part out of its origin and gives it its own identity that 
enables us to consider it as separate from the whole. 17  Transduction then 
“denotes a process—be it physical, biological, mental or social [...]. The 
transductive process is thus an individuation in progress” (Simondon 1992, 
313). Most importantly, much like Lefebvre, Simondon takes transduction to 
challenge the established notions of induction and deduction by stating that 
they can provide at best a limited understanding of individuation. Simondon 
argues that classical forms of logic, namely induction and deduction, cannot 
be used to understand individuation; they can inform us of the results of the 
process of individuation, but not the actual process. What is noteworthy in 
Simondon’s understanding of transduction, then, is that “it is at once a 
metaphysical and also a logical notion,” however, “in no way restricted to the 
logical mind-set” because it does not terminate “in a conclusive proof” 
(Simondon 1992, 313–314). For Simondon (1992, 314), transduction rather 
denotes “the course taken by the mind on its journey of discovery”.  
The similarities between how transduction is understood in speculative 
realism and in process philosophy emphasise the points of connection between 
these philosophies. By the same token, the concept also connects these 
philosophies to pragmatism. As both an ontogenic and a psychic process, 
Simondon’s transduction shares a special affinity with Charles Peirce’s 
concept of abduction. Differing significantly from both induction and 
deduction, abduction, like transduction, is the only kind of logical operation 
that can introduce new ideas (CP 2.96).18 Furthermore, Simondon would seem 
to share the Peircean view that logic is not restricted to formal or sentential 
argumentation (c.f. Part Three). In arguing that transduction is an intuition, 
Simondon is very explicit that there is an intuitive aspect to logic: 
Transduction [...] is not only a path taken by the mind, it is also an 
intuition, since it allows a structure to appear in a domain of 
problematics yielding a solution to the problem at hand. In the sense 
                                               
16 Simondon was most likely inspired by Schelling’s philosophy of nature as well as Whitehead that 
were both included in Merleau-Ponty’s lectures while Simondon was writing his dissertation under 
Merleau-Ponty’s supervision (Austin 2011, 9). See also Bergson (1944) for a vitalist theory of 
individuation. 
17 See also Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 60) who use the term in a fashion similar to Simondon’s. Or 
consider Peirce’s (EP 1, 353) idea of love as the ultimate force of creation and harmony in the cosmos: 
“The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting creations into independency 
and drawing them into harmony.” 
18 Interestingly, in addition to the obvious connection to Peirce, Simondon idea of transduction as 
the logic of discovery connects with Norwood Russell Hanson’s (1958) ideas of abduction as the logic of 
discovery or Gilbert Harman’s (1965) understanding of Inference to the Best Explanation (Article 3; Part 
Three). 
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contrary to deduction, however, transduction does not seek elsewhere a 
principle to resolve the problem at hand. (Simondon 1992, 314–315) 
One central connection between the use of transduction in European 
process philosophy and abduction in Peirce’s semiotic philosophy is the very 
notion of process that Peirce too uses to describe inference (Articles 1–3; 
Marila 2011; see also Part Three). At the heart of Peirce’s epistemology is a 
deep ontological commitment that all of the cosmos takes place as a form of 
pluralised interpretation, a process Peirce refers to as ‘semiosis’: 
All dynamical action, or action of brute force, physical or psychical, 
either takes place between two subjects (whether they react equally 
upon each other, or one is agent and the other patient, entirely or 
partially) or at any rate is a resultant of such actions between pairs. But 
by ‘semiosis’ I mean, on the contrary, an action, or influence, which is, 
or involves, a coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, 
and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way 
resolvable into actions between pairs. (EP 2, 411) 
Whereas dynamical action denotes a kind of brute actuality or relationality 
between two agents (compare with Morton’s clunk causality above), by 
semiosis, Peirce is referring to an increased sense of dynamism between more 
than two subjects. Remember that, in Peirce’s semiotics, semiosis is an 
interpretative process. The smallest unit of signification in this process of 
interpretation is the dynamic and tri-relative sign. The sign, then, consists of 
three elements; (1) the object of the sign (that which is being represented), (2) 
the representamen (that part of the sign which stands for the object in some 
capacity), and (3) the interpretant (the intellectual effect of an instance of 
interpretation). Consequently, semiosis, is not the simple physical act of 
connecting an object with a representation, but instead the process in which 
an object is mediated by a sign interpreted by a conscious subject. Importantly, 
in this process, the resulting interpretation becomes a further developed sign 
of the same object (CP 2.228). As pertains to our earlier discussion about 
transduction as a form of translation and transformation, the interpretant in 
Peirce’s model of the sign can be understood as a form of translation that 
provides a more complex understanding of the object of the sign (Liszka 1996). 
David Savan (1988, 41) has even proposed that the interpretant should be 
called the ‘translatant’. 19  Furthermore, interpretation, for Peirce, is not 
restricted to a thinking interpreter, but semiosis takes place in animals, plants, 
and crystals, an aspect that was also central to Simondon’s philosophy of 
individuation.20 
                                               
19 In this sense, Peircean semiosis, coupled with Simondon’s transduction, provides a way to balance 
between representation and translation. This could have great applicability, for instance, in thinking of 
the faithfulness of archaeological methods in representing the past versus their creative capacity to 
produce it. 
20 See Simondon (1992) for a discussion on transduction in crystals. Furthermore, consider, for 
example, how nonhuman lifeforms interpret an archaeological site and how they are therefore partial to 
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Peirce’s understanding of the process of interpretation can therefore be 
seen simultaneously as ontological and logical, and universal and infinite. In 
elaborating on the unfinished nature of interpretation, Peirce differentiates 
between two meanings of the object of interpretation, the ‘immediate object’ 
and the ‘dynamical object’: 
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,—i.e., the Object as 
represented in the Sign,—and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object 
is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term; therefore:), say 
rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign 
cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to 
find out by collateral experience. (EP 2, 498, emphases original) 
This distinction is important for understanding semiosis as both sign action 
and speculative inquiry. The immediate object can be conceptualised as the 
object as it is mediated or represented by the representamen and interpreted 
by an ‘interpreting thought’ (CP 1.480). The dynamical object on the other 
hand denotes an object that, while it is represented, nevertheless fails in 
determining an interpretant. In this sense the real object remains withdrawn 
from relations to a certain degree. Peirce clarifies this in another context: 
The object is something external to and independent of the sign which 
determines in the sign an element corresponding to itself; so that we 
have to distinguish the quasi-real object [i.e. dynamical object] from the 
presented object [i.e. immediate object]; or as we may say, the external 
from the internal object. And the external object as it is in itself is to be 
distinguished from the feature of the external object that is represented. 
(MS [R] 145)21 
By the same token, if a sign is not interpreted and fails to transform into a 
more developed sign, it fails to be a sign in general. This would not only bring 
the infinite interpretive process to a halt but it would also collapse the whole 
chain of semiosis. Because semiosis, and therefore also inquiry, is infinite, the 
dynamical object is never actualised or represented. 
The question then becomes how can a sign represent an object that does 
not exist? Because the dynamical object is a key component in Peirce’s inquiry 
as semiosis, it is not enough to state that all signs must have a dynamical 
object, but also to make the reservation that some dynamical objects are 
fictional or unreal (see, again, above quote; c.f. Bergman 2009; Bellucci 2015; 
Wilson 2017). Furthermore, Peirce would similarly seem to support the idea 
that, while the fictional objects themselves do not directly have real causal 
effects, the possibility of their existence may incite an interpreter to act in such 
                                               
how the site unfolds as an entity emergent of its constituents (Farstadvoll 2018; Tuominen and Marila 
2020). 
21  Compare Peirce’s dynamical object (or quasi-real object) with Harman’s real object and, 
correspondingly, Peirce’s immediate object (or presented object) with Harman’s sensual object (e.g. 
Harman 2018a, 80). Another connection could be drawn between what Harman calls the real qualities 
and the sensual qualities of an object and Peirce’s representamen and interpretant, respectively. 
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a fashion as to have real causal effects (c.f. EP 2, 497n).22 The sign cannot 
express but only indicate the potential existence of a dynamical object, leaving 
the interpreter to infer this from the aforementioned ‘collateral experience’ 
(i.e. the relationship between the sign and the immediate but unreal object?). 
This means that, rather than understand interpretation as explanation to the 
causes of a particular real object, all interpretation and inference should be 
understood as a form of anticipation (i.e. speculation). This is similarly true 
for indexical, iconic, and symbolic signs. Symbols (e.g. names) and icons (e.g. 
images) can represent fictitious objects, and in the case of indices (i.e. sign and 
object connected by physical necessity) the physical connection between the 
sign and the object—and, by this token, the reality of the object—only has to 
be anticipated or ‘prehended’, it does not have to be real in the narrow 
materialist or objectivist sense of the term (cf. Debaise 2017b; c.f. Wilson 2017, 
542–543). 23  Furthermore, keeping in mind Peirce’s conviction that 
interpretation is a habit in and of the world, the speculative nature of inference 
permeates all existence, not only human cognition. A horse only has to 
interpret movement in the bushes as an indexical sign of danger, the danger 
does not have to be real. In this sense, purely indexical signs and relations 
(connection by physical force) constitute only one aspect of causality, whereas 
the common form is aesthetic and anticipatory in nature. I will return to the 
connection between aesthetics and anticipation in Part Four. 

1)6+)2')3*23:)08=
The main objective of this part is to show that aesthetics rather than mechanics 
is the common form of causation, and that therefore also the common form of 
interpretation is aesthetic rather than explanatory. The most profound 
implications of the aesthetic view of causation for the epistemology of 
archaeology is that the application of particular archaeological theories or 
methods never succeed in giving a full account of the object of study (Articles 
1–3, and 5).24 A particular theory or possible explanation for the perceived 
qualities of the object is precisely a particularistic description of that object 
                                               
22 Compare Peirce’s fictitious object with Harman’s metaphor, the operation of replacing the sensual 
object (object of the metaphor) with a real object that is the experiencer of the metaphor (Harman 2018a, 
84). 
23 This does not mean that the object (or signified in semiological terms) could not be real (in the 
OOO sense): “signs do have an ultimate signified whose nature is precisely not to become present” 
(Harman 2018a, 206). 
24 Rather than denoting the representational ‘reality for us’, or pertaining simply to beauty, art, or 
bodily forms of experience, the term ‘aesthetic’ in this context is used as a metaphysical and speculative 
concept; a cosmological tendency of existence and relation. Harman provides a good description: “If we 
now say that the universe has an aesthetic or metaphorical structure, this has nothing to do with the 
shopworn theme of a conscious human artist projecting values onto an arbitrary perspectival universe. 
Instead, it is an actual metaphysical statement about the way that raindrops or sandstorms interact 
among themselves even when no humans are on the scene. The point is not the old postmodern chestnut 
of ‘life as literature,’ but rather causation itself as music, sculpture, and street theater. When we speak of 
beauty, charm, humor, metaphor, or seduction, these are no longer perspectivist and humanized terms 
employed to flog naive realism, but are instead the basis for a haunting new realism more compellingly 
naive than any that has come before.” (Harman 2005, 174) 
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rather than an explanation as to the process by which those qualities emerged 
(c.f. Hodder and Hutson 2003, 191–193). Future theories and explanations are 
similarly valuable in providing their unique view of the object. Or better yet, 
theories are similarly inexhaustible objects in the sense that they too change 
accordingly; they too will ultimately fail to represent their objects (Pétursdóttir 
and Olsen 2018).  
Along with the uses of Harmanian object-oriented ontology, the type of 
process philosophy attributable to Whitehead, Peirce, or Deleuze and Guattari 
has been instrumental in conceptualising the role of process in archaeological 
reasoning after the speculative turn (Normark 2006; 2010; Witmore 2012; 
Harris 2014; 2017; Fowler and Harris 2015; Gosden and Malafouris 2015; 
Fowler 2017; Hamilakis and Jones 2017; Cipolla 2018; Article 3. See also 
Immonen 2010; Harris 2018; Jensen 2018 for reviews of uses of Deleuze in 
archaeology and cultural theory). In his exposition of the tension between the 
realities and constructs of archaeology, Chris Witmore (2012) makes use of 
Whitehead’s speculative philosophy. For Witmore, archaeology’s tendency to 
treat the archaeological materials as substances predating the present and 
archaeological knowledge as abstractions of that past is based on the 
bifurcation between causation and interpretation. In general terms, this 
bifurcation can be held as responsible for creating the great divide between the 
past and the present, or archaeological materials and archaeological 
abstractions. Witmore then argues that archaeological abstractions only 
succeed in transforming rather than representing the past. Archaeology, for 
Witmore, becomes ‘pragmatology’, a pragmatic attitude ‘towards’ the past as a 
continually evolving and unfolding reality, and the way to practice archaeology 
is to orient oneself towards the objects. This ‘orienting towards the past’, then, 
as a method of transformative co-creation rather than abstraction from the 
factual, is motivated by the idea that things hold in reserve an immense and 
inexhaustible capacity for novel interpretations and perceptions of them 
(Witmore 2012, 27, 33; c.f. Witmore 2013; 2015; see also Rutherford 2016; 
Ståhl et al. 2017).  
Following this, any method by which we can study those objects provides 
only one particular viewpoint to the object (Shanks 2014; Witmore 2014). 
Drawings, maps, photographs, or 3D models are forms of translation, and the 
result of this translation is not a faithful representation of the object, but an 
altogether novel entity; a co-emergence determined partly by the chosen 
method and the phenomenon being researched or ‘represented’ (Witmore 
2004b; 2012; 2015; Edgeworth 2012; 2016; Ståhl et al. 2017). And yet, this is 
only the techno-scientific extent of the process of this translation. In the course 
of its existence, the object has taken part in multiple relations ranging from its 
manufacture and the multiple uses it may have had in the past to its discard, 
and from the geochemical processes in which it has partaken to its eventual 
finding by the archaeologist. Neither of these processes has exhausted the 
object in terms of what the object is made of or what it can be used for. These 
multiple relations that the object has shared and, more importantly, can 
possibly share in the future constitute the many meanings of the object (Article 
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2, pp. 17–18), with the reservation that the object is not exhausted by any 
collection of actualised or possible practical effects or meanings. 
In elaborating on the character of the aesthetic mode of experience in 
objects and organisms, James Gibson (1979) has coined the term ‘affordance’. 
In Gibson’s affordance theory, entities perceive their surroundings as 
possibilities for action rather than as collections of distinctive objects. An 
important aspect in Gibson’s theory then is that the affordance provides a way 
of negotiating between surroundings as objective and experience as subjective. 
What becomes out of the newly found relationship is the realisation that 
organisms experience their surroundings aesthetically as a mode of hybrid 
becoming or an anticipated creation, rather than through the act of iteration: 
An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and 
helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of environment 
and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An 
affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer. 
(Gibson 1979, 129) 
Because Gibson’s theory has its origin in ecology, it can intuitively be applied 
in the realm of sentient beings. However, his consolidation between objectivity 
and subjectivity also finds appreciation in conceptualising inanimate relations 
as aesthetic (Witmore 2012; Edgeworth 2016). Following Gibson’s ideas, a 
number of archaeology’s theorists have made the case for a pluralised 
aesthetics in the sense that all entities perceive their surroundings as 
affordances; all entities experience their surroundings in terms of an 
anticipation of what it can become, rather than as a collection of discrete 
objects (c.f. Olsen et al. 2012; Witmore 2012; 2014; Graves-Brown 2013; 
Pétursdóttir and Olsen 2014; Shanks 2014; Edgeworth 2016; Cipolla 2018). 
Furthermore, this kind of perception is not determined by a cataloguing of the 
constituents of the perceptive experience, but instead takes place as a type of 
transformative performance or ‘aesthetic translation’ (see also Article 3). 
This conceptualisation of translation is not only pertinent for object-object 
relations, but also for the process by which archaeological discovery becomes 
an act of past creation: as already noted, archaeologists routinely create that 
which is thought to have existed prior to its discovery (Hodder 1997; Buchli 
and Lucas 2011, 16–17; Edgeworth 2012). However, the act of creation can 
simultaneously be an act of destruction. Consider, for example, the 
archaeological excavation (c.f. Lucas 2001). Features are emergent results of a 
special type of process in which they are simultaneously created and 
destroyed: 
Features such as ditches, pits, postholes, animal burrows, palaeo-
channels, traces of ice crevices, other periglacial features and so on are 
rarely encountered in their entirety all at once. They do not suddenly 
appear in fully fledged being like potsherds or arrowheads do. Their 
surfaces are open rather than closed, and have to be disentangled from 
the convoluted stratigraphic sequences in which they are embedded. 
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Their edges are often indistinct and fuzzy. They may comprise 
numerous component parts, imperfectly fused or separated in space. 
They are inherently incomplete, sometimes being cut or truncated by 
other features. Their partial and open-ended outline is defined by soil 
boundaries which disappear out of sight to be followed along with the 
tip of the trowel, the continuations hidden by occluding layers of soil 
which must be dug out with mattock and spade. They split into 
divergent objects or merge into composite ones, or get partially covered 
over or removed. These emergent/receding and merging/fragmenting 
entities can be followed or tracked, but rarely can they be apprehended 
all at once in a single instant. At any moment only part of the feature is 
visible, and by the time the last of it is found most of the rest of it has 
been destroyed. (Edgeworth 2016, 99)25 
This understanding of causation raises a particular question regarding the 
nature of causation by asking where exactly does the type of novelty that calls 
for our attention and explanation come from in the first place? The 
philosophical doctrine known as ‘emergentism’ states that entities are 
irreducible to their fundamental or prior constituents, and, consequently, that 
their emergence or properties cannot be explained by the existence or 
properties of their constituents (DeLanda 2011; Witmore 2017). Famous 
examples include the emergence of organic life from inanimate life, and the 
emergence of consciousness from simpler forms of organic life (c.f. Deacon 
2013). In neither of these cases can the emergent properties be explained by 
the existence of simpler elements or any prior law by which that emergence 
took place. 
A similarly famous archaeological example is the spread of farming in 
Europe. The emergence of agriculture cannot be explained by the prior 
existence of the elements of the Neolithic. Neither was the emergence of 
agriculture governed by any prior or superior natural or cultural law. Instead, 
Neolithisation took place as gradual coevolution whereby the elements became 
entangled and transformed in the process (Hodder 2012; Robb 2013). The 
beginning of this coevolution is impossible to pinpoint and, while it is possible 
to detect subsistence consisting of full-blown farming, the developmental 
stages that led to farming often have to be inferred from vague and suggestive 
rather than conclusive evidence (e.g. Vanhanen et al. 2019). Consequently, 
Neolithisation cannot be broken down to prior or more elemental components 
or simple explanations. As John Robb sums his research on the topic, 
[a]fter a century of research, there is still no widely accepted 
explanation for the spread of farming in Europe. Top-down 
explanations stress climate change, population increase, or geographic 
diffusion, but they distort human action reductionistically. Bottom-up 
                                               
25 Another interesting example is given by Mats P. Malmer. In explaining the emergence of a new 
type in the evolution of an archaeological artefact, Malmer writes that “[w]e can define the concept 
‘genesis of a new type’ by saying that it is a point in a typological series at which the points of similarity 
between the groups arranged in time sequence are few, possibly so few that we are not certain whether 
there is continuity or no” (Malmer 1963, 265–266. See also Van Oyen 2015). 
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explanations stress the local, meaningful choices involved in becoming 
a farmer, but they do not account for why the Neolithic transition in 
Europe was so widespread and generally unidirectional. The real 
problem is theoretical; we need to consider the transformative effects of 
human-material culture relationships and to relate humans, things, and 
environments at multiple scales. (Robb 2013, 657) 
Emergentism’s view of causation, then, resists top-down or bottom-up 
theories, and in fact states that even together they will fail in providing 
satisfactory explanations for the process of emergence. As suggested by Robb, 
the problem is theoretical, but whether speculative philosophy can provide 
satisfactory answers to this problem remains unclear. While influential in 
archaeology, Harman’s object-oriented solution, for instance, has been 
criticised of falling short of providing a satisfactory account of the details of 
the process by which novel, especially social, objects emerge (Edgeworth 2016; 
Article 2, but see Harman 2016). Harman’s account for the process of 
emergence states that the objects that are created in this process are simply 
result of objects coming into unexpected or unforeseen relations, forming a 
larger, more complicated object in the process. The responsibility of science, 
then, Harman contends, is exactly to resist the temptation to reduce this 
process to material constituent or theories of meaning (2013; 2016; c.f. 
Campbell et al. 2019). 
Harman elaborates his argument with a distinction between three forms of 
intellectual reduction of emergence: undermining, overmining, and 
duomining (Harman 2011; 2013). Undermining is the conviction that common 
objects are composed of something more elementary, while overmining states 
that there is nothing hiding beneath relations, observed effects, or appearance. 
Physicalism and atomism are good examples of undermining, while idealism 
and social constructionism fall in the latter category. Duomining on the other 
hand is the position that simultaneously makes use of both positions. Modern 
science, in Harman’s (2013) treatment, is a duomining project because it 
simultaneously states that things can be broken into their elementary 
constituents and are knowable through mathematisation. Harman contends 
that OOO succeeds in avoiding this duomining position because it holds that 
objects are always more than their pieces and less than their effects (Harman 
2016; 2018a, 53). Interestingly, then, by describing his solution to the problem 
of under-, over-, and duomining, Harman simultaneously comes to propose a 
new solution to the problem of the two cultures (see also Article 1). In accusing 
the natural sciences for adopting an undermining strategy, and the humanities 
for mainly espousing overmining, Harman argues that, because speculative 
realism makes no exhaustive mining claims, it is the real third culture that 
transcends the gap between the sciences and the humanities (Harman 2012a). 
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If the task of speculative philosophy is to escape the correlationist circle, its 
first duty is to negotiate the tension between the empirical and the 
conceptual.26 Harman’s answer was to resist the conceptualisation of either 
top-down or bottom-up descriptions as exhaustive and remain open-ended to 
the possible creations that the cosmos is capable of. For the relevance of the 
epistemology of archaeology, the notion of open-endedness highlights the 
problematic relationship between expectation and discovery. Peirce’s answer 
to what could here be termed the problem of discovery was to conceptualise 
abduction as a main component in the process of discovery: abduction 
mediates between expectation and discovery by suggesting not probable but 
possible experiences. Abductive inference, then, is the only logical operation 
that can equip us with the needed preparedness to the unexpected and 
ambiguous ways in which novel things emerge and unfold in our experience. 
In many ways, then, when elaborating on the relationship between 
metaphysics and epistemology, the abductive extent of Peircean inference can 
be seen in connection to not only the ontological concept of transduction, but 
also to the sense in which Whitehead connects metaphysical concerns to those 
of epistemology in his quasi-rationalist speculative philosophy (c.f. Parisi 
2012; Savransky 2017). 
One concept through which Whitehead explores the structure of his 
speculative philosophy is proposition. “Unfortunately”, Whitehead writes, 
“theories, under their name of ‘propositions,’ have been handed over to 
logicians, who have countenanced the doctrine that their one function is to be 
judged as to their truth or falsehood”, while in actuality, such judgement is “a 
very rare component” (Whitehead 1978, 184). Whitehead then wishes to 
conceptualise proposition as more than food for judgement. The principal 
sense in which Whitehead (1978, 184) refers to the speculative nature of 
propositions beyond judgement is its function as a ‘lure for feeling’.27 This 
alternative function of propositions for Whitehead is to intensify and make 
experience important. Importance, importantly, does not entail the 
identification of facts, but of possibility: 
                                               
26 There is a tension between experience and discovery, habit and creation, and empiricism and 
rationalism. The task of speculative philosophy is to seek a relation between rationalism and empiricism. 
Worth mentioning in this context is the ‘radical empiricism’ of William James. If rationalism treats 
relation as an ontological necessity, and if empiricism sees relation as a fabrication of the experiencing 
mind, James radical empiricism states that “[t]o be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its 
constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is 
directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be 
experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else 
in the system” (James 1912, 42). For James, then, experience becomes the criterion of reality, but there 
is no correspondence between the two (c.f. Parisi 2012; Witmore 2015). “In other words, universality can 
be ascribed neither to the knowing subjects nor to the objects known” (Savransky 2012, 353, emphasis 
original). 
27  In this sense, proposition is “a new kind of entity”, or “a hybrid between potentialities and 
actualities” (Whitehead 1978, 185–186). 
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importance can never be reduced to a de facto or given situation: it 
implies attachment to something in a disappearing world, dwelling on 
possible becomings, pressing for, insisting on, all those ‘might haves’ or 
‘could bes’ implicit in situations. Making a situation, past or present, be 
of importance, means intensifying the sense of possibles it harbours, as 
expressed by the struggles and claims to another way of making it exist. 
(Debaise and Stengers 2017, 17)28 
In this sense, by aiming to intensify the multiplicity of possible experience 
rather than the singularity of factuality, proposition has a function beyond 
proof, but also cognition and logic in general. The intensification of 
importance contributes to the intensification of experience prior to any 
categorising consciousness (Debaise 2017b, 80). Whitehead contends that “a 
feeling does not in itself involve consciousness” (Whitehead 1978, 256), and 
that the way subjects feel the effects of the proposition are subject to the 
“differences in the histories of the origination of those feelings in their 
respective subjects” (Whitehead 1978, 263). In this sense the subjective forms 
of feeling are dominated by valuation rather than consciousness (Whitehead 
1978, 263).29 Whitehead continues: 
The subjective form lies in the twilight zone between pure physical 
feeling and the clear consciousness which apprehends the contrast 
between physical feeling and imagined possibility. A propositional 
feeling is a lure to creative emergence in the transcendent future. When 
it is functioning as a lure, the propositional feeling about the logical 
subjects of the proposition may in some subsequent phase promote 
decision involving intensification of some physical feeling of those 
subjects in the nexus. Thus, according to the various categoreal 
conditions, propositions intensify, attenuate, inhibit, or transmute, 
without necessarily entering into clear consciousness, or encountering 
judgement. It follows that in the pursuit of truth even physical feelings 
must be criticised, since their evidence is not final apart from an analysis 
of their origination. This conclusion merely confirms what is a 
commonplace in all scientific investigation, that we can never start from 
dogmatic certainty. (Whitehead 1978, 263–264) 
Whitehead’s philosophy, then, adopts the deep ontological conviction that 
subjective speculation is as much partial to the creation of experience (reality) 
as are those subjectivities which are object to the perception of that particular 
speculating subject. This tension between subjectivities rather than object and 
subject is what I refer to when I say that (exact) methods of representation too 
                                               
28 Speculative philosophy’s way of relating to things grants “due importance to the deeply plural 
experience of nature” while aiming to intensify “experience to its maximal point” (Debaise 2017b, 77). In 
this sense a speculative philosophy is not simply a speculative metaphysics, but an empirically sensitive 
pragmatic philosophy (Debaise 2017a). 
29  Whitehead’s understanding of the directionality and relation between perception and 
consciousness echoes Peirce’s view of the process by which “abductive inference shades into perceptual 
judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them; or, in other words, our first premisses, 
the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences, from which 
they differ in being absolutely beyond criticism” (CP 5.181; see also Article 3). 
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contain a speculative element and that they too are creative rather than 
impartial in the ontological sense (Articles 3–5; Part Four). There is therefore 
an important ontological aspect to how Whitehead sees creativity as the 
absolute force in the cosmos rather than a layer added onto it (Whitehead 
1956; c.f. Latour 1999). The task of philosophy, like any science, then, is to 
explain how this creation takes place and how more complex and abstract 
entities can emerge from simpler forms of life (Whitehead 1978, 20). To begin 
with, the speculating scientist will need a method by which this task can be 
undertaken, a method that places equal weight on the empirical and the 
rational:  
The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts 
from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin 
air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed 
observation rendered acute by rational interpretation. [...] 
[Imaginative] thought supplies the differences which the direct 
observation lacks. (Whitehead 1978, 5) 
In this way, Whitehead’s understanding of speculation as a source for 
empirical sensitivity highlights the interrelatedness of speculative thinking 
and empirical observation. The purpose of speculative thinking is to intensify 
the sensitivity of observation to its maximal point lest we get stuck in the 
groove of experiencing habitually. 
 


I have in this part explored the different understandings of this emergent 
process in reference to the tension between mechanistic and aesthetic 
causality. The common nominator for aesthetic forms of understanding is 
their abstract nature. We saw this with theories of transduction and abduction 
as well as with the metaphorism of alien phenomenology. These all endorse 
the view that translation, abstraction, vagueness, and metaphorical 
description rather than literal explanation of concreteness by causal necessity 
characterise understanding. In speculative philosophy, then, the aesthetic 
becomes 
the most fundamental characteristic of nature, rather than a 
supplementary added onto it. The aesthetic becomes the site of all 
ontology; it is the plurality of manners of being, manners of doing, 
capacities to be affected, in a word, the modes of ‘feeling’ that are at the 
center of a theory of the subjects of nature. (Debaise 2017b, 58) 
The important task of speculation as an empirically sensitive philosophy, or as 
an explicitly ‘speculative empiricism’, then, is towards those alternative modes 
of feeling, experience, and existence that it is capable of entertaining and 
creating (Debaise 2017a). Speculation does not simply imply that the past 
could have unfolded differently. As an empathic method, speculation denotes 
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a deeper intimacy with the experiences of the past subject as well. Like today, 
events in the past involved decision-making, hesitation, and insecurity. 
Speculation empathetically links us with the insecurities and hesitations felt 
by the subject in the course of the past event as it unfolded as a nexus of 
possibilities. The lure function of speculation is not simply intended to open 
this moment to the possibility that future experiences might be different from 
past feelings, but to intensify our feelings by linking them with the diversity of 
those felt in the past (Debaise 2017b). The decisions of past individuals are 
important to feel because they, just like our own decisions, are “related to the 
constitution of the actual world”, but also to the ways in which possibilities 
“continue to have a latent presence” (Debaise 2017b, 86).
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A decapitated frog almost reasons. The habit that is in his cerebellum serves 
as a major premiss. The excitation of a drop of acid is his minor premiss. And 
his conclusion is the act of wiping it away. All that is of any value in the 
operation of ratiocination is there, except only one thing. What he lacks is the 
power of preparatory meditation. (CP 6.286) 
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It was argued in the previous part that the speculative turn introduces 
metaphysical concerns that an empirically sensitive epistemology of 
archaeology cannot sidestep. A case was then made for an emergentist 
understanding of causation, and it was argued that aesthetics rather than 
necessity or mechanics is the ontological foundation of causation, and 
therefore interpretation and inference as well. The understanding of 
metaphysics as inherently a matter of aesthetics has specific implications for 
the epistemology of archaeology. First of all, inference cannot be thought of as 
a matter of causal explanation, but rather as a matter of aesthetic orientation. 
Secondly, because aesthetics takes centre stage, what is referred to as 
explanation is actually a form of anticipation. Thirdly, because the processes 
relevant for controlling the anticipations are underdetermined and 
contingent, the corresponding explanations remain highly uncertain and 
suggestive as opposed to reliable and conclusive. 
The tension between causality and aesthetics, explanation and description, 
or reliability and uncertainty are characteristic of the theoretical and 
methodological anxieties of archaeology throughout its existence. In 
archaeology, this tension has since the latter half of the 19th century manifested 
itself in the form of a troubled relationship between the natural sciences and 
the humanities in particular. As consequence, archaeology is marked by shifts 
in what is considered the proper or most reliable method of archaeological 
inference. These idealisations have, to a certain extent, tended to follow wider 
theoretical and methodological currents in archaeology’s neighbouring 
disciplines, such as history, literary criticism, or metaphysics for 
archaeological theorising, and analytical philosophy, evolutionary biology, or 
particle physics for archaeological science (Bapty and Yates 1990; Pluciennik 
2011; Kristiansen 2014; Martinón-Torres and Killick 2014; Lucas 2015; 
Pétursdóttir and Olsen 2018). 
All of the research articles presented in this thesis provide takes on the 
history of archaeology in light of the epistemological opposition between the 
sciences and the humanities, but more importantly between the preferred 
mode of inference in archaeology. Special attention should be paid to Article 4 
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that aims to negotiate between two different ways of understanding the nature 
of knowledge formation in archaeology. The article contextualises the 
emergence of New Archaeology in contrast to the so-called traditional 
archaeology. It was argued in the article that one of the special characteristics 
of New Archaeology is its dependence on the concept of deduction, while 
traditional archaeology has favoured the concept of induction. The 
philosophical underpinnings of both traditional archaeology and New 
Archaeology were to some extent also rehearsed in Part One. However, insofar 
as the traditional archaeology can be seen as chiefly inductive and the New 
Archaeology as primarily deductive, these concepts deserve further attention. 
Large parts of this part will therefore be dedicated to reiterating the history of 
archaeology from the perspective of induction and deduction. However, in 
aiming to follow the ontological considerations presented in Part Two, this 
part aims to highlight attempts in the epistemology of archaeology to sidestep 
the inductive/deductive dichotomy altogether. To this end, the part argues 
that the logical form of speculation is best described as abductive. In this 
respect, the part discusses the nature of ampliative inference from the 
viewpoint of abductive inference as well as Inference to the Best Explanation. 
The last chapter of the part is devoted to forming a typology of archaeological 
inference. 
2(9'8-32
In many ways, Scandinavia was the epicentre of archaeology’s methodological 
innovation between early 19th and mid-20th centuries. The majority of the 
discussion, however, dealt with the construction of archaeological 
chronologies and the explanation of cultural change through concepts of 
migration and diffusion, rather than the nature of archaeological inference 
(Article 4; Pohjola et al. 2019, 26–36). Although discussions over the 
archaeological method formed an important part of archaeological literature 
at that time, conceptualising the nature of archaeological inference through 
the concepts of induction and deduction remained sporadic. It should also be 
noted that in early Scandinavian archaeology the concepts were used as loose 
descriptions of the inferential process rather than introduced as logical 
schemas to follow. For this reason, other concepts, namely stylistic evolution 
and culture-historical idealism rather than logical structures should be seen as 
the two superstructures that guide interpretation in the so-called traditional 
archaeology. 
Early reference to the distinction between induction and deduction can be 
found in Sophus Müller’s (1884; 1897, 689–702) writings on the nature of 
archaeological inference. Although Müller engages in an explicitly 
epistemological discourse, his writings have remained relatively little studied 
in the philosophy of archaeology. An in-depth analysis of Müller’s (1884) 
philosophy of archaeology has been conducted by Finnish archaeologist Eero 
Muurimäki (2000, 137–156), so its broader exposition is not necessary. 
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Certain aspects in Müller’s writings are, however, useful for our purposes. 
Most importantly, Müller is explicit in his distinction between two types of 
inference when he argues that the nature of archaeological inference is 
inductive rather than deductive. 
The task of induction in Müller’s view is to establish generality in 
observation, but Müller also highlights that the nature of this generality—in 
terms of its power in explaining cultural change and variety—is local rather 
than universal. This emphasis on locality is evident in Müller’s insistence that 
prehistoric chronology for instance can never be establishment through 
evolutionary stylistic analysis, as was argued by his Swedish colleague, Oscar 
Montelius (Article 4). For Montelius, Darwinian evolution was the guiding 
principle behind stylistic analysis. Montelius went so far as to propose that the 
simple description and comparison of archaeological materials should no 
longer be the task of archaeology, but instead archaeology should seek to trace 
the internal connections between styles, and the development of one style from 
another, by following the laws of evolution (Montelius 1884; 1899).  
Müller (1884), then, was critical of the use of evolutionary theory as a 
starting point or as an explanatory model in constructing prehistoric 
chronologies stylistically. Müller held that evolutionary typology would lead to 
a situation where the evidence is used to verify the law that was supposed to 
explain the observed peculiarities in the evidence in the first place. In contrast, 
Müller argued that the analysis always depends on knowledge of or is affected 
by preconceived ideas regarding the find circumstances, or other knowledge 
of the subject matter (c.f. Gräslund 1987, 88). 
In his reply to Müller’s critique, Montelius (1884) insisted that his artefact 
analysis always proceeds in conjunction with the analysis of circumstantial 
evidence. Nevertheless, or, as argued by Bo Gräslund (1987, 89), perhaps for 
this very reason, Montelius had a hard time in separating the cause and effect 
in his chronology. Interestingly, Müller notes that, while the concept of law-
likeness in causality is central in archaeology, it can only be thought of in terms 
of special laws regarding the locality of the material itself rather than general 
laws regarding their establishment. Müller then contends that, while causal 
explanations may be interesting to certain speculatively oriented minds in the 
far future, they have no place in archaeology (Müller 1897, 695). 
The tactics by which Müller himself seeks to reconcile between cause and 
effect, or deduction and induction, is to emphasise the role of hypotheses as 
part of the inferential process. Because, in the ontological sense, Müller (1884, 
188) upholds the idea of free will, and therefore also of the contingence of 
human action, the hypotheses regarding causes behind cultural change should 
always be taken as contingent rather than explanatory (Article 4). Müller uses 
the concept of hypothesis in a very special sense that makes it a distinctive type 
of reasoning in addition to deduction and induction. Induction, for Müller, 
denotes the establishment of local and temporal specificity, such as the 
regional identification of a Neolithic culture group through the observation of 
similarities in the material culture, whereas deduction is the simple operation 
of determining that a new find belongs to a group of similar finds (Müller 1884, 
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191). Hypothesis on the other hand has a specific meaning for Müller, who 
treats it as an instance of analogical thinking.30 In Müller’s view, hypothesis 
provides an answer to a question by borrowing an idea from one context, such 
as modern ethnography, and applies that information in the archaeological 
context under study. The function of a stone axe, for example, has been 
possible to determine through modern analogy. For Müller, then, the primary 
method by which perplexing observations are made sense of in archaeology is 
the comparative method that proceeds from the known to the unknown 
through analogy.  
On the other hand, Müller writes that the most common form of 
archaeological inference is induction—the establishment of generality through 
simple observation—and that hypothesis only expands the specificity of those 
observations. Because, for Müller, both induction and hypothesis have their 
roots in the observation of archaeological materials, it remains unclear exactly 
to what extent he considers them as separate operations (c.f. Muurimäki 2000, 
150–156). By the very same token, because Müller considers the observation 
of modern materials similarly as a possible source of archaeological 
knowledge, it remains contestable whether Müller succeeds in avoiding the 
tactics he charged Montelius with, and whether Müller himself can avoid the 
confusion between cause and effect, or discovery and creation. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that both Montelius and Müller aim to emphasise the role of the 
archaeological material and their observation as primary sources of 
archaeological knowledge. Both Müller and Montelius support the idea that 
through careful collecting the amount of archaeological knowledge will 
increase and the amount of archaeological speculation decrease. 
This conception is also widespread in Finnish archaeology that has, in the 
historical sense, tended to focus on collecting with less emphasis on the role of 
theorising (Article 4). Those early (pre-1970s) Finnish texts that can be seen 
as theoretical do not so much address the epistemology of archaeology, but are 
better characterised as metaphysical. Overt systematisation, for instance, is 
criticised by recourse to what appears to the reader as a form of objective 
idealism and the emphasising of human free will (e.g. Nordman 1915; Tallgren 
1934). 
Accordingly, explicitly epistemological references to induction and 
deduction are rare in early Finnish archaeological literature. One example can 
be found in a conference talk given in 1923 by Finnish archaeologist Julius 
Ailio. In his talk, Ailio, who can be grouped in the natural scientist camp of 
Finnish archaeologists, iterates the objectives and methods of archaeology (see 
also Article 4). In many ways, the talk, in which Ailio (1923) describes the task 
of prehistoric museums, is characteristic of the archaeology of his time. First 
of all, following the nationalist agenda, Ailio writes that the primary 
responsibility of archaeology and museum work is the collection and 
                                               
30 Note also that, in some writings, Peirce refers to abduction as ‘hypothesis’, but also note that he 
sometimes differentiates between abduction and analogy as distinct forms of inference (e.g. EP 1, 300), 
although this can be what Peirce later refers to as a mixing up of abduction and induction (e.g. CP 6.145; 
c.f. CP 8.227). 
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preservation of those archaeological materials that tell the story of a nation. 
The role of the researcher, according to Ailio (1923, 19), is secondary and 
mostly classificatory.31 
In Ailio’s view, “the method of archaeology is that borrowed from the 
natural sciences, the so-called inductive method that draws general 
conclusions from particular observations” (Ailio 1923, 20, my translation). 
After casually mentioning induction, Ailio proceeds to list the types of 
archaeological phenomena the study of which he thinks is the prerequisite for 
drawing archaeological conclusions. It should, however, be highlighted that, 
although Ailio stresses the importance of collecting, he also points out that 
even if the archaeologist collects all the remains of the past, it would still 
amount to only a fraction of the “complete cultural belongings of that 
particular age” (Ailio 1923, 20, my translation). The extent to which Ailio then 
considers archaeological knowledge as theoretical, ideal, or speculative rather 
than material or directly observable remains unclear and Ailio never 
elaborates on how or to what extent the inductive inferences of archaeology 
should be considered as speculative. 
This vagueness in terms of the method of archaeological explanation 
characterises the history of Finnish archaeology. Instead of elaborating on the 
method of inference, much of Finnish archaeology has tended to rest on the 
notion of archaeology as an epistemically open-ended discipline. As a result, 
Finnish archaeology has tended to highlight the importance of the meticulous 
collecting of archaeological material rather than an intervening 
epistemological framework, and when explaining the unfinished and partial 
view of the past archaeologists have frequently made references to the 
adolescence of archaeology as a discipline and to the impartial and 
fragmentary nature of the archaeological record and the archaeological 
collections rather than the epistemological or methodological shortcomings of 
archaeology. Whereas for Ailio, Montelius’ typological evolutionism and its 
determinism was the guiding theoretical framework, for the majority of 
Finnish archaeologists the idealism of nationalism served as an adequate 
framework for theoretical or methodological reflection for a long time (Article 
4). Many have characterised the nationalist view as the romantic’s position in 
reference to a large group of scholars that include, for example, J.R. Aspelin, 
C.A. Nordman, A.M. Tallgren, C.F. Meinander, Matti Huurre, and to some 
extent Aarne Äyräpää (Siiriäinen 1989; Salminen 1993; 2003, 172–174; Salo 
1994; Muurimäki 2000, 158; Article 4). In this romantic view, the past is often 
seen as a puzzle that is recoverable through the very existence of the structure 
that is the puzzle itself (or the cultural contents of an ethnic group), while the 
puzzle nevertheless paradoxically remains inherently fragmentary and partial 
(see, for example, Tallgren 1920; Meinander 1967). Because much of Finnish 
archaeology has hinged on a vague formulation of empiricism that lacks a well-
                                               
31 In the early 20th century, Finnish archaeology (research) and heritage management (museum 
work) were still pretty much one and the same thing. Although the first chair in archaeology was 
established in the early 1920s, research and heritage management did not start to become increasingly 
separated until the early 1960s (see for example Enqvist 2016; Immonen 2016). 
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defined view of the nature of inference, it has often been labelled as 
atheoretical, a misleading view that persists into the 21st century. In Article 4, 
I explicitly argued that this view of Finnish archaeology as atheoretical is 
misleading, and that the empiricism characteristic of so much of Finnish 
archaeology should be seen as a deliberately chosen epistemological position. 
I will return to this topic below, and I will argue that, as much as the lack of 
theorising can be seen as a symptom of naive empiricism, it can similarly be 
taken as a sign of the kind of speculative attitude highlighted in the 
introduction of this thesis. 
)(9'8-32
Ultimately, the conceptual vagueness in problematising the relationship 
between empirical observation of archaeological material on the one hand and 
speculation as to the unobserved past events on the other led to the emergence 
of a new critical movement in archaeological theorising. The emergence of 
New Archaeology in the wake of the Second World War marked a move away 
from the empiricism of traditional archaeology in search of a more 
methodologically robust model of archaeological inference (Article 4). 
Especially the idea of archaeology as an inherently inductive and descriptive 
form of idealist culture history became increasingly challenged by the new 
archaeologists who saw empiricism to denote a subjectivist conceptualisation 
of archaeological knowledge in general (Articles 3 and 5; Marila 2018). In 
order to sidestep the subjective idealism and rationalism of empiricism, New 
Archaeology highlighted the relevance of an epistemology that would 
ultimately eliminate the subjectivities in research (Articles 1, and 3–5; Marila 
2018). 
In order to alleviate the epistemic pessimism that new archaeologists 
accused traditional archaeology of, New Archaeology came to highlight two 
concepts in particular. On the one hand, whereas traditional archaeology had 
tended to emphasised the inductive method, New Archaeology saw induction 
as limited to observations made in the present. Instead, the New Archaeology 
turned to the concept of deduction as the guiding principle in the testing of 
hypotheses concerning the past (Article 4). On the other hand, New 
Archaeology came to place increasing emphasis on the concept of process. The 
aim was to establish law-like behavioural and natural regularities that could 
be used in inferring past activities from the contemporary archaeological 
record. An aspect to be kept in mind when assessing the epistemological 
underpinnings of the New Archaeology, and its impact on European and 
Scandinavian archaeology, is that similar development in terms of the coming-
of-age of archaeology took place in Scandinavian, British, and Americanist 
archaeology (Article 4). The two latter, however, mark the wider dissemination 
of New Archaeology’s theoretical rigour. While the British (Clarke 1968) 
variant of New Archaeology tended to promote conceptual clearness, the 
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American version of New Archaeology highlighted the importance of a 
deductive logic. 
According to Kent Flannery (1973), two types of North American New 
archaeology existed in the early 1970s. The first type promoted deduction as 
the key logical schema in devising explanations, while the other pursued an 
ecologically orientated conceptualisation of process, both cultural and natural 
in proceeding from observation to explanation. Flannery fittingly refers to the 
deductivist camp as ‘law-and-order’ archaeologists: 
The law-and-order archeologists receive their nickname from the fact 
that they not only believe that Carl Hempel rose from the dead on the 
third day and ascended to heaven—where he sits at the right hand of 
Binford—but, to use their own words, ‘have made the formulation and 
testing of laws (their) goal.’ (Flannery 1973, 50) 
The other camp of new archaeologists that survived into the early 1970 
Flannery humorously dubs as ‘Serutan’ archaeologists: 
The ‘Serutan’ archeologists pursue a systems-theory framework and 
derive their nickname from an inordinate interest in the ‘natural 
regulation’ of systems. For them it seems that the law-and-order 
archeologists’ version of Hempel—or at least, the way they apply it—is 
precisely the physical-science approach that [Ludwig] von Bertalanffy 
rejected in the 1920s as being inadequate in dealing with biological 
phenomena. (Flannery 1973, 51) 
The epistemology of both of these sub-genres of New Archaeology hinges on 
the existence of an explanatory superstructure. For the law-and-order 
archaeologists this superstructure is a logical schema, the hypothetico-
deductive method, that allows for the establishment of specific inductive 
generalisations as explanatory laws. For the Serutan archaeologists the 
superstructure is the system that encompasses both the natural and the 
cultural. The events within the system then take place according to the specific 
laws of that system, most importantly the laws of evolution.  
Flannery (1973) predicted that the dialectics between these two camps 
might continue for some years, and in the course of the 1970s, the law-and-
order camp slowly died out as result of the critique that was targeted against 
its reliance on Hempelian covering laws (Article 4).32  Flannery (1973, 52) 
points out that the Serutan archaeologists saw that the reliance on universal 
laws mistakes many correlations as causally related. Although strong positive 
correlation can be established between shoe size and vocabulary size, no causal 
connection between the two ‘symptoms’ can be demonstrated (Flannery 1973, 
                                               
32 “The ‘law-and-order’ and ‘Serutan’ archeologists are held together by a dream and a nightmare. 
The dream is their mutual vision of what archeology could become in the future, when it is science with 
a capital S. The nightmare is that the ‘young fogeys’ will forever keep it the imprecise pseudoscience that 
it is today.” (Flannery 1973, 53) 
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52). Many phenomena that show a high correlation are only coinciding 
symptoms rather than causally related. 
Today, the Serutan type is what is generally understood as processual 
archaeology.33 Interestingly, part of the reason for the evolution by which New 
Archaeology became known as processual archaeology was the critique that 
New Archaeology received not from the old generation of traditional 
archaeologist, but instead from two very unexpected fronts. 
The first is a large group of young archeologists, many still in their 
twenties, who are harshly critical of process studies and militantly 
committed to purely inductive analyses of ‘real’ data from traditionally 
conducted excavations; this group has been dubbed ‘the young fogeys’ 
by one processual archeologist. The second group includes some of the 
original proponents of the new archeology—members of the first 
archeological generation ever to walk on water—who, once they had 
achieved some degree of national prominence (or tenure), forgot they 
had ever espoused processual studies and hastened to join the old guard 
on the pretext of ‘bridging the generation gap.’ In the idiom of the day, 
these are referred to simply as ‘cop-outs,’ and they include some of the 
very people whose earlier studies are frequently cited as good examples 
of process archeology. (Flannery 1973, 49) 
In dealing with the first group, Flannery (1973, 49) is quick to point out that, 
according to the traditionalist who criticises New Archaeology for adopting the 
deductive model, deductive reasoning (processual archaeology) can only be 
carried out after the laws have been established inductively (see Article 4). 
Interestingly, the second group that Flannery refers to as cop-outs is the same 
group that gave New Archaeology its impetus in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
through the concept of cultural process (e.g. Willey and Phillips 1958; Caldwell 
1959; Binford 1962; 1965; c.f. Flannery 1967).  
The idea of process and evolution in explaining change, then, was central 
to early new archaeologists, and the hypothetico-deductive method became an 
important epistemological addition for reasons other than archaeological. 
Kristian Kristiansen (pers. comm., 27 Oct, 2017) recounts an incident 
regarding Lewis Binford’s visit to the department of archaeology at the 
University of Copenhagen in the 1980s. When prompted to explain the reasons 
for his abandoning the idea of cultural evolution in favour of the hypothetico-
deductive method in the late 1960s, Binford contended that, as a description 
of the steps of inference, the H-D model was simply more convincing and 
therefore more efficient in attracting research funding. 
When the hypothetico-deductive method was abandoned by Binford as a 
guiding principle for a scientific archaeology in the 1970s, he came to favor 
                                               
33 The term New Archaeology is best reserved for the type of reactionary archaeology that saw the 
use of a formal method of explanation as an alternative to the descriptivism of traditional archaeology: 
“New Archaeology is as yet a set of questions rather than a set of answers; when the questions are 
answered it too will be Old Archaeology” (Clarke 1973, 17). In one sense, the ending of the deductivist 
project made New Archaeology old. Processual archaeology, then, is a more fitting term for what is 
understood as New Archaeology today. 
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middle-range theory as the conceptual substitute in bridging between 
archaeological facts and past processes (Binford 1977; Binford and Bertram 
1977; Article 4).34 The idea behind mid-level theories was that anthropological 
observations could be used as support in explaining archaeological 
observations. The logic used in this argumentation differed in some respect 
from that of the hypothetico-deductive method. While both are based on the 
existence of unifying processes (in H-D a covering law), the logical operation 
in anthropological argumentation follows the form of analogical reasoning, 
and is therefore either inductive or abductive in nature. Ironically, then, 
Binford (2001, 80) writes in his magnum opus Constructing Frames of 
Reference that the logical form of processual archaeology is induction. Binford 
does not refer to induction as simple enumerative induction, but rather as the 
process of combining multiple lines of evidence. Because the archaeologist has 
to be able to combine evidence that is relevant for a particular context, the 
ecological system rather than a logical schema became normalised as the 
explanatory superstructure in processual archaeology, a view that survives in 
today’s versions of it (e.g. Manninen 2014).35 
One of the central ideas behind middle-range theorising was to also 
account for the processes responsible for the fragmentation and loss of the 
archaeological evidence. In many ways, then, Binford’s (2001) newly-found 
idea of the combining of evidence as inductive inference can be seen as a 
strategy to compensate for the scarcity or the fragmentation of archaeological 
materials. The task of induction, for Binford, was to combine inductive 
observations in ways that make the resulting inductive generalisation more 
robust than the individual chains of observation. Although this view of 
induction is a fitting description of how archaeologists compensate for the 
fragmentation of archaeological materials, a similar connection can also be 
established between scarcity and deduction. It should therefore be noted that 
the idea of the primary form of the logic of archaeology as deductive rather 
than inductive also found supporters in Scandinavia, and especially in areas 
where archaeological materials are often considered especially scarce.  
Norwegian archaeologist Arne B. Johansen (1969; 1974) was one of the 
very few in Scandinavia to adopt an explicitly deductivist conceptualisation of 
the process of archaeological inference. In fact, Johansen (1969, 99) points out 
that the small amount of finds relevant for his research topic, the 
establishment of a typology of non-tool lithic material, is the reason why he 
devotes a large part of his study to theoretical considerations. While Johansen 
totally eschews induction, stating that archaeological inference is deductive 
                                               
34 This move would undoubtedly count as ‘copping out’ in Flannery’s book. 
35  The ecological approach of processual archaeology was to some extent also adopted in 
Scandinavian and Finnish archaeology in the course of the 1970s (see Myhre 1991, 168–171). In the 
context of Finnish archaeology, elements from the ecologically and anthropologically oriented 
Americanist archaeology were adopted by Ari Siiriäinen (1974) in his dissertation Studies Relating to 
Shore Displacement and Stone Age Chronology in Finland, but most importantly by Milton Núñez 
(1984) in his dissertation On the Subneolithic and Other Cultural Phenomena of the Finnish Stone Age. 
These works mark a clear deviation from the culture-historical tradition of Finnish archaeology by 
placing increasing emphasis on the reconstruction of the natural environment in addition to the study 
of archaeological artefacts. 
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through and through, he does so by defining deduction in a fashion that clearly 
distances him from the positivism of Americanist New Archaeology. First of 
all, for Johansen, deduction denotes the existence of a conceptual frame of 
reference that allows the archaeologist to identify any find as pertinent for the 
purposes of archaeology in the first place. Secondly, Johansen also argues that 
there is no realm of independent data that would allow us to examine the 
validity of existing theories objectively or free from other existing theories. 
Johansen’s first point becomes evident through the following quote: 
From this point of view an archaeological material should not be 
regarded as a batch of data but rather as a possibility for data to appear 
provided we look at the batch through the appropriate type of looking 
glass, that is the appropriate theory of culture. [...] Without such a 
culture concept the material would only consist of a bewildering mass 
of possibilities for datadiscovery where nothing and everything might 
be relevant. (Johansen 1969, 99–100) 
In adopting these tactics, Johansen argues that observations are theory-laden 
and that the idea of archaeological knowledge as inductive generalisation from 
observed facts is misguided (see also Dommasnes 1987, 2; Myhre 1991, 172–
173).36 Johansen’s approach leads to a bunch of problems that he nevertheless 
also identified. The most important according to Johansen (1969, 101) is that 
of circular reasoning, or the problem of induction, where the result of analysis 
is presupposed. This problem of induction, as well as Johansen’s second 
point—that there is no objective data that can be used to objectively compare 
existing theories—can then be clarified by the following question: “Are there 
in spite of this general structure any hope now and then to trespass the 
boundaries surrounding the research and thus bring the final theory of culture 
outside the initial general frame used in discovery” (Johansen 1969, 101)?  
In resolving this question, Johansen (1969, 101, 103) states that, in most 
types of empirical research, our conceptual frames are an unavoidable 
element. Nevertheless, in Johansen’s opinion, in order to compensate for this 
situation and make discovery meaningful in the first place, we should 
consciously aim to create new conceptual models as well as alternative 
competing theories that can then allow for new data to make sense (Johansen 
1969, 27, 102–103). Whereas for the Binfordian (1968) New Archaeology, 
deduction denoted a logical framework that should ultimately allow 
archaeologists to distance themselves from the theories that guide their initial 
observations and give rise to hypotheses, Johansen sees those frameworks as 
unescapable. By these tactics, Johansen also exposes the hidden empiricism of 
the explicitly anti-empiricist New Archaeology. Johansen then contends that 
theories rather than data have the ability to shape existing theories or 
expectations regarding observation, and that 
                                               
36 Naturally, in order to transcend the naive empiricism of traditional archaeology, the idea of 
theory-ladenness of observation was built into positivist New Archaeology as well (e.g. Binford 1977, 1–
3). 
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[i]t will almost never be possible to free oneself from circular reasoning 
in the meaning used here. The closest approximation to this ideal is now 
and then to let in as parts of our investigatory theory of man/culture 
elements without empirical support from the neighboring disciplines. 
Such analytical devices may then enable us to uncover deviant and 
adjusting types of data. (Johansen 1969, 103) 
In this sense Johansen (1969, 27) argues, in reference to Paul Feyerabend, that 
analogical thinking for instance has a special role in archaeology in providing 
alternative theories to the existing ones (c.f. Binford 1972, 57). It is interesting 
to note that Johansen’s suggested procedure of letting in elements without 
empirical support also denotes a characteristically speculative understanding 
of the role of theories, another trait that distances him from the deductivism 
of New Archaeology. Johansen then continues: 
Because ‘facts’ only exist in relation to a preconceived theory it e.g. 
appears to be no essential difference between speculative and ‘facts’-
based research. Theories of culture 100 years ago were no more based 
on speculation than are those of our own time. Then, as in our time a 
certain amount of speculation and definition of ‘facts’ must precede the 
discovery of such facts. Whether the speculation is based on a functional 
theory of culture or on biblical myths about the human past makes only 
slight difference because ‘facts’ like choppers, handaxes and palaeolithic 
‘tool kits’ had no existence until the proper type of theory had been 
invented. To look at our predecessors in the field as more speculative 
and negligent of facts than we are is therefore not justified, when we 
conceptualise ‘speculation’ like this. Most of the phenomena that are 
facts to us were simply undefined and thus non-existent in former 
periods of research. (Johansen 1969, 103–104) 
The most often placed criticism against the subjectivism behind this type 
of speculative approach has been that emphasising conceptual frames over 
archaeological materials ultimately leads to the idea that the facts can support 
any theory. Johansen anticipates this argument by distinguishing between two 
types of deductions, consistent and non-consistent deductions. Johansen 
(1969, 104) then states that the “significant feature of Nazi-archaeologists was 
not that they had a particularly firm preconceived theory but that they let this 
theory influence too much the deductions based on the data”. While 
Johansen’s solution might appear somewhat hastily constructed at first, upon 
more careful analysis, it, and his whole philosophy of archaeology, includes 
many of the traits of the type of speculative empiricism that was outlined in 
Part Two. In other words, speculative empiricism entails the idea that, while 
we encounter objects aesthetically, phenomena are never exhausted through 
their appearances. The points of connection between speculative empiricism 
and Johansen’s philosophy of archaeology can be further clarified through the 
following Whiteheadian motto: “We must be systematic; but we must keep our 
systems open. In other words, we should be sensitive to their limitations. 
There is always a vague ‘beyond’, waiting for penetration in respect to its 
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detail” (Whitehead 1956, 8; Article 5). Through his analysis of theory-
ladenness, Johansen demonstrates how important creative use and creation of 
concepts and theories is for empirical sciences. Had Johansen been more 
explicit in his somewhat vaguely formulated argument that new theories can 
behave just like new facts in their capacity to challenge existing conceptual 
models, his ideas might have been more easily accepted by his contemporaries 
(e.g. Malmer 1980).37 
Johansen’s ideas were to a certain degree welcomed in Finland by professor 
of archaeology C.F. Meinander (1977, 78–79; Article 4, p. 31). However, the 
deeply subjectivist undertone of Johansen’s approach remained somewhat 
unappealing to Meinander who wanted to retain a stronger degree of openness 
in terms of the archaeologist’s conceptual framework. Instead, Meinander 
opted for the view that can be characterised as find positivism (Article 4). 
However, it is important to notice that the type of positivism adopted by 
Meinander is not related to logical positivism, and that the word positivism is 
misleading in this context. Just like Johansen’s definition of archaeology as 
deductive differs from the deductivism of New Archaeology significantly, 
Meinander’s definition of positivism differed significantly from the positivism 
of New Archaeology. Both Johansen’s deductivism and Meinander’s find 
positivism highlight important aspects of speculative philosophy rather than 
positivism. 
 

 
So far, we have seen that archaeology’s interpretive dilemma is characterised 
by two problems in particular. The first one concerns the problem of 
induction: if induction is generalisation from observation, how can those 
observations ever be of the past rather than remain hopelessly of the present? 
The other one is also connected to the problem of induction, but intimately 
through deduction: if all observations are theory-laden, how can the amount 
of archaeological knowledge ever grow, or how is any form of empirically 
derived knowledge possible in the first place? The latter question is of 
importance for the kind of speculative attitude promoted in this thesis. How 
can we come to understand anything beyond the confines of our own thinking, 
concepts, theoretical structures, or understanding? While some solutions to 
this problem were already proposed above, most importantly through the 
analysis of Arne B. Johansen’s deductivism, the part will turn to presenting 
more explicit attempts to transcend the inductive/deductive dichotomy in 
archaeology, and to reiterating their philosophical underpinnings. 
                                               
37  In philosophy of science, Sami Paavola, for example, has made an interesting observation 
concerning the theory-ladenness of observations. In discussing the so-called reversible figures where the 
same data can be interpreted in two different ways, Paavola (2015, 233), notes that in discussions on the 
theory-ladenness of observations the observation-ladenness of theories is seldom noted. At times, as in 
visual illusions, the perception is ‘forced onto the observer’: “Hypotheses are [...] closely related to 
observations, and they have their origins in this close relationship”. For an archaeological example, see, 
for example, Edgeworth 2012. 
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While undoubtedly problematic, Johansen’s idea of the inescapable 
subjectivity of archaeological observation nevertheless sparked interest in 
wider debates in the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in 
Scandinavian archaeology at a relatively early stage (Malmer 1980; Johansen 
1982; c.f. Myhre 1991). The ideas developed by Johansen also anticipated 
many of the characteristics that became widely accepted in archaeological 
theorising in the course of the 1980s and the 1990s. Johansen’s philosophy of 
archaeology can therefore be seen as a contribution towards the emergence of 
interpretive archaeology ten years later, and Johansen should accordingly be 
included in the list of early interpretive archaeologists. In particular his 
influence, although not a topic addressed by Johansen himself, contributed 
towards discussing the role of social theories in archaeology (Myhre 1991, 173). 
It is precisely this increasing interest in social theory in archaeology that brings 
us to our next topic.38 
As the deductivist program of New Archaeology faced increasing critique 
in the course of the 1970s, the epistemology of archaeology marginalised. On 
the one hand, this marginalisation marks the proliferation of archaeological 
theorising that drew not so much from positivist philosophy of science, but 
instead from social, cultural, and linguistic theories, such as the broad fields 
of ethnography, anthropology, structuralist semiotics, poststructuralist 
critical theory, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and pragmatic semiotics 
(Preucel 1991; Articles 1 and 2). Those who ventured into social theory mainly 
borrowed their philosophical frame of reference from linguistics, particularly 
from structuralism and poststructuralism, but also from pragmatic semiotics 
(c.f. Bapty and Yates 1990; Preucel and Mrozowski 2010). Those who did 
continue the philosophy of science program initiated by New Archaeology 
mostly turned to postpositivist Kuhnian philosophy of science on the one hand 
and scientific realism on the other in conceptualising the nature of 
archaeological inference (c.f. Kelley and Hanen 1988; Gibbon 1989). The 
central aim of this ‘postprocessual epistemology of archaeology’ was to find 
novel conceptualisations for the process by which the unobserved is inferred 
from the observed without recourse to logical positivism or radical 
subjectivism (Article 5).39 In this respect, pragmatist philosophy in particular 
came to form an important inspiration for philosophers of archaeology in 
search of the third culture (see Articles 1–3). 
                                               
38 Social aspects, both past and present, were, of course, discussed earlier (e.g. Tallgren 1934; Clark 
1939). To a large extent, having witnessed the Second World War, New Archaeology’s idea of the method 
of explanation, validation, and interpretation aimed towards the elimination of personal or social 
authority in science. Further distinction should be made between social theory and theorising 
archaeological inference as a matter of social practice rather than formal logic. 
39 Postprocessual here refers to interpretive archaeology, not only because interpretive archaeology 
became after processualism but because postprocessual archaeology was generally interested in those 
processes that take place after the archaeological processes, which were the focus of processual 
archaeology. 
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In trying to solve the problem of inference from observation to the 
unobserved, several authors have come to suggest that archaeological 
inference is best understood in terms of analogical or abductive inference, not 
induction or deduction (Articles 1 and 3). The logical operation akin to 
abduction known as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) in particular 
became popular among archaeologists in the course of the 1980s (see Article 
3, p. 72 for references; c.f. Marila 2013). Whereas much of New Archaeology’s 
epistemology, for instance, had stressed the inferential schema, these new 
formulations of the method of inference aimed to transcend the 
inductive/deductive dichotomy by highlighting the actual practice as well as 
the social and subjective extent of the inference process (Article 3; Wylie 1985; 
Kelley and Hanen 1988, chapter 4; Gibbon 1989, chapter 7). 
An early example of what can be considered an attempt to transcend the 
schematic induction/deduction dichotomy by reference to a practical 
conceptualisation of inference was presented by Leroy Johnson (1972, 368) as 
part of his critique of New Archaeology’s overarching reliance on the 
hypothetico-deductive method. In his analysis of the troubles that the new 
‘avant-garde archaeology’ (i.e. New Archaeology) can lead to, Johnson points 
out three major shortcomings: (1) social scientists have never discovered law-
like regularities that are not trivial and therefore uninteresting to the 
archaeologist, (2) law-like generality would obscure the simplest phenomena 
that behavioural scientists are interested in, and, most importantly, (3) 
deduction cannot deal with likelihood or degree, because for deductive logic 
correctness is an all-or-nothing affair (Johnson 1972, 367).40 In Johnson’s 
view, the procedure of deductive testing suggested by avant-garde archaeology 
would, contrary to its objective of increasing objectivity, end up creating 
unwanted conceptual biases and that, in order to avoid those biases, 
archaeology should be radically empiricist. Johnson then argues that the 
modus operandi of archaeology “is to include systematically all the characters 
or traits that the investigator can observe” (Johnson 1972, 373): 
The archaeologist, after the descriptive analysis is done, then tries to 
determine why the data were arranged or grouped in such-and-such a 
way. Outside controls and independent data help provide the answer. 
[The] explanation may include factors such as geographic situation and 
tool-kit function, as well as age, in explaining classification or seriation 
of archaeologic assemblages. (Johnson 1972, 374, emphasis original) 
Johnson’s (1972) socially enlightened alternative to explanation by deduction, 
then, is what he calls the ‘analytical narrative’, the procedure of linking 
numerous inductively drawn generalisations and background knowledge from 
multiple fields in order to account for the uncertainties or other weaknesses 
nested in those generalisations. In this sense, following the idea that the 
simple procedure of deductively testing the correctness of a hypothesis is not 
possible, the archaeologist assumes some sort of relevant connection between 
                                               
40 Johnson, born in 1935, would probably not qualify as a young fogey (see above). 
  65 
 
 
multiple inductive inferences and uses those connections to strengthen the 
overall reliability of a particular conclusion. Other scholars have made similar 
claims about the most common character of archaeological inference as the 
analogical combining of relevant observations across a wide range of domains, 
both past and present (e.g. Ascher 1961; Morgan 1973; Smith 1977; Shelley 
1999; Wylie 2000; 2002; Binford 2001; Currie 2016).41 
Alison Wylie (1989b) refers to the combining of evidence in order to 
construct more robust theories as ‘cabling’. In this metaphor, the cable 
consists of multiple strands which together make the cable considerably 
stronger than any individual strand, or any individual link in a cable, for that 
matter. The process through which one aims to establish connectivity between 
individual strands of evidence Wylie refers to as ‘tacking’. Tacking, for Wylie, 
denotes a dialectical movement between strands of evidence in order to 
establish to what extent any particular strand of evidence might be relevant for 
the question at hand (1989b, 14). In other words, when tacking between 
perspectives, we seek to distance ourselves from our own experiences and 
theories in order to find evidence that simultaneously supports and challenges 
the existing theory. One central element in this process is surprise (Wylie 
1989b, 16). The observation of a surprising fact can lead us to challenge a 
particular pre-existing theory. Wylie contends that 
[w]e frequently find out that we were wrong, that the data resist any 
interpretation that will make them consistent with our expectations, 
and that we are dealing with a subject (cultural or otherwise) which is 
very different from anything with which we are familiar. We are then 
forced by the evidence to consider completely different interpretive 
possibilities than we have entertained in the past, and even to rethink 
deep-seated orienting presuppositions about the nature of cultural 
phenomena. (Wylie 1989b, 16) 
Wylie then concludes by pointing out that of course facts are not totally given, 
but that it would be similarly fallacious to assimilate them to theoretical 
constructs, as is characteristic of relativist views of the relationship between 
objectivity and subjectivity or fact and theory (Wylie 1989b, 16–17). 
In addition to providing a description of how strands of evidence are 
combined, Johnson’s (1972) analytical narrative highlights that, in combining 
a host of inductive inferences, archaeological inference succeeds in including 
those weak inductive inferences that might end up eliminated in favor of more 
robust hypotheses if the deductive procedure of testing was followed. This 
does not only mean that the archaeologists should know their materials as 
intimately as possible but that, in order to identify some insignificantly 
seeming evidence as relevant, they should also acquaint themselves with 
research areas outside of archaeology. Ethnography in particular is seen as a 
                                               
41 Note also that already Müller and, before him, C.J. Thomsen, stressed that the study of artefacts 
alone is not sufficient for the construction of chronology, but archaeology should always take the find 
circumstances into account. 
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valuable field by Johnson, but he similarly stresses the importance of 
philosophy, zoology, statistics, and mathematics (Johnson 1972, 375).  
In characterising the logical form of the analytical narrative, and in order 
to sidestep the problem of induction, Johnson identifies a third mode of 
inference that he refers to as the Sherlock Holmesian method of induction 
(Johnson 1972, 368).42 While simple enumerative induction generalises from 
the observation of similar facts, Holmesian induction combines those 
individual inductions by speculating about possible linkages between them. 
Needless to say, wide-ranging background knowledge in a variety of fields or 
domains—and therefore the ability to identify a larger number of small details 
that do not fall within preconceived theoretical models or series of inductive 
generalisations as significant—becomes an important part of archaeological 
inference. Johnson’s reference to Holmes, then, marks a widespread use of the 
detective analogy in archaeology both as a metaphor and, more importantly, 
in terms of the actual inferential process (Kelley and Hanen 1988, 360 [IBE]; 
Shanks 1992 [metaphor]; Shanks 1996 [abduction]; Strinnholm 1998 
[abduction]; Pearson and Shanks 2001 [abduction]; Holtorf 2005; 2007 
[metaphor]; see also Klejn 2001, 40 for references).  
While the detective metaphor is useful in describing the practice rather 
than the form of archaeological inference, it also introduces a source of 
confusion in terms of the nature of inference. Holmes himself refers to his 
method as a form of deductive reasoning (based on the axiom ‘when you have 
eliminated all which is impossible, then, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth’), but it has been pointed out that detective 
reasoning is in fact closer in form to abductive inference (c.f. papers in Eco and 
Sebeok 1983; Anderson and Twining 2015). Furthermore, the sense in which 
detective reasoning can be considered an instance of abductive inference 
rather than deductive inference also risks the confusion between two further 
understandings of the nature of detective reasoning; detective reasoning as a 
creative logic of hypothesis creation (abduction), and detective reasoning as a 
logic of hypothesis selection (IBE). As will become apparent below, this 
distinction also marks a distinction between gradual hypothesis elimination 
and hypothesis creation, and by this token also two very different takes on 
what constitutes inference to begin with. Therefore, the distinction is also vital 
for a speculative epistemology of archaeology which aims to intensify the 
importance of creative hypothesis formation rather than the elimination of 
speculation by recourse to a priori hypothesis selection criteria. 
 
The concept of Inference to the Best Explanation was first introduced in 1965 
by philosopher Gilbert Harman: 
                                               
42 Compare with Sophus Müller’s use of ‘hypothesis’ (see above). 
  67 
 
 
I claim that, in cases where it appears that a warranted inference is an 
instance of enumerative induction, the inference should be described as 
a special case of another sort of inference, which I shall call ‘the 
inference to the best explanation.’ [...] In making this inference one 
infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the 
evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there will be several 
hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so one must be able to 
reject all such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making 
the inference. Thus one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis 
would provide a ‘better’ explanation for the evidence than would any 
other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true. 
There is, of course, a problem about how one is to judge that one 
hypothesis is sufficiently better than another hypothesis. Presumably 
such a judgment will be based on considerations such as which 
hypothesis is simpler, which is more plausible, which explains more, 
which is less ad hoc, and so forth. I do not wish to deny that there is a 
problem about explaining the exact nature of these considerations; I will 
not, however, say anything more about this problem. (Harman 1965, 
88–89) 
In these formulations, Harman’s IBE “corresponds approximately” to 
abduction (Harman 1965, 88), and his vague conceptualisation of the selection 
criteria should be seen against this identification.43  
Some years later, Harman (1968) gave a revised version of IBE in which he 
states that all enumerative inductions are cases of IBE. For Harman, then, IBE 
is inductive, not abductive. Furthermore, Harman states that IBE is not the 
operation of comparing alternative explanatory hypotheses, but rather the 
comparison of competing explanations. In this sense, Harman aims to 
highlight that induction already is an explanation of the observations included 
in it, and that the important part in assessing competing hypotheses is their 
fitness in the existing body of knowledge: “The best explanation is the one that 
fits in best. It is inferable if it fits in sufficiently better than competing 
alternatives” (Harman 1968, 531). And he continues: “inference to the best 
explanation is ultimately inference to the best total explanatory picture of the 
world” (Harman 1968, 533). By these tactics, Harman sidesteps the problem 
of induction by arguing that all enumerative inductions are ampliative, not 
because induction assumes the truth of the generalisation that it tries to 
establish through observation of its instances, but because the evidence of 
induction is already dependent on other inductions, or because inductive 
inferences have a history (Harman 1968, 531–532; c.f. Norton 2003; for the 
distinction between types of IBE in reference to induction, abduction, and the 
logic of discovery, see Hintikka 1998; Minnameier 2004; Paavola 2006; 
                                               
43  For some, abduction does not conform to formal logic because it also includes instinctive, 
intuitive, emotional, and other vaguely quantifiable reasons as important factors in pursuing or choosing 
a particular hypothesis over other possible ones (Article 3; c.f. Semetsky 2004; Paavola 2005; Forth 
2018; see, however, Ma and Pietarinen 2018 who provide a formal description of abduction). Peirce 
would at times support the view that abduction is an instance of insight (CP 5.181), but he does not see 
intuition (MS [R] 595) or instinct (MS [R] 1573) as inferential. 
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Campos 2011). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether Harman’s 
identification between IBE and induction really solves the problem of 
induction. 
Philosopher Peter Lipton (1991) provides a further developed account of 
the selective process of competing hypotheses. Lipton (Lipton 1991, 59–61) 
argues that, whenever we are faced with evidence that requires an explanation, 
all hypotheses go through two epistemic filters. First, we select a group of 
potential or plausible hypotheses out of all possible explanations, and out of 
these possible hypotheses we select the best possible explanation. Unlike 
Harman, Lipton treats IBE as a form of inductive inference, and therefore 
concentrates on how we compare or evaluate multiple plausible hypotheses 
(c.f. Campos 2011). This of course leads to the problem of identifying the 
criteria that allow the selection of one hypothesis over competing ones in the 
first place. In discussing the selection criteria Lipton makes one central 
distinction, that between likely explanations and lovely explanation (Lipton 
1991; c.f. Marila 2013). Whereas likely explanations would initially seem like 
those that scientist would choose over other less likely ones, Lipton points out 
that the likeliest explanations may not be the ones that provide the greatest 
sense of understanding. To say, for example, that the tastiest meals are 
prepared by great chefs may be a likely explanation, but it does not, in all its 
triviality, provide a deeper understanding of gastronomy (Lipton 2000, 187). 
Similarly, Newtonian mechanics, in providing a broad understanding of the 
behaviour of physical objects, may be a lovely explanation, but it may not be 
the likeliest (Lipton 1991, 62). 
Lipton then argues that the best explanations are those that provide the 
greatest sense of understanding while still being the most likely ones. 
Accordingly, Lipton suggests that Inference to the Best Explanation should be 
construed as Inference to the Loveliest Explanation (2000, 187). If Lipton is 
to establish a connection between likeliness and loveliness, he has to answer 
the following three questions: 
(1) How do we identify the features of explanations that contribute to the 
degree of understanding they provide? 
(2) How do we show that the aspects of loveliness match judgements of 
likeliness, or that the loveliest explanations also tend to be those that are 
judged likeliest to be correct? 
(3) How do we show that, granting the match between loveliness and 
judgments of likeliness, the former is in fact the scientists’ guide to the 
latter, and, most importantly, that loveliness is actually a form of 
explanation? 
In answering the first question, Lipton (2000, 188) stresses the importance of 
contrastive reasoning: why the observed happened rather than something else. 
In identifying contrafactual effects, we infer to the possible causes behind 
them. This in turn shows to us that not any cause will suffice in explaining the 
observed effects; “[n]ot all causes provide lovely explanations, and an account 
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of contrastive explanation helps to identify which do and which do not” 
(Lipton 2000, 188).44 
Lipton’s answer to the second question is partly connected to the first. 
Lipton argues that in establishing the match between loveliness and likeliness, 
we actually combine a host of possible explanations and eliminate those that 
are in conflict with the observed facts. The match between loveliness and 
likeliness is therefore established by comparing cases with known connection 
between causes and effects: 
This general pattern of argument, which seeks explanations that 
account not only for a given effect, but also for particular contrasts 
between cases where the effect occurs and cases where it is absent, is 
very common in science—for example, wherever use is made of 
controlled experiments. (Lipton 2000, 189, my emphasis) 
In other words, Lipton’s answer to questions (1) and (2) is that through the 
comparison of data against and between possible hypotheses, we choose those 
ones that are likeliest to be true, and because the resulting hypotheses are the 
most likely accounts of the total account of the world, they are also the loveliest 
in terms of their capacity to provide the greatest sense of understanding.  
This leaves Lipton with the task of demonstrating why a given hypothesis 
is likely just because it is lovely, and why lovely hypotheses therefore are also 
explanations. In this respect, Lipton points out that a critic of the model could 
argue that, although the connection between loveliness and likeliness can be 
established, IBE does not necessarily have anything to do with explanation but 
is instead based on other factors. In other words, “[w]hy should it be that the 
hypotheses that scientists judge likeliest to be correct are also those that would 
provide the most understanding if they were correct?” (Lipton 2000, 190). 
Lipton simply answers that “[i]f scientists select hypotheses on the basis of 
their explanatory virtues, the match between loveliness and judgments of 
likeliness follows as a matter of course” (Lipton 2000, 190). Lipton (2000, 191) 
then concludes—by adding one metalevel—that the inference that a lovely 
hypothesis is also the likeliest to be correct is simply the best possible 
explanation. In this sense, Lipton’s take on IBE highlights how science in 
practice does not follow a clear template or procedure, but is always dependent 
on the nature of available evidence. 
Harman’s and Lipton’s analyses of IBE as inductive highlight an important 
distinction that can be made when assessing the relevance of induction as an 
                                               
44 Hypotheses are to be regarded in relation to various other phenomena and subsidiary information 
as well as the researcher’s background knowledge. This is also evident in discussions on abduction. 
Abduction requires background knowledge and a consideration or anticipation of counterarguments in 
practice. In philosophy of science this understanding is sometimes referred to as ‘strategic abduction’ 
(Paavola 2004), ‘model-based abduction’ (Magnani 1999), or ‘abduction as practical inference’ (Kapitan 
2000). Note also that, in addition to this theoretical or sentential side of abduction, one can identify 
another, more practical, sensorial, or manipulative sense in which abduction takes place in the company 
of things: “A man can distinguish different textures of cloth by feeling; but not immediately, for he 
requires to move his fingers over the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare the sensations of 
one instant with those of another” (CP 5.221; c.f. Article 3; Shelley 1996; Magnani 2004. See also, for 
example, Pétursdóttir 2014). 
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ampliative form of inference; that between induction as formal or schematic 
and induction as factual or material. In a treatment of induction similar to 
Harman’s, John Norton (2003) refers to induction as a material theory and 
argues that there are no universal inference schemas that inductive reasoning 
should follow. Instead, inductive inference is grounded in facts and the 
relevance of those facts is limited to particular domains. Norton then contends 
that 
[t]he important point is that the facts prevailing in the relevant domain 
dictate what can count as an explanation for the evidence. Indeed that 
something explains at all is itself recovered by direct inspection of the 
case at hand and not by demonstrating conformity to some externally 
supplied template for what counts as a good explanation. (Norton 2003, 
657–658) 
Because induction does not have wide-ranging generality but is instead 
limited to particular observations, Norton (2003) proposes that the specificity 
of inductive generalisations will have to be compensated by combining 
inductions over a broader field. “In learning more facts, we extend our 
inductive reach by supplying more localized inductive inference schemes” 
(Norton 2003, 647). Interestingly, then, similar ideas were put forward as part 
of the critique targeted against New Archaeology’s centralisation of the 
deductive method and its denouncement of induction under the auspices of 
Hume. As was already noticed above, the idea that induction is not limited to 
a general inductive schema is therefore well-established also in the 
epistemology of archaeology (e.g. Dommasnes 1987; Wylie 1989b; Watson 
1991; Strinnholm 1998; Binford 2001; Articles 3 and 4). The real relevance of 
Norton’s analysis for our exposition of IBE is that, much like induction does 
not follow any particular schema, the selection of hypotheses in IBE is not 
based on any formal rules that would allow a secure comparison of hypotheses, 
but instead on the material constituents of a hypothesis (Norton 2003, 656–
657; c.f. Norton 2010). 
Because the IBE model of hypothesis selection provides a much more 
intuitive and practical description of the inference process than the formalist 
accounts of induction or deduction, it has become widely discussed in 
archaeology (e.g. Kelley and Hanen 1988; Hanen and Kelley 1989; Routledge 
1995; Fogelin 2007; Bogaard 2015). However, many treat IBE as a further 
developed form of abductive inference with little regard for the differences 
between IBE and abduction. As result, passing reference to abduction is made 
in the discussions on IBE, while the role of abduction in IBE remains vague in 
these treatments. 
Lars Fogelin’s (2007) treatment of the uses of IBE in archaeology does 
highlight the important distinction between IBE as hypothesis selection and 
IBE as hypothesis creation. Fogelin differentiates between Harmanian and 
Liptonian understanding of IBE as an inductive logic of hypothesis selection, 
and IBE as a form of hypothesis creation similar to how Norwood Russell 
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Hanson (1958) sees hypothesis formation and scientific discovery as instances 
of abductive inference. Having made this distinction, Fogelin does not deal 
with hypothesis formation, discovery, or abduction, but instead proceeds to 
discussing IBE in terms of possible hypothesis selection criteria. Fogelin’s 
(2007, 618–619) seven criteria, some of which derive from Lipton (1991) are 
generality, modesty, refutability, conservatism, simplicity, empirical 
broadness, and multiplicity of foils (i.e. counterarguments). In order to show 
that culture-historical, processual, and postprocessual archaeologies share an 
epistemological connection, Fogelin then presents four cases from the history 
of archaeology and argues that, regardless of how archaeologists themselves 
have conceptualised the process of hypothesis selection (as inductive, 
hypothetico-deductive, or hermeneutic), the inference process has actually 
followed the general model of IBE, and that the selection of “the most 
compelling” explanation has been founded on the above mentioned seven 
selection criteria.45 
Another discussion of IBE as a characteristically archaeological method of 
inference is provided by Kelley and Hanen (1988; c.f. Hanen and Kelley 1989). 
In their exposition of the history of archaeological inference, primarily 
targeted against the use of deduction in the course of the New Archaeology, 
Kelley and Hanen aim to show that IBE is the most common form of 
archaeological inference. While much of the book is dedicated to discussing 
the philosophy of science in archaeology, one chapter provides a host of 
archaeological cases where IBE was used. One of Kelley and Hanen’s examples 
reviews Emil Haury’s 1958 study of the archaeological evidence found at Point 
of Pines in southern Arizona (Kelley and Hanen 1988, 279–286). In his study, 
Haury reported anomalous findings that did not fit the generally accepted 
account of the Point of Pines site. These new findings included, for example, 
clay vessels made of local clay but decorated in a fashion characteristic of the 
northern Kayenta region rather than with local motifs, a D-shaped kiva 
normally associated with northern regions, as well as botanical remains of 
plant varieties more common to the northern part of the state. In trying to 
explain the surprising findings, Haury concluded that migration from the 
north would explain the anomalies. Interestingly, Haury, did not set out to 
interpret the materials with the migration hypothesis in mind. In fact, Haury 
was sceptical of migration hypotheses to begin with, and was only inclined to 
adopt one in light of the unexpected observations (Kelley and Hanen 1988, 
                                               
45 It is interesting that Fogelin at the same time argues for generality and broadness (explanations 
should cover a wide field of different aspects of the material and be applicable in a variety of cases) as 
well as for modesty, simplicity and conservatism (explanations should not be applied to everything, they 
should be simple rather than complex, and well-established explanations should not be discarded easily). 
There is, of course, no good reason why all explanations should be simple or applicable to a wide variety 
of cases. In fact, this kind of conservatism may well result in a systematic neglect of the possibilities of 
science. Consider the following passage from Peirce: “[E]ven the most admirable of modern reasoners, 
and in those kinds of reasoning in which they are at their very best, occasionally draw inferences that 
[are] utterly unfounded, but which more or less tinge all their subsequent teachings. Yet considering 
modern science as a whole, I believe its positively wrong conclusions are of small moment compared 
with its neglect systematically to consider possibilities among which there are likely to be keys to 
undiscovered treasuries of truth.” (EP 2, 465–466, emphasis original) 
  72 
 
 
281). Kelley and Hanen (1988, 285–286) then point out that Haury’s intimate 
knowledge of the materials in both regions partly contributed towards noticing 
the discrepancies, whereas many others may have missed them, and, more 
importantly, that Haury’s adoption of the migration hypothesis led to 
increased readiness for other sceptics to do the same. 
Interestingly, then, Kelley and Hanen (1988) do not only demonstrate that 
much of archaeological reasoning follows a pattern (in their view the model of 
IBE) that does not easily conform to either the inductive or the deductive 
schema; they also highlight that the selection of hypotheses does not follow 
clearly defined selection criteria. Instead, Kelley and Hanen contend that the 
evidencing process is affected by social factors such as the personal prejudices 
of the researcher or the core beliefs held by the scientific community. In a 
Kuhnian fashion, Kelley and Hanen then point out that the core beliefs of the 
discipline are often considered sacred until the amount of conflicting evidence 
makes it impossible to support that view. Similar examples of the holding 
power of existing theories in the history of Finnish and Swedish archaeology 
were presented in Article 4. 
Instead of telling much about how possible explanations are selected in 
light of the available data, the cases discussed by Kelley and Hanen (1988) 
perhaps better showcase how some hypotheses are considered more appealing 
because they fit the particular scientific atmosphere or because there exists a 
critical mass that will also see those particular hypotheses as worthy of further 
examination. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to research why individual 
researchers choose to pursue one hypothesis over other possible ones because 
usually only the successful hypotheses make it into the publications. In light 
of the above, IBE can perhaps better be described as inference to the pursuit-
worthiness of hypotheses or as ‘inference to better explanation’ (McKaughan 
2008; Bogaard 2015; Nyrup 2015; 2020). Both perspectives highlight that the 
logic of archaeology is not a matter of logical schemas, but is better understood 
as an activity and as a personal and historical process (Articles 1–5). In this 
process, the personal traits of the researcher, such as the audacity to follow 
vague hunches or take half-baked ideas seriously, are much more important 
than an explicit inferential schema (c.f. Dewey 1929, 247; Snyder 2005; Lahiri 
2017). Furthermore, as was discussed in Article 3 in particular, the reasons for 
selecting one hypothesis over another are often impossible to explicate, and 
are instead only vaguely identifiable. While discussions over IBE, as we saw 
above, have remained somewhat vague about the nature of inference as a 
process as well as about the role of ambiguity in it, these aspects have been 
more intimately incorporated in discussions on abductive inference. I will 
therefore limit my exposition of IBE as hypothesis selection to the above 
examples, and instead turn to our second understanding of detective 
reasoning as a way to transcend the inductive/deductive dichotomy; the 
abductive logic of discovery. 
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For the Popperian New Archaeology, hypothesis formation remains a matter 
of psychology rather than logic (e.g. Binford 1977, 2; Article 3, p. 73). In this 
context, it does not matter whether the hypothesis is introduced in a dream or 
a hallucination; the important thing is whether the hypothesis will survive 
testing. While IBE is more concerned with the process of hypothesis selection 
and treats hypothesis formation as an independent realm, abduction concerns 
both of these. It was argued above that IBE can either be considered as an 
instance of abduction or induction. Whereas both induction and abduction 
find relevance in the context of IBE, I will turn to discussing abduction as the 
logic of hypothesis creation. However, the discussion also concerns the 
distinction between induction and abduction, and in fact the end of the last 
chapter of this part is dedicated to this distinction in general. 
An early reference to abduction in the context of archaeological theory is 
provided by Fred Plog (1974, 19) who sees abduction as the central operation 
by which hypotheses are introduced. Plog explicitly states that abduction is not 
an instance of inductive inference, and that the quality of an abduction is 
dependent on the creative ability of the individual scientist. Plog refers to 
Hempel (e.g. 1965, 6) in his view that imagination and guessing are what give 
rise to possible explanatory hypotheses, although it should be noted that 
Hempel, along with other hypothetico-deductive philosophers, such as 
Popper, does not see how matters of psychology or creativity are relevant for 
the logic of science. Plog then writes that 
[f]amiliarity with data is an essential condition for carrying out any 
research, for operationalizing any hypothesis. But, while familiarity is 
essential, the probable validity of an hypothesis cannot be evaluated on 
the basis of the amount of data an investigator treated in creating it. It 
is a function of his creative ability as a scientist, and no more. One often 
suspects that those who wish to explain hypothesis creation as a linear 
function of data examination are trying either to shift responsibility for 
hypotheses they could not create or to protect themselves lest they be 
wrong. The courage to risk being wrong is the essence of innovation. 
And, to claim that explanations are derived from data rather than the 
minds of scientists is intellectual cowardice. (Plog 1974, 19) 
In arguing the above, Plog hints towards a certain kind of mysticism in 
hypothesis creation that was never taken seriously as part of the Hempelian or 
Popperian epistemology of New Archaeology. This mysticism is best 
understood as an element of subjectivity. In this sense, Plog’s understanding 
of abduction is inspired by Norwood Russell Hanson’s (1958) Peircean 
understanding of the logic of discovery as fundamentally abductive rather than 
inductive (Plog 1974, 19). Hanson, who can be considered one of the first to 
introduce the concept of theory-ladenness in philosophy of science, held that 
abductive inference and subjective perception are two sides of the same coin 
(Hanson 1958, 86). In order to understand this connectedness between 
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inference and perception one has to realise that, for Hanson, theory-ladenness 
in science means ‘causality-ladenness’ (Heidelberger 2003, 140). This means 
that, while we can perceive effects without a background theory, we need one 
to understand their relevance for the context in which they take place. In other 
words, we need a theory to form a causal connection between observations. 
“Causes certainly are connected with effects; but this is because our theories 
connect them, not because the world is held together by cosmic glue” (Hanson 
1958, 64). The identification of causal connections pertinent to a particular 
context, then, hinges on a wide range of pre-existing theoretical background 
knowledge. Otherwise we would not be able to distinguish causality from 
random coincidence (Hanson 1958, 64). Furthermore, because any contextual 
detail can be possibly relevant for a given problem, the identification of a 
possible cause for that particular detail is important. The abduction of a 
possible cause hinges on previous observations of causes for similar effects, 
but the resulting hypothesis is by no means determined by those previous 
experiences. Rather, the relevance of a hypothesis is evaluated in light of 
imagined possible observations (Article 5). Perception, then, is permeated by 
abduction: “The dawning of an aspect and the dawning of an explanation both 
suggest what to look for next” (Hanson 1958, 86).  
Unfortunately, the majority of Plog’s study is dedicated to the development 
of methodological rigour, and he has little more to say about the aspects that 
are important for the creation of hypotheses. Interestingly, the sense in which 
Plog refers to abduction as the key logical operation behind the formation of 
(possibly) successful hypotheses echoes in the way in which Michael Shanks 
sees abduction as a force of hypothesis creation. Shanks’ description, however, 
ultimately succeeds in retaining the sense of mysticism or personal wonder 
that characterises abduction as the logic of perception: 
Abduction is this process of reasoning backwards, studying tracks, and 
is rooted in all the senses and faculties. Every dimension of experience 
and memory may be helpful in making the imaginative conjecture. 
Abduction is the work of intuition, defined not as extra-sensory 
perception, but as a lightning recapitulation of rational processes. After 
all, anyone could do what Holmes does—it is elementary; only he does 
it so quickly. (Shanks 1996, 38) 
In another context, Pearson and Shanks (2001, 60) contend that abduction 
“is a creative process of speculative modelling which demands no hierarchy 
between empirical attention, analysis and leaps of the imagination”. The sense 
in which Shanks (1996, 38–39) then refers to abduction as a practical, creative, 
embodied, and even emotional reasoning highlights the development in which 
archaeologists interested in epistemological matters turned to the role of the 
body, perception, and the senses in the course of the 1980s and the 1990s (e.g. 
Edgeworth 1990; Tilley 1994, see, especially, Article 3 for discussion on 
abduction and the senses, and for further references to archaeological 
literature on the topic). Nevertheless, although Shanks is careful in making a 
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distinction between abduction and other modes of inference, namely 
induction and deduction, he does treat abduction as the procedure by which 
hypotheses are created for later testing. 
Like Shanks’ treatment of abduction, Cameron Shelley’s Visual abductive 
reasoning in archaeology (1996; see also Shelley 1995) reflects the 
phenomenological and embodied understanding of the epistemology of 
archaeology. In his article, Shelley stresses the centrality of visual mental 
imagery in generating archaeological hypotheses. Shelley (1996, 280) 
contends that archaeology is a particularly well-suited context for the study of 
abductive reasoning since “archaeologists are routinely confronted with the 
visual properties of new, concrete objects and required to explain them”. 
Shelley then points out that one particular operation by which mental imagery 
are formed in archaeology is abduction. However, in his analysis of the 
suitability of abductive inference in the context of archaeology, Shelley (1996, 
279) argues that Peircean abduction has one drawback—“its restriction to a 
language-like medium of representation, namely sentences”. Shelley’s 
solution, then, is to expand abduction to govern the visual realm. In order to 
understand the reasoning behind Shelley’s description of abduction as limited 
to the sentential level, and in order to contextualise his solution to extend 
abduction beyond its sentential boundaries, which I will take up shortly, a brief 
exposition of Peirce’s understanding(s) of abduction is needed. At least two 
very different meanings of abduction can be identified in the course of Peirce’s 
career (Paavola 2005), and Shelley only succeeds in accounting for one. 
In an early formulation from 1878, Peirce identifies abduction as a 
syllogism by contrasting it to induction and deduction. Note that, at this point 
in his career, Peirce used the word hypothesis instead of abduction; the two 
terms are synonymous: 
Deduction 
Rule.—All the beans from this bag are white. 
Case.—These beans are from this bag. 
Result.—These beans are white. 
Induction 
Case.—These beans are from this bag. 
Result.—These beans are white. 
Rule.—All the beans from this bag are white. 
Hypothesis [Abduction] 
Rule.—All the beans from this bag are white. 
Result.—These beans are white. 
Case.—These beans are from this bag. (CP 2.623) 
In these sentential descriptions, or syllogisms, deduction states the necessary 
consequences of the application of a rule to a case, induction generalises a rule 
from the observation of a case, and abduction infers a case from a rule and a 
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result. The reason for Peirce’s identification of abduction as a form of inference 
distinct from induction and deduction is that, by doing so, Peirce intended to 
argue that the introduction of new ideas through abductive inference (‘Case’ 
in the hypothesis [abduction] example above) is a matter of logic, just like it is 
in induction and deduction. Whether Peirce succeeds to do this with his 
syllogism, remains a matter of discussion. Jaakko Hintikka (1998), for 
instance, has pointed out that the syllogistic form leads to problems that do 
not work in Peirce’s favour. Hintikka argues that, in the syllogistic form, the 
inference does not even provide probabilistic support for the abductive 
conclusion, a fact that makes it hard to accept abduction as a form of inference 
and therefore part of logic. Hintikka (1998, 511–512) then suggests that, in 
order to understand abduction as an instance of ampliative inference, one 
should understand it as a form of interrogation, or as the act of asking why-
questions. According to Hintikka, abduction should be seen as part of an 
interrogative method, not as an inferential schema. In this sense, Hintikka 
points towards an understanding of abduction that differs from the sentential 
definition significantly.  
Later in his career, Peirce indeed revised his understanding of abduction 
significantly, and Peirce scholars often make a distinction between Peirce’s 
pre- and post-1903 construals of abduction (e.g. Ma and Pietarinen 2018; 
Chiffi and Pietarinen 2019). In one of these post-1903 definitions, Peirce gave 
the following revised formulation of what abduction means: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed; [cf. Result] 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, [cf. Rule] 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. [cf. Case] (CP 5.189) 
Although this formulation obviously follows the sentential form of the earlier 
example, the substance of the sentences already points towards an 
understanding of abduction as a matter of discovery rather than evidencing 
(Burks 1946; Fann 1970; Anderson 1986). Here the part ‘there is reason to 
suspect’ already introduces abduction as a practical logic of scientific 
discovery. 
However, the evolution of Peirce’s thinking becomes even clearer through 
a quote from roughly the same time period. In circa 1905, Peirce characterised 
abduction as one of three “elementary modes of reasoning” (CP 8.209) in the 
following manner: 
The first, which I call abduction [...] consists in examining a mass of 
facts and in allowing these facts to suggest a theory. In this way we gain 
new ideas; but there is no force in the reasoning. The second kind of 
reasoning is deduction, or necessary reasoning. It is applicable only to 
an ideal state of things, or to a state of things in so far as it may conform 
to an ideal. It merely gives a new aspect to the premisses. It consists in 
constructing an image or diagram in accordance with a general precept, 
in observing in that image certain relations of parts not explicitly laid 
down in the precept, and in convincing oneself that the same relations 
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will always occur when that precept is followed out. [...] The third way 
of reasoning is induction, or experimental research. Its procedure is 
this. Abduction having suggested a theory, we employ deduction to 
deduce from that ideal theory a promiscuous variety of consequences to 
the effect that if we perform certain acts, we shall find ourselves 
confronted with certain experiences. We then proceed to try these 
experiments, and if the predictions of the theory are verified, we have a 
proportionate confidence that the experiments that remain to be tried 
will confirm the theory. (CP 8.209, emphases original) 
In this definition, abduction is essentially conceptualised in terms of scientific 
methodology rather than as a simple inferential schema or logical form (c.f. 
Paavola 2005). Although the description bears striking similarity with how 
New Archaeology conceptualised the deduction of test-implications from a 
hypothesis (see Article 4, p. 24) the crucial difference is that, whereas the H-D 
model denotes an adherence to a particular logical schema, abductive 
inference does not follow one. Most importantly, then, this methodological 
definition highlights that, in the process of inference, abduction is the phase 
that introduces new ideas so that they can in some cases, but not necessarily 
all, be subjected to the test of experimentation and experience (Article 3).  
More importantly, however, Peirce’s post-1903 understanding of 
abduction takes abductive inferences as questions pertaining to the interests 
of the inquirer, and experimentation entails the use of abductive inferences as 
lures for novel observations, or as Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2019) contends,  
abductive conclusions are requests to Nature to act in a certain way in 
certain kinds of circumstances, so that the skilful manipulators (the 
experimenters) would become in a position to gain important pieces of 
information as part of their yes–no-interrogation strategies. (Pietarinen 
2019, 256, emphasis original) 
Importantly, then, abduction becomes an ‘interrogative mood’, a feeling that 
the answer to the question might be important for the interests of the inquirer 
and that therefore the possibility that a hypothesis is true should be further 
investigated, resulting in the illocutionary conclusion ‘Let’s investigate!’ (Ma 
and Pietarinen 2018; Chiffi and Pietarinen 2019). In other words, if IBE 
suggests possible hypotheses (and possibly even criteria for their evaluation), 
the purpose of abduction is to intensify the feeling that a particular hypothesis 
deserves further attention. In its revised form, then, Peirce’s abduction fulfils 
the requirements set by both Hintikka (1998) and Shelley (1996). Peirce’s 
revised definitions pertain to Shelley’s requirements by framing abduction as 
a logic of practice instead of form, and they satisfy Hintikka’s view of abduction 
as an interrogative method in seeing abduction as a logic of asking questions 
rather than providing the conditions for conclusions (c.f. Pietarinen 2019). 
Although Shelley’s (1996, 279) straightforward dismissal of Peirce’s 
understanding of abduction as sentential is somewhat of an oversight, Shelley 
nevertheless makes a point in showing how deeply non-language-like 
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archaeological reasoning can be. One of Shelley’s (1996, 284) main points in 
elaborating on the non-sentential nature of inference is that explanations 
regarding the production of an archaeological object, for instance, are partly 
dependent on the possibility of being able to form a mental visualisation of the 
causal history of the object’s production. Shelley (1996, 284–285) uses stone 
tool production as an example of how visual abduction works. From the flake 
material found at an archaeological site, archaeologists familiar with the 
procedure of making a stone tool experimentally are able to infer causal 
reasons for certain traits in the flake material. Shelley gives an example of flake 
material that consisted of what the archaeologists called right-hand and left-
hand flakes in a ratio of 57 to 43 percent, respectively. According to Shelley, a 
visual thought experiment on how the tool maker would rotate the cobble 
between blows led the archaeologists to infer that the flakes had been 
produced by a right-handed tool maker. This hypothesis was later 
corroborated by an experimental production of a similar tool that resulted in 
a 56 to 44 percent ratio between right-hand and left-hand flakes.  
Shelley’s article remains a somewhat isolated incident in the epistemology 
of archaeology. In addition to being one of the few to have dealt with abduction 
in archaeology explicitly, Shelley is also one of the few that makes a clear 
distinction between abduction and IBE (see, however, Fogelin 2007). The 
more common alternative has been to confuse between the two in varying 
degrees (e.g. Hanen and Kelley 1989). Therefore, rather than inventing logical 
criteria for how the best explanation is selected from a collection of plausible 
or possible explanations, Shelley’s article provides a convincing description of 
how new ideas and new explanations are born in archaeology. Furthermore, 
Shelley’s article underscores the visual and embodied aspects of discovery and 
knowledge production and emphasises that subconscious visual abductions 
“may be very significant and lead to interesting new discoveries” (Magnani 
2004, 227. Magnani also refers to Shelley in this respect. See also Paavola 
2011. For further references to visuality in archaeology in the sense discussed 
here, see, for example, Jones 2001; Moser 2012; Jones et al. 2015). 
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As became evident from the examples discussed in the above rundown of the 
history of the epistemology of archaeology, the fundamentals of the formation 
of archaeological knowledge have been conceptualised in terms of induction, 
deduction, and abduction. From the above presentation of the common 
conceptualisations of the method of archaeological inference it is, then, 
unsurprisingly, possible to identify three main groups: (1) the 
inductivists, (2) the deductivists, and (3) the abductivists. Each group 
is further dividable into two subgroups, a critical and a naive position, 
resulting in a total of six groups. Although the following typology to some 
extent reflects the chronological history of archaeology from induction to 
deduction and abduction, the division is not tied to any particular time or 
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place, and the grouping should be seen foremost as a summary of the aspects 
discussed above. 
Subgroup 1a. The first group, generally referred to as naive 
inductivists, consists of those empiricist archaeologists who see 
archaeological inference as inherently inductive. In this context, 
induction denotes a certain conceptualisation of inference as ‘theory-
free’, followed by the empiricist conviction that through careful collecting 
a complete image of the past will eventually emerge. In other words, the 
objective of naive inductivists is to replace speculative hypotheses with 
secure inductions. In this sense, the form of inference in this first group 
could be termed ‘inference to the inevitable explanation’. Contrary to the 
empiricist objectives of the group, its inductivism can ultimately lead to 
skepticism, subjectivism, and idealism. This is a large group consisting 
mostly of traditional archaeologists as well as archaeologists who see the 
practice of archaeology as theory-free. Notable members include, for 
example, Sophus Müller, Oscar Montelius, and Julius Ailio. Note that the 
term naive in this context is not used as a pejorative term, but should 
instead be taken as a reference to the kind of empiricist attitude 
promoted in this thesis. 
Subgroup 1b. The second subgroup of inductivist archaeologists, here 
dubbed as critical inductivists, emerged with the decline of New 
Archaeology. Instead of adopting a view of the logic of archaeology as a 
formal logical system, as was common in New Archaeology, 
archaeological inference, and therefore the formation of new knowledge, 
is here seen as the combination of inductive generalisations. Especially 
those who see IBE and analogical thinking as instances of inductive 
inference belong to this group. Critical inductivism is common in 
archaeology. Notable authors include Leroy Johnson, Jane Kelley, 
Marsha Hanen, Alison Wylie, Lars Fogelin, as well as later Binford and 
other ‘serutan’ (that is, processual) archaeologists. Inductivism of this 
sort also contains an aspect of phenomenology, mainly through the 
works of Alison Wylie. 
Subgroup 2a. The first deductivist subgroup can be referred to as 
naive deductivists. The epistemology of this group is characterised by 
its connection to logical positivism and logical empiricism, naturalism, 
and evolutionism. Induction is seen by naive deductivists as a subjective 
generalisation that should be subjected to testing. This is the ‘law-and-
order’ type of New Archaeology that stressed the hypothetico-deductive 
method in the testing of hypotheses, and the term ‘naive’ in this context 
is used to call into question whether the adoption of deductivism over 
inductivism really resulted in any lesser degrees of theoretical naivety. 
The lifespan of this group was not long due to the criticism from the 
critical inductivists in the early 1970s. Regardless of its short existence, 
this group had quite a few members, most notably early Binford. Note 
that those who see deductive explanation as a matter of statistics 
naturally belong to the group of critical inductivists. 
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Subgroup 2b. The second subgroup of deductivists can be called 
critical deductivists. Deductivists of this type see deduction as a 
matter of subjectivism rather than as a strategy leading to increased 
objectivity. Most notably, critical deductivists consider observations as 
intimately theory-laden, and for this reason this group shares striking 
similarity with the critical inductivists. This group, however, falls in the 
deductivist category mainly by influence of Arne B. Johansen and, 
although many of its other members do not use the word deduction, the 
epistemology of this group is characterised by its centralisation of theory 
over data. Due to its centralisation of theoretical frameworks as 
inescapable, this group also encompasses the various rationalist, idealist, 
solipsist, relativist, and social constructionist forms of interpretive 
archaeology. Therefore, this type of deductivism is widespread in 
archaeology outside explicit epistemological treatments, and the list of 
members is extensive. 
Subgroup 3a. The first subgroup of abductivists, or what might be 
termed critical abductivists, is basically an abductivist version of 
critical inductivism (1b). Whereas critical inductivism sees the 
combination of inductive inferences as a matter of inductive 
generalisation (i.e. cabling), critical abductivism sees it as an instance of 
abductive inference. Therefore, for critical abductivists, also IBE and 
analogous thinking are instances of abductive rather than inductive 
inference. Furthermore, although the members of this group view 
hypothesis creation as abductive, they do not necessarily consider 
abduction as part of logic, and therefore separate abduction from 
induction and deduction as a matter of psychology. This type of 
abductivism is not widely adopted in archaeology. Members include, for 
example, Leo Klejn and Fred Plog. Some critical inductivists could be 
seen to belong to this group. 
Subgroup 3b. The second abductivist subgroup, or what could be called 
naive abductivists due to their strong empiricist devotion, consists of 
those who see the creation rather than the combining of hypotheses as 
the main task of abduction and who, furthermore, consider abduction 
intimately connected to logic rather than being simply a matter of 
psychology. By this token, the members of this group include perception 
and tacit or bodily forms of knowledge as elemental to logic. Members 
include Michael Shanks, Cameron Shelley, and, to some extent, the 
author himself (Articles 1 and 3). Note again that the term naive is not a 
pejorative term, but rather denotes a kind of speculative attitude towards 
the empirical. For this reason, the group could also be termed 
speculative abductivists. 
Although these six groups have very different ideas of how archaeological 
knowledge is developed from hypotheses to more secure forms of knowing, 
they all share two important and deeply entangled points of connection that 
are also part of the reason for the difficulties in conceptualising the process of 
archaeological knowledge production. Firstly, all of the above sketched 
epistemologies treat induction, deduction, and abduction as more or less 
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distinct operations. In addition to conflating between two meanings of the 
term deduction, it has, more importantly, been particularly challenging in 
archaeological theorising to clearly define abduction and induction in ways 
that would allow us to identify to what extent archaeological theories are result 
of induction, and to what extent hypotheses can be seen to resist the different 
eliminationist strategies and remain abductive. The clear distinction between 
hypothesis creation as a matter of psychology and hypothesis testing as a 
matter of inference in particular has tended to conceal the ambiguities 
involved in speculation rather than resolve them. In this respect, the above 
discussed distinction between abduction as sentential and abduction as 
methodological in particular is an important clarification that helps us to 
analyse the possible reasons for the difficulties in conceptualising the nature 
of archaeological inference. In particular, it highlights that matters of 
psychology and phenomenology phase into matters of logic. 
This leads us to the second point. All groups treat abduction (or hypothesis) 
as a provisional resort. In this sense, all of the above sketched six groups share 
a certain eliminationist idea that speculative hypotheses can and should be 
controlled and gradually eliminated by recourse to deductive or inductive 
selection and testing. For the naive inductivists (1a), the common strategy of 
elimination is collecting of data, whereas critical inductivists (1b) and critical 
abductivists (3a) hold that a hypothesis can be made more reliable (or a 
generalisation more justifiable) through the combination of hypotheses with 
relatively narrower applicability. The naive deductivists (2a) mainly see that 
all hypotheses fall equally outside the scope of logic until they go through a 
deductive process of selection and testing, and that a deductive conclusion 
should not hinge on untested or untestable hypotheses. The critical deductivist 
(2b), on the other hand, contends that all evidence is identified as evidence 
according to pre-existing theoretical frameworks to begin with, and that the 
invention of theories and concepts rather than the discovery of evidence is 
what can lead to new knowledge. This position shares many qualities with that 
of naive or speculative abductivism (3b). Although critical deductivists and 
naive or speculative abductivists are separated by the degree to which they 
emphasise existing theoretical frameworks, both hold that existing ideas are 
revised by theoretical reflection as much as they are affected by observation of 
new facts.46 
In order to further clarify how these groups have distinguished between 
different inferential modes, and to show how, by all groups, hypotheses have 
been considered as subject to elimination, I have selected two further quotes 
from Peirce. Ironically, as part of his 1878 syllogistic formulations of 
abduction, Peirce also gives the most lucid definition of the difference—or, 
rather, the connection—between induction and abduction: 
The great difference between induction and hypothesis [i.e. abduction] 
is, that the former infers the existence of phenomena such as we have 
                                               
46 Fast forward to the very end of Chapter 15 in Part Four for a quick answer to what I think could 
be added as a seventh group to the sixfold typology of archaeological inference. 
  82 
 
 
observed in cases which are similar, while hypothesis [i.e. abduction] 
supposes something of a different kind from what we have directly 
observed, and frequently something which it would be impossible for us 
to observe directly. Accordingly, when we stretch an induction quite 
beyond the limits of our observation, the inference partakes of the 
nature of hypothesis [i.e. abduction]. It would be absurd to say that we 
have no inductive warrant for a generalization extending a little beyond 
the limits of experience, and there is no line to be drawn beyond which 
we cannot push our inference; only it becomes weaker the further it is 
pushed. Yet, if an induction be pushed very far, we cannot give it much 
credence unless we find that such an extension explains some fact which 
we can and do observe. Here, then, we have a kind of mixture of 
induction and hypothesis [i.e. abduction] supporting one another. (CP 
2.640) 
The above quote highlights that there is no clear demarcation between 
induction as evidential and abduction as speculative, but instead that 
induction also contains a speculative element. Both are connected to 
observation, and the nature of this connection is not a matter of kind but of 
degree. With this realisation in mind, the above quote also highlights that 
there is not much difference between conceptualising the combination of 
observations as inductive (as in 1b) or as abductive (as in 3a), and that the 
difference between abduction and induction in this case is more of a 
terminological nature. Whereas inductivists see ampliative knowledge as a 
matter of induction, abductivists take it as abductive.  
For clearer future use of the terms, in reference to their meaning in the 
process of evidencing, the term induction should be reserved for the operation 
of inferring “from one set of facts another set of similar facts”, whereas the 
term abduction should be used when inferring “from facts of one kind to facts 
of another” (CP 2.642). In the following quote, Peirce discusses this distinction 
further. 
Hypotheses [abductions] are sometimes regarded as provisional 
resorts, which in the progress of science are to be replaced by 
inductions. But this is a false view of the subject. Hypothetic [abductive] 
reasoning infers very frequently a fact not capable of direct observation. 
It is an hypothesis [abduction] that Napoleon Bonaparte once existed. 
How is that hypothesis [abduction] ever to be replaced by an induction? 
It may be said that from the premiss that such facts as we have observed 
are as they would be if Napoleon existed, we are to infer by induction 
that all facts that are hereafter to be observed will be of the same 
character. There is no doubt that every hypothetic [abductive] inference 
may be distorted into the appearance of an induction in this way. But 
the essence of an induction is that it infers from one set of facts another 
set of similar facts, whereas hypothesis [abduction] infers from facts of 
one kind to facts of another. Now, the facts which serve as grounds for 
our belief in the historic reality of Napoleon are not by any means 
necessarily the only kind of facts which are explained by his existence. 
  83 
 
 
It may be that, at the time of his career, events were being recorded in 
some way not now dreamed of, that some ingenious creature on a 
neighboring planet was photographing the earth, and that these 
pictures on a sufficiently large scale may some time come into our 
possession, or that some mirror upon a distant star will, when the light 
reaches it, reflect the whole story back to earth. Never mind how 
improbable these suppositions are; everything which happens is 
infinitely improbable. I am not saying that these things are likely to 
occur, but that some effect of Napoleon’s existence which now seems 
impossible is certain nevertheless to be brought about. (CP 2.642, 
emphases original) 
Through this rather imaginative example, Peirce demonstrates how the 
stability of a hypothesis might make it look like an induction whereas it is 
actually an abduction. This goes to demonstrate that the simple distinction 
between speculative hypotheses and those operations that aim at the 
cementation of a hypothesis into a belief may not work in favour of the 
eliminationist objectives. A hypothesis may simply be distorted in ways that 
make it appear as an induction. In this respect, the task of hypothesis is to 
resist the strategies of elimination by reminding us of the fact that evidence 
“which now seems impossible is certain nevertheless to be brought about” (CP 
2.642). Just like there is no clear distinction between hypothesis formation 
and hypothesis testing, there is no clear separation between observation and 
anticipation. The relationship between abduction and induction boils down to 
the metaphorical distance between observation and anticipation. As becomes 
evident in the case provided by Peirce, the hypothesis that Napoleon once 
existed is not a matter of observation, but of anticipation of observation, 
however remote. 
 

 
In this part, I have aimed to outline some common ways of conceptualising the 
nature of archaeological inference. The discussed examples are necessarily 
selective, but they nevertheless highlight that no one model has been able to 
sufficiently convey the multifaceted nature of what we refer to as 
archaeological inference. This is mostly result of the efforts to see hypotheses 
as provisional resorts that should not be adopted as part of the body of 
knowledge until they have been tested against a known body of evidence and 
verified or falsified. In this respect, Peirce’s later view, in which abduction is 
the logical operation that leads to new hypotheses and not the evidencing 
process that aims to fix an abduction by way of induction, was central for our 
analysis of the common modes of archaeological inference.  
Whereas this part discussed the common consideration of inference as the 
procedure consisting of creating, comparing, verifying and falsifying 
hypotheses, the next part is a clear departure from these concerns. Instead of 
conceptualising inference as an evidencing process, the next part argues that 
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the equally important task of inference is to resist the commonly employed 
strategies of hypothesis elimination and belief cementation. In this sense, 
special effort is made to highlight hypothesis, abductive inference, and, more 
importantly, speculation as forms of future anticipation and future creation.
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If relevance rather than authority or objectivity had been the name of the 
game, the sciences would have meant adventure, not conquest. (Stengers 
2018, 144) 
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In Part Two, we learned that the materials of archaeology follow a certain 
open-ended aesthetic speculative logic. The nature of this logic was chiefly 
discussed in terms of the concept of transduction which is the common mode 
of the type of creative and emergent material logic that gives rise to new 
entities and therefore new ideas as well. In Part Three we saw that the views 
of logic commonly adopted in archaeology have not necessarily been able to 
follow the aesthetic logic of its materials and that, as result of this relative 
failure, recent new materialist archaeological thinking (with loose reference to 
OOO and speculative realism as philosophical inspiration as well) has tended 
to engage in a type of ontological rather than epistemological theorising, as 
became evident in Part One and Part Two. Although, in new materialist 
archaeological theory, ontology denotes a kind of descriptive philosophy that 
aims to remain sensitive to the underdeterminacy of the causes behind 
particular observed effects by centralising aesthetics and by resisting the 
established forms of archaeological categorisation and sense-making, it 
nevertheless remains unclear whether the descriptive approach is as 
ontologically sensitive as it aspires to be. 
The aim of this part, then, is twofold. On the one hand, based on the 
historical considerations presented in Part Three, this part aims to formulate 
an epistemology of archaeology in a way that remains faithful to the 
ontological considerations presented in Part Two. On the other hand, in order 
to mediate between empiricism and speculation, the part aims to discuss the 
possible implications or consequences–and benefits–of an ontologically 
sensitive idea of epistemology. I will begin by discussing what I see as the 
common objectives of science, how these objectives have been thought to be 
achievable through a systematic methodology of archaeology, and how in fact 
a more open-ended conceptualisation of the epistemological system will be 
better suited to account for the type of ontological underdetermination of 
interpretation discussed in Part Two (c.f. Alberti and Marshall 2009). In 
particular, then, the part will argue that the empirically sensitive and 
ontologically responsible form of speculation is not theory-free observation, 
but anticipation of observation in the most diverse meaning of the term. In 
epistemological terms, this means that the real, as it is understood in 
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traditional realism, is insufficient as the measure of truth. Instead, speculation 
as a form of anticipation denotes an ethical disposition towards the real, and 
inference as an intellectual process entails a position aimed towards the 
common good rather than the ideal real. I will therefore also argue that, in 
order to make anticipation meaningful for the common good and in order to 
make it relevant beyond the above discussed strategies of the elimination of 
speculation in the epistemology of archaeology, a sense of hesitation is needed. 
This hesitation is discussed in terms of a disciplinary deceleration. 
Deceleration, or slowing down, then, is seen as synonymous with systematic 
open-endedness. Because the history of archaeology is also a history of 
methodological acceleration, the part makes special reference to the 
relationship between natural sciences and humanities in archaeology. In other 
words, it is argued that through deceleration, and by caring for speculation, 
the future of archaeology will see a more intimate convergence of the two 
fields. 


 
As already mentioned, it is unclear whether the new empiricist and new 
materialist archaeological theory has succeeded in establishing itself as the 
ontologically sensitive philosophy of archaeology it has aspired to be. In fact, 
the whole project of anticorrelationist speculative philosophy has been heavily 
criticised as a dark philosophy that is at best a dystopian description (i.e. not 
a solution) of the end times ruled by inanimate automatons and conceptual 
disarray (Wolfendale 2014; Hornborg 2017). The topic has also been discussed 
in archaeology (Ion 2018; Pétursdóttir 2018). Part of the problem for some is 
that speculative philosophy appears as the systematic philosophy that it is 
critical of in the first place. Artur Ribeiro (2019), for instance, argues that the 
objective of, in his case, new materialisms is plagued by a logical fallacy. In 
Ribeiro’s view, new materialisms, and speculative philosophies in general, aim 
to provide descriptions of a reality that is nevertheless supposed to remain 
withdrawn and unknowable. In other words, a speculative philosophy can 
never claim that it is a better account of the unknowable than another 
speculative philosophy. This incoherence, Ribeiro contends, undermines the 
whole purpose of speculative philosophy, the aim of which is to stay 
speculative in respect to the withdrawn. The biggest shortcoming of new 
materialisms in Ribeiro’s view is that, because new materialist philosophies 
focus on metaphysical speculation rather than on those knowledge systems 
that are supposed to represent those phenomena, they tell us nothing of how 
empirical research is supposed to be conducted. At best, as argued by Ribeiro, 
metaphysical speculation targets the non-empirical in ways that have nothing 
to do with archaeology as an empirical science, and that speculative 
philosophy has therefore no real applicability in archaeology as a social science 
(cf. Campbell et al. 2019). Similar arguments about the role of metaphysics as 
part of the philosophy of science are wide-spread in archaeology (e.g. Watson 
1973; 1991; Flannery 1982). In arguing the above, Ribeiro (2019) misses two 
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important points of speculative philosophy. Firstly, in arguing that speculative 
philosophies undermine their own objective of remaining systemically open-
ended by constructing ontological systems in form of speculative description, 
Ribeiro makes the common mistake of confusing between form and contents. 
In other words, systematic open-endedness is not a form of closed system just 
because open-endedness is suggested as a systematic philosophy. Just like 
tolerance does not entail tolerance of intolerance (this would be the formalist 
conclusion), but is rather a consideration of the effects of intolerance (this 
would be the pragmatic conclusion), systematic open-endedness entails a 
systematic separation between the destructive and constructive effects of 
being systematic. In other words, what speculative philosophy in general 
states is that we should keep our epistemological systems open so as to not be 
limited by them empirically. 
In his second argument, namely that ontological speculation is non-
empirical and therefore not a fitting description of how empirical research 
should be conducted, Ribeiro raises a more important question. Although it 
remains questionable whether science should follow any predetermined 
methodological guidelines that allow us to decipher the superiority of one 
theory, generalisation, or explanation over another, as implied by Ribeiro 
(2019), his point touches on some of the central shortcomings of new 
materialisms as a model for the epistemology of archaeology. If assessed as a 
type of realist epistemology, it is clear that the ontological description of what 
reality is like ‘behind’ the ‘for us’ appears deeply conflicted. Ribeiro’s (2019, 
33) alternative to a new materialist speculative philosophy, then, is a type of 
realism based on mutually accepted conceptions of what counts as real. 
Realism, to Ribeiro, is not an ontology that makes claims about the mind-
independent and unknowable existence of an entity, but instead an 
epistemology based on an agreement as to the meaning of the term real. In this 
way, Ribeiro’s realism becomes a literalist epistemology, meaning that the 
reality of an entity is dependent on the commonly agreed meaning of a 
statement (cf. Gallie 1956; Lucas 2019, 123, 130). This, in turn, renders realism 
a matter of common sense. In common sense realism, the meaning of the real 
is determined by the meaning of a true statement. Practically, the type of 
common sense realism called for by Ribeiro is a way of bringing back to 
archaeology a sense of good old empiricism that does not regard metaphysical 
claims as prerequisite for empirical claims (see also Ribeiro 2016). 
At the same time, however, one wonders whether the literalism of Ribeiro’s 
empiricism makes it an ally of positivism. Ribeiro’s distinction between 
ontology and epistemology is based on the idea that ontology is necessarily 
speculative while epistemology is not and that, at the end of the hypothetical 
day, epistemology will be stripped of any speculative considerations. I follow 
this sentiment only partly. I take ontology as a speculative concept to serve as 
a starting place for a countermovement to the kind of positivist epistemology 
that takes the real as epistemologically exhaustible. In this sense, ontology is 
an epistemological term, but only designed to refer to the emergent potency of 
the empirical. We can therefore replace the term ‘ontology’ with the term 
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‘speculative epistemology’ which, in this context, would be an attempt to avoid 
the danger of falling into social constructionist, correspondence theoretic, or 
represetativist conceptions of the real, and an attempt to make possibility 
ontologically real. This is simply a way of balancing between rationalism and 
empiricism by making the claim that the real is always more real than 
traditional empiricist and positivist epistemologies, or old materialism for that 
matter, suggest (c.f. Moffat 2019).47 
Interestingly, David Clarke has argued for the epistemological relevance of 
metaphysical speculation in archaeology by contending that 
every archaeologist has thoughtfully or unthinkingly chosen to use 
concepts of a certain kind—thus committing himself to a metaphysical 
position, restricting himself to certain paradigms, to use certain 
methodologies, to accept certain modes of explanation and to pursue 
certain aims. (Clarke 1973, 12) 
Metaphysics, for Clarke, then, is the invention of conceptual systems, and the 
practical objective of metaphysical reflection is the realisation that 
“unknowing devotion to one metaphysical system prevents the recognition of 
those of other archaeologists” (Clarke 1973, 12–13). Clarke (1973, 14) then 
concludes that “fundamental speculation at this level is exceedingly important 
if only because the more fundamental the metaphysical controlling model, the 
less we are normally inclined to rethink it” (see, also, Klejn 2001, 7–8 for a 
discussion of Clarke’s classifications of theoretical archaeology). 
These concerns about the relationship between metaphysics and 
epistemology and their relevance for each other highlight an important aspect 
about the new materialisms. Unlike many critics of new materialisms claim, 
new materialisms are as much concerned about the immaterial as they are 
about the material (Lemke 2017). In this context it should also be noted that 
Harman (2016), for instance, explicitly distances his object-oriented 
speculative realism from the new materialisms by stating that their 
relationality tends to leave no room for the immaterial. Harman then explicitly 
refers to his position as a form of immaterialism. In other words, although 
speculative realism and the new materialisms are extremely widespread 
doctrines, and therefore at times almost indistinguishable, constant vigilance 
is called for when using these terms. Nevertheless, what both speculative 
realism and new materialisms aspire to teach us is not simply that the real 
comprises both material and immaterial things that exist independent of our 
thinking them (this is what the old realism taught us), but instead that those 
things exist in ways that are much weirder than the real of traditional 
empiricism (Harman 2012b, 184). The result is “a weird realism in which real 
individual objects resist all forms of causal or cognitive mastery” (Harman 
2012b, 188, emphasis original). Simultaneously, one should also remember 
that this weird realism is also inherently empiricist in its speculations, perhaps 
akin to what Danilyn Rutherford (2012; c.f. 2016) calls ‘kinky empiricism’, 
                                               
47 See, also, Wolfe (2017) for the misunderstandings between old and new materialisms. 
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[a]n empiricism that admits that one never gets to the bottom of things, 
yet also accepts and even celebrates the disavowals required of us given 
a world that forces us to act. An empiricism that is ethical because its 
methods create obligations, obligations that compel those who seek 
knowledge to put themselves on the line by making truth claims that 
they know will intervene within the settings and among the people they 
describe. (Rutherford 2012, 465) 
Both the material and the immaterial and the ontological and the 
epistemological, then, are saturated by a sense of anticipation and 
unfinishedness, and an empathetic sense of care for the unfinished. In this 
way, speculation is not simply speculation into the unobservable and the 
transcendent, but instead a pragmatic and an empiricist wager on the 
“unfinishedness of the present” (Savransky 2017); a wager on what might be. 
This wager is motivated by the idea that, through the creation of concepts, 
theories, and speculations, we pragmatically contribute to the creation of the 
actual world around us, however unrealised or latent the effects of those 
epistemological activities may be: 
Thus, a speculative proposition becomes ‘true’ to the extent that it 
succeeds in infecting its environment while allowing itself to become 
infected by it. Indeed, it seems to me that the ‘truth’ of a proposition is 
nowhere to be found if not in the very process whereby a proposition 
and its world begin, little by little, drop by drop, to respond to each 
other. What, at the end of the day, deserves to be called ‘true’, is the 
event of the future experience that such an exchange has enabled to 
come into existence. (Savransky 2017, 36)  
With this detour into the quarrel between ontology and epistemology we 
can return to the place of common sense in the matter. While I am deeply 
sympathetic with the type of common sense realism promoted by Ribeiro, I 
remain reserved as to whether it really can be adopted as the type of scientific 
epistemology Ribeiro himself criticises new materialisms falling short of (see 
also Article 1). It was argued in Part Two and Part Three that, in order to stay 
open to the unexpectedness and weirdness of the subject matter of 
archaeology, the epistemic systems adopted in archaeology should be kept 
open-ended. In other words, it was suggested that archaeologists should adopt 
a radically empiricist attitude. An important question then is whether this 
epistemological open-endedness sets us back in the old empiricism of 
traditional archaeology with its shortcomings. In other words, if we adopt a 
common sense approach, are we thrown back to some form of essentialism 
(Dunnell 1982; 1992, 84–86), or perhaps a kind of skeptic idealism that 
identifies between observation and existence (see also Article 5)? 48  If the 
                                               
48 Consider Peirce’s description of common sense realism: “Take, for instance, that superlatively 
cunning defense of common sense, the doctrine of immediate perception,—a doctrine so subtle that it 
has eluded the grasp of many a fine logician,—and what is it, after all, but a confession that to see and to 
be seen are one and the same fact.” (CP 7.561n) 
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answer to that question is affirmative, then how should we frame the type of 
empiricism that would allow us to stay open to the real on its own terms rather 
than as subordinate to the existing epistemic categories?  
If, as seems necessary, we set out to treat common sense as a form of 
empirical and realist philosophy, we should distinguish between at least two 
types of common sense; constructionist common sense and critical common 
sense (a concept I promoted in Article 1 in reference to Peirce). While both 
forms of common sense denote a degree of mutual agreement as to the nature 
of truth and reality, they are separated in one important respect. In order to 
clarify this distinction, we will again resort to the writings of Peirce, but 
through a very fundamental question about the ultimate aim of scientific 
inquiry (see also Articles 1 and 2). In his 1877 The fixation of belief, Peirce 
writes that the sole purpose of research, or what he refers to as inquiry, is to 
reach a state of belief: 
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall 
term this struggle inquiry, though it must be admitted that this is 
sometimes not a very apt designation. [...] With the doubt, therefore, 
the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence the 
sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. (EP 1, 114–115).  
In identifying the possible pitfalls of this endeavour, Peirce is very explicit that, 
in the struggle to attain a state of belief, the scientist must remain aware of 
those methods of inquiry that can provide a false sense of settlement of 
opinion. Peirce then identifies three methods that can lead to a false sense of 
settlement; (1) the method of tenacity (fixation of individual belief by resisting 
alternative views dogmatically), (2) the method of authority (fixation of belief 
by institutional power or social and hierarchical authority), and (3) the a priori 
method (fixation of belief by human reason, meaning also that ideas may 
appear clear without being so). These methods would provide only a 
temporary sense of fixation of belief and therefore they would ultimately put 
an end to inquiry on false grounds (Article 1).49 
In his solution to the problem, Peirce formulates a fourth method that he 
calls the scientific method. Whereas the three aforementioned methods take 
as their purpose the settlement of opinion by recourse to individual or social 
agreement, the scientific method seeks for external permanency, something 
upon which our thinking has no effect. This external permanency would be 
something that affects, or would affect, everyone, and although these effects 
are necessarily as various as are individual conditions, the method should be 
such that the ultimate conclusion of everyone shall be the same. Peirce 
contends that, “[t]o satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method 
should be found by which our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by 
some external permanency” (EP 1, 120). Although Peirce sees that the 
scientific method is the one to follow, he does admit that the three non-
                                               
49 “It is certainly important to know how to make our ideas clear, but they may be ever so clear 
without being true.” (EP 1, 141) 
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scientific methods all have advantages (EP 1, 121–122). The a priori method is 
appealing because it offers “comfortable conclusions”. The method of 
authority is the only one that will lead to peace because it appeals to masses 
and “forbids unsafe non-conformities”. The method of tenacity, on the other 
hand, can be admired for its “strength, simplicity, and directness”. Therefore, 
the method of tenacity can offer a way to make up our minds and stay true to 
an adopted position no matter what is thrown our way.50 From the viewpoint 
of the four methods listed above, there is a sense in which the concept of 
common sense might end up satisfying only the former three. If by common 
sense we refer to our established thinking habits, the first three methods would 
represent constructionist common-sensism. Furthermore, the type of 
common sense realism outlined above in reference to Ribeiro (2019) is also 
represented in the first three methods. 
Peirce made every effort to distinguish his position from constructionist 
understandings of common sense. In order to highlight the dangers of the 
three dubious methods, Peirce distinguished his understanding of pragmatism 
as a method of inquiry from that of his contemporaries and decided to call his 
approach ‘pragmaticism’, a word “ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers” (CP 
5.414; Article 1). In doing so, Peirce wanted to expand from his earlier 
pragmatic maxim “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (CP 
5.402) to seeing pragmaticism as a more careful consideration of the “general 
habits of conduct a belief in the truth of the concept (of any conceivable 
subject, and under any conceivable circumstances) would reasonably develop; 
that is to say, what habits would ultimately result from a sufficient 
consideration of such truth” (CP 6.481). In other words, Peirce wanted to 
distance his version of pragmatism from the individualist humanism of F.C.S. 
Schiller and from the social constructionism of William James, and he believed 
that the pragmatisms of his contemporaries would only lead to subjectivism 
(Scott 1973; Liebhafsky 1986; Anderson 2009; Poggiani 2012). Whereas a 
subjectivist would contend that the truth of a proposition is dictated by a 
logical feeling in the reasoner’s mind (cessation of doubt), or by the practical 
effects of adopting a belief, Peirce’s pragmaticism ultimately aims to preserve 
the logical feeling of doubt. Peirce then states that, 
if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any actual satisfaction, but 
must be the satisfaction which would ultimately be found if the inquiry 
were pushed to its ultimate and indefeasible issue. This, I beg to point 
out, is a very different position from that of Mr. Schiller and the 
pragmatists of today. (CP 6.485) 
In this sense, common sense realism is closer to the subjectivist position rather 
than what Peirce takes as the scientific method. According to Peirce, common 
                                               
50 “Still oftener, the instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind, exaggerated into a vague dread 
of doubt, makes men cling spasmodically to the views they already take.” (EP 1, 116) 
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sense denotes the idea that there are certain propositions that are taken as true 
(EP 2, 432–433), and although these ‘indubitable’ propositions have 
instrumental value, they do not belong to science, whose duty is to criticise 
common sense and correct it (hence his pragmaticism). In other words, the 
second type of common-sensism that Peirce outlined as critical common-
sensism is in line with his conception of the scientific method.  
But what is the narure of realism in critical common-sensism? In his 1905 
Issues of pragmaticism, Peirce (EP 2, 346–359) writes that critical common-
sensism is marked by its realism. Again, one must distinguish this pragmatistic 
notion of realism from the common sense realist conviction that the real is 
determined by the literal meaning of ‘true’, as well as from the conviction of 
scientific realism according to which the real is a collection of objects and laws 
that govern their movement. For Peirce, the realism of critical common-
sensism differs from these narrow definitions of realism by positing (in 
congruence with his revised maxim of pragmaticism) that, in addition to real 
individuals and real generalities, the mind-independent real includes real 
possibilities: 
[Realism] is usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects 
that are general, among the number being the modes of determination 
of existent singulars, if, indeed, these be not the only such objects. But 
the belief in this can hardly escape being accompanied by the 
acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues [i.e. undetermined 
generals], and especially real possibilities. For possibility being the 
denial of a necessity, which is a kind of generality, is vague like any other 
contradiction of a general. Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities 
that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon. (EP 2, 354, 
emphases original) 
In this sense, possibility is an ontological rather than an epistemological 
notion and, in arguing the above, Peirce adopts an unusual understanding of 
the real. Suddenly the real has no external permanency, propositional or 
actual, but is permeated by the notion of possibility and, by extension, 
contingence.  
Naturally, Peirce’s notion of possibility and contingence as ontologically 
necessary also requires an epistemological equivalent. For Peirce, doubt 
becomes this epistemological necessity, and at the same time it becomes 
evident that fixation of belief (or truth) becomes an approximate value that 
can never be reached. This notion becomes most evident through Peirce’s 
consideration of inquiry in the long-term. If the aim of inquiry is to reach an 
agreement as to the nature of reality, and if the cessation of doubt might end 
up satisfying only our contemporary understanding of what is possible, there 
must be something about reality that remains beyond or resists the satisfaction 
provided by the fixation of belief. Contrary, then, to what one might predict 
based on the recent achievements of science, Peirce contends that regardless 
whether the pursuit of science “were to go on for a million, or a billion, or any 
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number of years you please” (CP 5.409), it is unsure whether it would ever be 
possible to reach a conclusion as to the truth of every possible hypothesis. 
We cannot be quite sure that the community ever will settle down to an 
unalterable conclusion upon any given question. Even if they do so for 
the most part, we have no reason to think the unanimity will be quite 
complete, nor can we rationally presume any overwhelming consensus 
of opinion will be reached upon every question. All that we are entitled 
to assume is in the form of a hope that such conclusion may be 
substantially reached concerning the particular questions with which 
our inquiries are busied. (CP 6.610) 
Amidst all this dialectic between the unavoidable incompleteness of inquiry 
and the hope that drives it, Peirce also gives a very practical reason why inquiry 
might never be brought to conclusion. Peirce contends that some “minute facts 
of history” or “the lost books of the ancients”, might eventually remain “buried 
secrets”, “forgotten never to be recovered” (CP 5.409; c.f. Jardine 1986; Misak 
1991). In other words, there are questions that remain unanswerable 
regardless of the fact that we know that the evidence needed for answering 
those questions once existed and still might exist in forms that are simply 
irrecoverable with the available methods. Stated differently, truth becomes the 
real aim of inquiry without being part of it (Misak 1991, 163–164; c.f. Wilson 
and Brunson 2017): “Inquiry is that which aims at truth and truth is that which 
would be the product of inquiry” at the end of the hypothetical day (Misak 
1991, 167, my emphases).  
The real, in this sense, is always more than permanent, and because 
possibility is suddenly an ontological rather than solely an epistemological 
mode of existence, we are quickly moving in the direction of speculative 
realism and its view of reality as weird, knowledge as indirect, and truth as 
withdrawn. In other words, to speak of a thing-in-itself is not a claim to ‘know’ 
that thing (truth), at least not in the sense that knowledge can be understood 
as ‘justified true belief’. Instead one might, following Harman’s (2018a, 180–
181) wordplay, define knowledge as “unjustified true belief” (as when 
aesthetically orienting towards a real object through sensed qualities when 
using metaphorical language or allusion = aesthetics), or as “justified untrue 
belief” (as when orienting towards real rather than sensed qualities through 
literal translation = knowledge). 
Importantly, this aesthetic understanding of reference also forms a clear 
counterpoint to the literalism of common sense realism because what we are 
saying is simply that, for reasons discussed above, reality cannot be reduced to 
a commonly agreed meaning of a proposition. This results in the notion that 
knowledge is never about the truth, “not because nothing is real, but because 
reality is so real that any attempt to translate it into literal terms is doomed to 
failure” (Harman 2018a, 192, emphasis original). In the course of the following 
lines, this seems evident also to Peirce: 
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Do [buried secrets] not really exist because they are hopelessly beyond 
the reach of our knowledge? And then, after the universe is dead 
(according to the prediction of some scientists), and all life has ceased 
forever, will not the shock of atoms continue though there will be no 
mind to know it? (CP 5.409) 
This does not mean that we would have to adopt a hopelessly pessimistic 
view of the possibility of knowledge, and it should be kept in mind that we are 
talking of truth rather than knowing as the function of the escaping real. In 
Article 1, I wrote that inquiry is made possible because the human mind is akin 
to the truth as result of the organism’s close coevolution with the universe. 
However, I was not sufficiently clear in the article that, regardless of this 
coevolution and the resulting metaphysical connection between the human 
mind and her surroundings, knowing occupies a space somewhere between 
being fully ignorant and knowing the truth. In other words, truth as the aim of 
inquiry is never actualised because reality is inexhaustible and irreducible to 
any one part of it, such as an organism’s perception of her/its surroundings, 
regardless of their coevolution. By this token, inquiry is not motivated by truth 
but by love of truth, and the real becomes a matter of perpetual ‘anticipation’ 
of truth rather than truth consisting of an external permanence that can be 
used as a touchstone of truth and validity: 
Science is defined in the dictionaries as systematized knowledge. But 
considered as one of the elements of the life of civilization science is not 
so much characterized by knowledge as by a resolute desire to know. 
Science to be a live thing must be growing; and to grow it must be 
animated with the spirit of inquiry; and the most essential element of 
the spirit of inquiry is a swiftness to see that you have been in the wrong. 
(MS [R] 860)51 
The view of knowledge expressed here will become clearer when I turn to 
discussing knowledge as a matter of concerns rather than a matter of facts in 
the next chapter. 
4-78)1303+-'%07=78)17%2(8,-2/-2+38,)6;-7)
At this point it has become evident that the truth of a hypothesis—and 
therefore the validity of an epistemological system—cannot be evaluated 
against the real as consisting of an external permanence. In Part Three, I 
argued that the common conceptualisations of the epistemology of 
archaeology have treated speculation as a point of elimination because they 
take the real past to be a finite collection of permanent and knowable objects. 
Following this notion, I also argued that the epistemology of archaeology is 
characterised by different eliminationist strategies. I suggested that 
                                               
51 Consider also the following statement from Whitehead (1956, 22): “Panic of error is the death of 
progress; and love of truth is its safeguard.” 
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archaeologists have postulated a variety of ontological and epistemological 
superstructures such as culture, evolution, logic, or mind, and that all of these 
are aimed at the gradual reduction of speculation and uncertainty. Throughout 
the remaining of this part, I want to further develop the idea that was 
introduced in Article 5. This is the idea that speculation is not simply food for 
proof or falsification. Instead, I want to show that speculation is an 
epistemological and ontological force of creation that should be cared for. This 
is to say that instead of thinking of speculative propositions as possibly true or 
wrong, we should think of them as a collection of possible futures, however 
remote (c.f. Latour 1999). By this notion, we are also entering the realm of 
ethics, and I will later return to this issue by considering speculation as a 
method aimed at the preservation of the multiplicity of matters of concern. 
The aim of inquiry therefore becomes the anticipation of the effects of 
pursuing a particular notion of truth on those epistemologies that entertain a 
different conception of the idea (c.f. Saitta 1983). 
What is the role of our knowledge practices against the setting of possible 
futures? In Modes of Thought, Whitehead (1956, 233) writes that the task of a 
university is “the creation of the future, so far as rational thought, and civilized 
modes of appreciation, can affect the issue” (c.f. Stengers 2018, 109). 
Whitehead then asks what is the role of philosophy in this setting. Whitehead 
approaches the question through what he terms ‘the fallacy of the perfect 
dictionary’. The fallacy in the fallacy of the perfect dictionary is the idea that 
the humankind has already entertained all the ideas that are applicable to its 
experience and, furthermore, that human language explicitly expresses those 
ideas (Whitehead 1956, 235). Whitehead then points out that the fallacy is 
what divides philosophy into two schools, the critical school and the 
speculative school. The member of the critical school confines himself to the 
limits of the dictionary, while the member of the speculative school aims to 
enlarge the dictionary. This enlargement is achieved through appeal to direct 
insight and to the indication of situations which promote that specific insight 
(Whitehead 1956, 236). In other words, whereas the critical school adopts a 
position that is aimed towards the advancement of conceptual clearness, the 
speculative school sees as its task the creation of concepts that can be added to 
the dictionary. “The divergence between the schools”, Whitehead (1956, 236) 
contends, “is the quarrel between safety and adventure”. 
We can now look at the epistemic practices of archaeology through the 
notion of the fallacy of the perfect dictionary. The common epistemic 
strategies that I outlined in Part Three, and which were also discussed to 
varying degree in all of the research articles (but most importantly in Articles 
1, 4, and 5) are all targeted towards the promotion of epistemic safety. This 
safety is partly provided by the scholars’ possibility to revert to the dictionary 
in moments of uncertainty. We learned in Part One and Part Three that for 
culture-historical archaeology the idealist view of an unchanging cultural 
ethos on the one hand and the idea of biological evolution by which the culture 
evolves on the other formed the superstructure that is equivalent to the perfect 
dictionary. Early New Archaeology on the other hand took positivism’s 
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literalism and the hypothetico-deductive model as equivalent to the 
dictionary, while later formulations of New Archaeology came to emphasise 
natural and cultural processes and the human as part of an ecological law-like 
system of signification (Article 4; Part Three). Some forms of interpretive 
archaeology, as we have learned, saw human cognition or human perception 
as the system of signification and the root for definitions in the dictionary 
(Article 2). 
Because the dictionary includes all of those ideas that are applicable to 
human understanding, it will provide the scholar with a blueprint for 
understanding the human mind, and because it encompasses the whole of 
human understanding, the dictionary will also provide a schematic blueprint 
for the best possible method of rendering the possible intelligible (Part Three). 
While the critical position is a safe position, its reliance on the dictionary will 
necessarily lead to a situation where possibility is conceptualised only within 
the confines of the dictionary. By these tactics, the physical reality outside of 
the dictionary is made in the image of what is considered expressible within 
the confines of the dictionary. These are all tactics targeted towards the 
elimination of doubt, and the resulting view of the possible is a sterile view 
with no room for thinking otherwise. 
It is worth noting that, for Whitehead, in contrast to the critical school, the 
speculative school represents a civilised mode of thinking. This is the school 
that, by rational though and civilised modes of appreciation, aims to expand 
the dictionary. For the speculative school, this expansion is only achieved 
through the intensification of speculation to its maximal point; a method by 
which the deeply plural nature of experience is exposed (see Part Two). We are 
therefore not interested in the relationship between the dictionary and the 
world, but in broadening the dictionary by generating ideas that attract novel 
experiences (c.f. Stengers 2011b; Debaise 2017a). One of the downsides of the 
critical school’s adherence to the dictionary is that in it the perfect dictionary 
is considered as a coherent epistemic system that is congruent with—and in 
some cases the prerequisite of—the real. Naturally, this position states that 
there are other systems of knowledge that agree with the reality to lesser 
degrees, and that those systems of knowledge are also in conflict with the 
perfect dictionary. By contrast, for the speculative school, the task of 
epistemology becomes the consideration of the real effects that acting on an 
idea could possibly have in the world, rather than the evaluation and titration 
of a description against an external permanence. In other words, what the 
speculative school calls for is betterment of the universe by recourse to the 
creation of ideas. 
In order to elaborate on this ethico-aesthetic dimension of epistemology, I 
want to return to the idea discussed in Part Two according to which our 
epistemic practices are always partly creative in respect to the reality they are 
supposed to represent or render intelligible. John Law and Marianne 
Elisabeth Lien (2012) have made an interesting case for how the farming-
practices of Atlantic salmon in Norway create multiple salmon in the process. 
Law and Lien then call for an empirical ontology of salmon-farming and argue 
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that there is no natural or ‘real’ salmon that exists prior or regardless of the 
farming-practices. Instead, the two contend that technical or veterinary 
practices such as measuring or feeding, or scientific practices such as 
description and taxonomy, each create their own salmon. This process is 
empirical in the sense that the emergent product of the process of 
individuation is observably different from the product of another set of 
relations, and it is ontological in the sense that the resulting salmon cannot be 
reduced to any particular theoretical construction. On the contrary, because 
the practices that contribute to the emergence of the salmon are unpredictable, 
the resulting salmon transcend those practices (Law and Lien 2012, 372). In 
this sense, a salmon affords many salmon depending on the nature and impact 
of the practices involved. In other words, each salmon is emergent of the 
practices involved.  
With this notion in mind, we can similarly look at epistemology as a system 
of practices. What is characteristic of a system of practices is that it is always 
motivated by particular interests, and in light of interests, the real is not simply 
a matter of facts, but a matter of concerns (Latour 2004; Witmore 2015). To 
return to the salmon example, the emerging individual salmon are always 
result of particular interests, such as economical or scientific interests, but one 
salmon is not less real than the other. 
Isabelle Stengers shares a similar view of the real as a matter of interests 
rather than facts. Instead of referring to reality as a set of facts, she uses the 
term ‘ecology of practices’ (Stengers 2010; 2011a). Stengers discusses her 
notion mainly in the context of modern science and she contends that the 
modus operandi of modern science has been an invalidation of those practices 
that do not conform to objectivism’s notion of the transcendent. Modern 
science in this sense has upheld an image of the scientific method as a measure 
of the real. The resulting epistemology is a linear one that sees the past and the 
future as symmetrical and connected, and knowable and predictable. Stengers 
then suggests that, in order to civilise modern science, that is, to make the 
critical school critical of those concepts that it admits uncritically, modern 
science should be seen as an ecology of practices. Ecology of practices in this 
sense is a philosophy that remains responsible in respect to the fact that 
science is practiced from a variety of perspectives and matters of concern, and 
that the creation of the real is a matter of assigning importance to the world 
accordingly (c.f. Witmore and Shanks 2013). The way we have framed modern 
science here is mainly result of one practice having gained monopoly over the 
real, partly as result of convincing rhetoric and the promise of settlement of 
opinion. Stengers then suggests that what civilised scientists have “to cultivate 
is the capacity to participate in the collective assessment of the consequences 
of an innovation, rather than a decision based on values” (Stengers 2018, 103). 
As an ecology of practices, civilised science remains open-ended in respect to 
the effects of pursuing a thought, because the practices and concerns of one 
epistemology can produce effects that can hinder or negate those of another. 
Stengers’ suggestion to civilise modern scientific practices (Stengers 2018), 
however, is not a call for abandoning science nor is it a demand for thinking 
  98 
 
 
unsystematically, but rather about replacing the modern practices’ demand for 
universality and reduction with the systematic practice of considering 
possibility as more than subordinate to plausibility or probability, or as 
Witmore and Shanks (2013, 386) describe the situation in the context of 
archaeology “a common image of archaeology was never behind us. On the 
contrary, a common image of archaeology has yet to be formulated.” This 
formulation of the identity of archaeology calls for an understanding of unity 
as a function of diversity rather than universality (Witmore and Shanks 2013, 
387).52 
Speculative philosophy, then, becomes a “struggle against probabilities” 
(Stengers 2010, 17), and most importantly this struggle denotes a systematic 
way of thinking otherwise. Following this notion, Sandra Rosenthal offers an 
informative description of systematic open-endedness in her Speculative 
Pragmatism (Rosenthal 1986). Like Stengers, Rosenthal does not denounce 
philosophy as a systematic way of thinking, but instead emphasises that we 
should be able to keep the adopted system open-ended to the possibility that 
other philosophical systems may differ in their conception as to the nature of 
truth and evidence: 
To understand speculative pragmatism as philosophical system from 
within its own perspective is to view it not just as one more system in a 
tradition of systems in conflict, but rather as a system that recognizes 
that to understand itself, it must view itself as an emergent perspective 
that is an outgrowth of that tradition, and which in turn accounts for, or 
makes meaningful, that tradition through a reinterpretation of it as a 
past that yields, and is explained by, this novel emergent perspective. 
Thus, it must offer not just a system based on the evidence it sees, but it 
must account for the fact that different philosophies differ as to what 
constitutes the nature of evidence. It must offer not just a theory of 
truth, but it must account for the fact that different philosophies differ 
as to what constitutes the nature of truth. It must offer not just 
foundations, but it must account for the fact that different philosophies 
differ concerning the very foundations of philosophy. It must be not just 
another system in conflict, but it must account for the fact that there can 
be systems in conflict. (Rosenthal 1986, 197) 
Following Rosenthal’s argument, epistemology, as a way of thinking 
systematically, should be designed towards the systematic consideration of the 
multiplicity of matters of concern and points of view involved. In this setting, 
speculation into the many possible subjectivities involved in research not only 
becomes the central intellectual operation that aims at the preservation of the 
possibility of difference, but also an opportunity for increased objectivity (c.f. 
                                               
52  Note how here, in contrast to the concept’s use in archaeology, civilising does not mean 
urbanisation or sedentism. On the contrary, civilising denotes a nomadic lifestyle with no real centres of 
knowledge or fixed points of departure for a hierarchical or stratified evaluation of a system of values. 
And even if this nomadic philosophical civilising involves the assessment of innovations, it does not base 
that evaluation on a system of values, but instead is a pragmatic and situated evaluation of the actual 
and possible effects of an innovation. 
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Nagel 1986; Haraway 1988; Bauer 2002; Stengers 2010; Savransky 2012; 
2014; 2016; Witmore and Shanks 2013; Viveiros de Castro 2014; Åsberg et al. 
2015; Sørensen 2017). 
Keeping this in mind, the purpose of speculation is to remind us of the fact 
that there are situations, interests, and knowledges in conflict. Let us consider 
the implications of this notion in the context of archaeology more practically. 
As we have learned, the most commonly noted systems in conflict in 
archaeology have been the humanities and the sciences. Because these two 
systems are constantly viewed as conflicting in their epistemologies (and 
ontologies), the possibility of reconciliation has been discussed in terms of 
interdisciplinarity rather than unification. After the atomisation of 
archaeological theorising in the course of interpretative archaeology, 
discussions about the possibility and nature of interdisciplinarity in 
archaeology have mainly been motivated by the rapid development of genetics 
(Pluciennik 2006; Lidén and Eriksson 2013; Kristiansen 2014; Heyd 2017; Ion 
2017; Sørensen 2017 and comments; Nilsson Stutz 2018). Kristian Kristiansen 
(2011; 2014) sees the recent methodological development to denote a scientific 
revolution in archaeology. More precisely, for Kristiansen (2014), the 
emergence of aDNA studies during the recent decade marks a third scientific 
revolution in archaeology, the previous two being the adoption of Darwinism 
in the 19th century, and the emergence of radio carbon dating in the 20th 
century. In Kristiansen’s (2014) view the recent scientific revolution is 
constituted by the use of big data and quantitative modelling, but most 
importantly by the development of stable isotope and aDNA research during 
the recent 10–15 years.  
Although increasing reliance on genetics promises a new and heightened 
sense of interdisciplinarity in archaeology, it also introduces certain problems. 
Common critique towards the utilisation of genetics in archaeology usually 
targets the tendency to derive overarching generalisations from a very small 
collection of samples. As result, the histories of large population groups are 
being inferred from a limited number of samples (Cassel 2000; Hakenbeck 
2008, 16; Johannsen et al. 2017). More importantly, however, as the identity 
of a population is reduced to a set of genetic markers, the intricacies of the 
archaeological context and their relevance for questions of cultural variety and 
individual identity have tended to be overlooked (Heyd 2017; Furholt 2018). 
Wide-reaching generalisations on population history and migration are often 
made by geneticists and the shortcomings of the research usually regard poor 
integration of archaeological materials. The extreme specialisation 
characteristic of archaeological sciences can often hinder the incorporation of 
distinct disciplinary traditions and different types of evidence: information 
from genetics into archaeology and vice versa often travels as simplified facts. 
At times, this has resulted in research that overlooks important parts of the 
archaeological evidence, but which nevertheless enjoys a high degree of 
scientific impact. Furthermore, when combined with ideas of origin and 
authenticity, aDNA research directly connects with centuries of research 
tradition in European archaeology (Cassel 2000; Niklasson 2014, 60; Klejn 
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2017). Obvious risks in this development include the validation of various 
political or ideological objectives, an old mistake that should be left of the 
history of archaeology rather than repeated by state-of-the-art research 
(Müller 2013; Heyd 2017; Hakenbeck 2019). Therefore, the critique usually 
comes from concerned archaeologists, rather than geneticists. The real 
challenge in this development has been to incorporate or connect the practices 
of aDNA research with more wide-ranging knowledge or research on 
archaeological materials (Lidén & Eriksson 2013; Heyd 2017; Johannsen et al. 
2017). The integration of genetic and archaeological data poses challenges 
especially when dealing with questions of very broad scale where migrations 
over broad areas or population admixture over long timespans are inferred 
from a small collection of samples. In general, then, aDNA research is only 
feasible as part of archaeology.  
So, what does this new development do to archaeology? Interestingly, 
Kristiansen and his team of scientists declare that the new scientific 
methodology finally lifts the “interpretative burden from archaeology”, and 
that the new freedom can be invested in “properly theorising and interpreting” 
local processes of migration (Kristiansen et al. 2017, 335). Kristiansen and his 
associates leave the meaning of proper theorising and proper interpretation 
rather vague, but the rhetoric raises suspicions of the possibility of a return to 
methodological monism à la positivism. For example, the results of aDNA 
analyses are often understood as verification or falsification of older 
archaeological interpretations or hypotheses, while what they actually do is 
raise further questions (Sørensen 2016; 2017). An important question then 
becomes how to avoid adopting an epistemology that assumes the superior 
explanatory power of some methods while rendering others unreliable—
unless, of course, corroborated by the results of the superior one (González-
Ruibal 2014; Sørensen 2017)? By this token, a similarly pressing question is, 
what does the new positivism do to research that falls outside of the narrow 
definition of the scientific? Convincingly, Alfredo González-Ruibal asks, 
will I be allowed to do my archaeology under the new revolutionary 
regime? This is not a mere rhetorical question. By ‘allowed’ I mean: will 
there be funding for projects that do not fit the model proposed [by 
Kristiansen (2014)]? Will there be positions opened in universities and 
research institutions? Postgraduate and postdoctoral fellowships for 
those who take a different path? Furthermore, what happens with those 
of us who fail to attract the large (and scarce) amount of funding needed 
for systematic DNA analyses or isotope databases? Are we condemned 
to do second-rate archaeology? Or even worse, what happens with those 
thousands of archaeologists who do not even have the chance to apply 
for funding in places like Africa, the Middle East, or Latin America? 
(González-Ruibal 2014, 44) 
While the new scientific revolution presents itself as a possibility for an 
increased mode of interdisciplinarity to those already firmly established in the 
practices of genetics (and other natural scientific methods for that matter), 
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many have challenged genetics as the hard and fast solution to the problem of 
interdisciplinarity and asked how can we make sure that those research 
methods or interpretations that do not have value in the new order can be 
saved. In attempting to bridge the gap between sciences and humanities, 
Alexandra Ion (2017) argues that, contrary to having provided a means to 
proper theorising or proper interpretation, genetics necessitates a rethinking 
of the connecting medium between the sciences and the humanities. Ion 
proposes that historical narrative could be the connecting medium between 
the results of archaeology and genetics. Historical narrative, in Ion’s view, 
would provide the framework in which the results of genetics are rendered 
archaeologically meaningful. Ion therefore sees archaeology as a form of 
storytelling in which the role of genetics is to provide parts of the story rather 
than concluding evidence (c.f. Currie and Sterelny 2017). 
In a somewhat similar vein, Sørensen (2017) has argued that the increasing 
reliance on natural scientific methods as the provider of indisputable evidence 
tends to render the methods of the humanities unreliable, ultimately leading 
to the loss of subjectivity and empathy as parts of doing science (see also 
Article 3). In this sense, the increasing reliance on natural scientific methods 
directly contributes to the discipline’s methodological simplification 
(Sørensen 2016). Sørensen (2017, 10) then sees speculation as a connecting 
point between natural sciences and humanities, and he proposes that 
speculation is the way to provide the two sub-disciplines with a context in 
which the seemingly disparate realms of evidence can be made to make sense. 
Sørensen argues that rather than providing decisive conclusions, the results of 
archaeological science are food for speculations, and that just like the nature 
of inquiry in the humanities is open-ended, we should also see the results of 
the sciences as similarly underdetermined: “any answer we arrive at only 
unleashes a host of new questions” (Sørensen 2017, 10). The insight embedded 
in this notion is that archaeological science too contains an element of 
speculation that resists the eliminationist strategies commonly adopted in the 
epistemology of archaeology (Part Three). 
Recently, Liv Nilsson Stutz (2018) has voiced a concern for the future of 
interdisciplinarity in archaeology. Nilsson Stutz (2018, 52) argues that the 
recent development that has been presented in the form of a scientific 
revolution risks a biased neoliberal conceptualisation of interdisciplinarity 
where the interdisciplinary consists of hypothesis-driven science, or a set of 
(natural) scientific practices carried out by highly competent researchers who 
provide clearly ordered scientific knowledge. Nilsson Stutz (2018, 52) then 
proposes that in order to avoid a situation where perspectives that 
unnecessarily complicate the past are being suppressed, archaeology should 
more systematically include perspectives from the sciences and the 
humanities. For Nilsson Stutz (2018), this is especially important when 
questions of public and collaborative archaeology and multivocality are 
considered (c.f. Nicholas and Markey 2015). She then writes that if we 
approach multivocality not as a political struggle but as “transdisciplinary 
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collaboration”, we can free our political leanings from the factors that 
influence our disciplinary identities and strategies (Nilsson Stutz 2018, 53).  
Nilsson Stutz contends that archaeology’s relevance in transdisciplinary 
collaboration is that it provides a way of knowing the world. Importantly, 
Nilsson Stutz’s world is not the object-world of positivism, but rather a plural 
concept: 
If we accept the premise that there are different worlds, different ways 
of knowing, then we must respectfully bring what we can offer to 
transdisciplinary engagement with communities outside the academy. 
If we want to continue on the path of a decolonisation of the discipline 
we must focus our efforts on adjusting our attitude, not our insights and 
knowledge. We need to think in terms of relations—as in power and 
respect—rather than in terms of essence of determining ‘a more correct 
way of knowing’. Just as I have advocated for greater disciplinary 
literacy, I can see greater mutual cultural understanding as an 
important aim—and a likely outcome—of respectful, sustained 
engagement with diverse communities seeking and contributing to 
decolonization. (Nilsson Stutz 2018, 54) 
Nilsson Stutz is not explicitly calling for a speculative archaeology, but her 
statement that—in order to decolonise archaeology (that is, to make 
archaeology collaborative)—archaeologists have to adjust their attitudes 
rather than knowledges is an implicit call for a speculative (i.e. civilised) 
archaeology. This is to say that collaboration can only be achieved by the 
consideration of the effects of research rather than the veracity of a 
proposition. 
Now, if we again consider the role of speculation beyond hypothesis testing, 
it becomes clear that the role of speculation in archaeology is to intensify the 
importance of alternative ways of appreciating the world. Importantly, in 
order to entertain alternative ways of appreciating the world, speculation 
denotes a sense of hesitation. This hesitation is targeted at the consideration 
of the effects of pursuing a particular conceptualisation of the world. In 
practical terms, hesitation means that we aim to systematically anticipate the 
possible practical effects that our pursuing a particular truth would have in the 
world, and by the same token to entail the forestalling of a decision. In other 
words, hesitation denotes the idea that we consider the effects of pursuing a 
particular notion of truth on those practices that may entertain a different 
notion of truth. Anticipation and hesitation, then, are connected modes of 
appreciation, both of which refer to a future that becomes observable and real 
in the ecology of practices. So while there is a connecting medium or a common 
ground that makes it possible to compare not only two or more hypotheses but 
also the possible effects of pursuing a truth on those whose interests differ 
from ours, this common ground is not of the nature of an external 
permanence. On the contrary, the connecting medium makes itself visible as a 
form of anticipation of action; a perpetually self-renewing possibility for felt 
experience (c.f. Dawney et al. 2017). Specifically, in the context of archaeology, 
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in the sense discussed above, the hesitation necessitated by the presence of 
possibility would denote a sense of responsibility for the ways in which 
upholding or presenting a particular research program or a set of methods as 
superior or more reliable than others would have on the world (Part Two; c.f. 
Saitta 1983; Witmore and Shanks 2013; Cipolla 2018). Most importantly, then, 
in the methodological sense, the hesitation called for here is aimed at the 
intensification of the fact that methodological simplification will also lead to 
ontological simplification. My question then is, what happens to ontological 
plurality in the age of fast science?53 
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The history of archaeology’s scientific revolutions is also a history of 
acceleration. As a modern science, archaeology is marked by 19th century 
ideals of progress and accumulation of knowledge. On the one hand, the idea 
of cumulative knowledge is rather evident in the sense that, to a great extent, 
archaeology can be characterised as total history that sees the past as a 
collection of parts that can ultimately be pieced together by careful collecting 
(Article 4; Part Three). On the other hand, as already noted, in a more 
explicitly methodological sense, the history of archaeology can be seen as a 
series of conceptual and technological advances from the wide-ranging 
implementation of evolution theory in the course of the 19th century to the 
invention of radiocarbon dating in the mid-20th century, and more recently to 
the increasing interest in matters of provenience and mobility and the use of 
digital technologies, genetics, and big data towards those ends. 
In science in general, the rapid methodological development in the course 
of the 20th century has sparked a distinct countermovement that goes by the 
name of ‘slow science’. According to Jerimy Cunningham and Scott 
MacEachern (2016), slow science is marked by 
(1) a recognition of the ethical and human consequences of scientific 
research and of the human relations involved in such research; (2) a 
recognition of the need for contemplation, collaborative learning and 
careful thought in the course of research; (3) some concern for the 
communal aspects of such research, for mutual cooperation and 
support by colleagues and students; and (4) a critique of 
                                               
53 This type of simplification is not only a concern in the sciences. As Latour (2004, 233–234) has 
noted, philosophy, perhaps more so than the sciences, has fallen victim of simplification through their 
selection of empirical examples: “The problem with philosophers is that because their jobs are so hard 
they drink a lot of coffee and thus use in their arguments an inordinate quantity of pots, mugs, and jugs—
to which, sometimes, they might add the occasional rock. But, as Ludwik Fleck remarked long ago, their 
objects are never complicated enough; more precisely, they are never simultaneously made through a 
complex history and new, real, and interesting participants in the universe. Philosophy never deals with 
the sort of beings we in science studies have dealt with. And that’s why the debates between realism and 
relativism never go anywhere.” To this one might add that, in comparison to archaeology, the empirical 
examples of STS are never complicated enough. In other words, an archaeology that accounts for not 
only the mugs and cups and the occasional rocks but also the complex histories of new and real 
participants in the universe, could bridge the gap between realism and relativism. 
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bureaucratization and the inappropriate intrusion of practices and 
concepts from business and management into the academy, whether in 
research and/or in teaching. (Cunningham and MacEachern 2016, 633) 
Unsurprisingly, the slow science movement has found supporters in 
archaeology as well. One commonly shared concern within the slow 
archaeology movement is that digitalisation and other so-called fast methods 
can have an alienating effect (Article 3). For many, then, slowing down denotes 
a way of regaining an appreciation for the humanity and the craft of 
archaeology (Caraher 2013, 2016; Cunningham and MacEachern 2016). 
William Caraher (2013), for instance, has voiced a concern for the preservation 
of the craft of archaeology (c.f. Caraher 2016; Cunningham and MacEachern 
2016). Caraher (2013) contends that the digitalisation of archaeology has 
resulted in the fragmentation of research practices and a weakened state of 
mutual understanding of the research process among involved parties. More 
importantly, however, Caraher contends that digitalisation has resulted in the 
fragmentation of knowledge about the very object of research. Slow 
technologies, then, that is technologies that are ‘inefficient’ in contrast to fast 
technologies, for Caraher, would mark a state of heightened appreciation of 
those phenomena that routinely go unnoticed in the digital era. One specific 
way to reintroduce a sense of craft in archaeology would be the use of 
handwritten notes in field documentation. This, Caraher argues, would 
provide a stronger link between our bodies and our understanding of the past, 
as well as between our bodies and those of past individuals. Moreover, Caraher 
(2013) argues that slowing down would help individuals to recognise their role 
in the process of interpretation and help make the discipline more humane, 
more open, and most importantly more inclusive and ethically sustainable (c.f. 
Wylie 1997; Saitta 2007; Fossheim 2017; Tringham 2018; Milek 2018; 
Domanska 2018; Caraher 2019).  
Cunningham and MacEachern (2016), on the other hand, provide an 
ethnographic perspective to slow archaeology. For Cunningham and 
MacEachern, ethnography should be understood as a way of resisting the 
simplifying effect of the natural scientific revolution. They argue that 
ethnoarchaeology could be a form of slow archaeology if ethnoarchaeology is 
not understood as limited to the construction of middle-range theories or 
modern analogies, but instead as a way of developing an understanding of 
modern cultural variety. This realisation, then, could be used in archaeological 
contexts as a way of intensifying the sense of cultural variety in the past 
(Cunningham and MacEachern 2016, 635; c.f. Zubrow 1989).  
As a gesture of inclusion, slow science, then, aims to decelerate 
methodological development for the sake of preservation of the multiplicity of 
matters of concern, and methodological deceleration, in turn, would lead to 
more efficient communication within and between different disciplines, 
ontologies and epistemologies.  
The sense in which I want to call for a deceleration of science is not an 
attack on technology, scientific methodology, or interdisciplinarity, but rather 
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a call for the type of civilised science outlined by Whitehead and Stengers (see 
discussion above). Most importantly, Stengers (2018) characterises civilised 
science as an acknowledgement of the communal and social aspects of science. 
Civilised science, for Stengers, then, entails the appreciation of the various 
matters of concern involved in research. In this sense, civilising is not the 
modernist act of universalisation, or the act of civilising those who remain 
unaware of the modern method of scientific evaluation, both in terms of 
competing hypotheses and the results of science (see also Cunningham and 
MacEachern 2016). On the contrary, what civilising means for Stengers is not 
an act of education but a process of healing. This healing is driven by the idea 
that things could be differently, or what Stengers (2018, 145) refers to as “the 
possibility of creating relevant modes of togetherness between practices, both 
scientific and non-scientific; finding relevant ways of thinking together” (c.f. 
Nilsson Stutz 2018). 
In order to elaborate on what this togetherness might mean in the long 
term, I want to return to Peirce’s considerations about the aim of inquiry. In 
epistemological terms, civilising denotes a consideration of what Peirce 
referred to as “the most admirable end” of scientific conduct. If inquiry is 
driven by epistemological considerations of logic, and by the centrality of 
abductive logic in particular, the most admirable end also denotes a deep sense 
of ethical consideration of what and to whom the end as an outcome of the use 
of logic means. Interestingly, however, Peirce contends that, in determining 
the most admirable end, epistemology has to turn to not only ethics but 
ultimately to aesthetics for guidance: 
Esthetic is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively admirable 
without any ulterior reason. Ethics, or the science of right and wrong, 
must appeal to Esthetics for aid in determining the summum bonum. It 
is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct. Logic is the 
theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must 
appeal to ethics for its principles. (CP 1.191, my emphasis) 
Peirce placed logic, ethics, and aesthetics under ‘normative science’, or the 
science that “investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of 
phenomena to Ends; that is, perhaps, to Truth [cf. logic], Right [cf. ethics], and 
Beauty [cf. aesthetics]” (CP 5.121, emphasis original). The end, Peirce 
contends, is not instrumental to an end, but would have to be desirable in 
itself. The determination of the most admirable end, then, renders logic a 
matter of ethics and, in determining the most ethical or admirable end (for no 
other reason than the end itself), ethics has to resort to aesthetics for guidance 
(Smith 1972; Apel 1981; Liebhafsky 1986; Barnouw 1988; Tejera 1994; Herdy 
2014).  
What facilitates this train of thought is the very concept of the summum 
bonum (Herdy 2014, 276). In other words, the end would have to be equally 
true, right, and beautiful. Sørensen et al. (2011) clarify this position in the 
following way: 
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The aesthetic finality makes up the most basic condition for the rational 
and creative nature of man; thought as a kind of self-controlled action 
can only be intentional if reason as an aesthetic ideal has been 
transformed into a habit of feeling [...]. The aesthetic finality provides 
in other words a telos that points at self-controlled action, and creates 
the possibility for the goodness of action, the truth of reasoning, and the 
attraction of feeling. It makes up the basis for reasoning, allowing the 
feelings, actions, and thoughts of man to move in a certain kind of 
direction, in harmony with the development of the universe, towards a 
greater rationality. According to Peirce, this is the manifestation of the 
progressive state of reason, or the growth in the concrete 
reasonableness, which he used synonymously with summum bonum, 
the highest good. In other words, evolution is an aesthetical­moral 
process, rather than a process that moves in any direction what so ever. 
Man is marked by the living telos of reason. He is attracted to it by aid 
of the intrinsic aesthetic goodness of the idea(s), so that there can 
emerge an intellectual sympathy in his mind. Only in that way, he can 
truly become creative. (Sørensen et al. 2011, 226, emphasis original) 
Importantly, then, in this context, aesthetics is not the “pleasure-ground of 
those who spend their lives in the delights of art” (MS [R] 602.11). Rather, 
aesthetics denotes a principle or a method for resisting the “habitual modes of 
perception” (Thomas 2017, 201), a kind of preservation of ignorance for the 
purpose of greater equality (Rancière 2006).54 The above discussed reality of 
the possible as an ontological register, in this context, is an important 
consideration. The possible is not determined by the existing world but by an 
ideal world, a world that “ought to be” (Herdy 2014, 269). Rancière (2006, 5) 
poetically refers to this possible state of knowing as a “finality without end”. 
Ultimately, however, the summum bonum is motivated by the melioristic idea 
that even if, or perhaps because, humans are fallible, they have the capacity, 
desire, and moral duty to alter their habits for an improved future situated 
somewhere between conservative pessimism and progressive optimism 
(Bergman 2012; 2015). In other words, meliorism occupies the middle ground 
between anti-intellectual Ludditism and scientistic hubris.55 
By this notion, we can return directly to the considerations of the role of 
aesthetics in speculative philosophy discussed in Part Two. Aesthetics as first 
philosophy becomes the antidote to the habits of thinking in causal terms and 
the related deterministic notion of symmetry between the past and the 
present. In other words, aesthetics highlights that the future is not a 
straightforward extension of the past. Most importantly, aesthetics in the 
speculative sense marks a willingness to detect degrees of difference that the 
                                               
54  It is worth noticing that abduction expresses a similar positive ignorance-preserving quality 
because it entails a speculative orientation towards the unknown (c.f. Magnani 2009; 2013). 
55 See, also, Wilson and Brunson (2017) who take summum bonum to denote a ‘transhumanist’ 
mandate for the augmentation or betterment of human cognitive powers in order to transcend the limits 
postulated by deterministic and causalist thinking. By this token, it should also be noted that I refer to 
fallibilism not as the idea that knowledge remains incomplete in terms of resembling a reality but as the 
idea that in order to anticipate the possible effects of knowledge claims to a community of inquirers they 
have to be operationalised through a fallibilist framework. 
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destructive habits of thinking towards the settlement of opinion might end up 
suppressing (Article 5). In this sense speculation directly aims at the 
recognition of different modes of aesthetic appreciation, or the different 
modes of assigning importance to the world, and the idea that these are modes 
of creativity rather than determination (c.f. Thomas 2017). This is why 
Sørensen et al. (2018) likewise refer to aesthetics as attraction of feeling.56 
Through their separation between practice and result, modern practices 
aim at the suppression of the multiplicity of feeling and modes of aesthetic 
appreciation (Article 3; Stengers 2010, 30). One can identify something as 
simple as the structure of the scientific article as one such strategy of 
separation. The research article has become the major forum for publishing 
the results of scientific research, but its form—which often begins with the 
presentation of the materials and methods and proceeds to the reporting of 
the results and a discussion of their importance—tends to give a somewhat 
distorted or simplified picture of research. For this reason, Peter Medawar 
(1991) has called the scientific paper a fraud. Medawar argues that the form of 
the scientific paper misrepresents the thought processes that gave rise to the 
results reported in the paper. Medawar’s discontent with the scientific paper 
is based on the idea that science as discovery or creation of new ideas is, 
contrary to how the scientific paper represents it, not inductive in its 
fundamental nature (Articles 4 and 5, Part Three; c.f. Hanson 1958). For 
Medawar (1991), induction implies that we always start with an untarnished 
mind and naively collect observations or bits of data and only then come up 
with new knowledge, whereas in reality the idea often precedes the 
identification and collection of the evidence. Medawar then points out that 
rather than relying on a schema of demonstration, discovery starts with a 
sense of importance or relevance; that a particular hypothesis should be 
investigated further (as in Peirce’s post-1903 understanding of abduction; Ma 
and Pietarinen 2018; Chiffi and Pietarinen 2019). For this reason, Medawar 
suggests that the inductive form of the scientific paper should be discarded. To 
begin with, Medawar contends that the discussion, which is usually placed at 
the end of the paper, should come first. This means that the hypotheses that 
the paper misrepresents as conclusions should be presented at the beginning 
as hunches or ideas, followed by ‘the scientific facts and scientific acts’, that is, 
the presentation of materials and methods. In other words, Medawar argues 
that scientist should not be ashamed to admit that “hypotheses appear in their 
minds along uncharted byways of thought; that they are imaginative and 
inspirational in character; that they are indeed adventures of the mind” 
(Medawar 1991, 233). 
Medawar’s criticism only pertains to one type of scientific paper and he is 
exaggerating the problem’s extent to a certain degree. His worries nevertheless 
highlight the fact that only those hypotheses that are deemed successful by the 
researcher, or his peers for that matter, make it into the publication. By 
                                               
56 There is definitely a connection between Peirce’s aesthetics as consisting of aesthetic finality, and 
the sense in which Whitehead considers lure for feeling as the aesthetic quality of experience (c.f. 
Barnouw 1988; Thomas 2017) 
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omitting factors like guesswork, failure, or personal audacity, scientific writing 
often misrepresents the processes that created the conditions of 
demonstration to begin with (Snyder 2005; Lahiri 2017). Importantly, then, it 
is unusual to report in articles the hunches and intuitions that led to discovery, 
not to mention the anxieties caused by entertaining hypotheses that turned 
out to be false.57 The writing style of science tends to conceal the ambiguities 
or personal aspects involved in research by overvaluing non-ambiguous 
language (Gero 2007, 2015; Boozer 2015; c.f. Hodder 1989; Chippindale 1996; 
Lucas 2019; Articles 3 and 5). Research tends to be reported in concise and 
impersonal language and as the outcome of the utilisation of clearly defined 
evidential categories which allows for the identification of significant 
observations or research results, a procedure Joan Gero refers to as “cleaning 
the data” (Gero 2007, 320). More importantly, this cleaning of data tends to 
‘black box’ certain methodological aspects as well as social and intellectual 
processes that led to the discovery of those results in the first place, at least 
until something goes wrong (Latour 1987; c.f. Law 2004; Harman 2009). In 
this sense, scientific reporting is a type of liturgy designed towards the 
preservation of a tradition rather than the reporting of the factors that led to 
the creation of an idea. 
In addition to these considerations on the distorting effect of scientific 
publishing, one should keep in mind that as more and more emphasis in 
archaeology is put on publishing in high profile scientific journals, and because 
publications in these journals weigh more than publications in those of the 
humanities in the evaluation of research output, the tendency will ultimately 
result in lesser degrees of impact or relevance for those who publish in the 
humanities (Lidén 2017). Lidén and Eriksson (2013) contend that the above 
discussed tendencies have resulted in the widening of the gap between the 
sciences and the humanities. As a solution to the problem, Lidén and Eriksson 
(2013) propose that what is needed for better collaboration between the two 
fields is a common language, and that the development of that language hinges 
on the realisation that the two fields are connected by common research 
problems (c.f. Lidén 2017; Tringham 2018). From the ecology of practices 
viewpoint, however, the common problem approach appears as a similarly 
simplifying strategy based on the assumption that all of the research questions 
of science are connected through a value-neutral common ground. Recently, 
Alfredo González-Ruibal (2018) has noted that not even the Anthropocene, 
regardless of the global, ubiquitous, and destructive nature of the matter, can 
be considered a common problem. While the scale and magnitude of the 
problem transcend its historical causes, and although the problem has a deep 
and common anthropogenic aetiology, the Anthropocene nevertheless affects 
people who cannot be held accountable for creating it. Following the 
ontological principles addressed above, namely that the practices of science 
contribute to the creation of the world, methodological and conceptual 
                                               
57 In this context, it might also be useful to consider the epistemic and heuristic value of reflection 
on missed opportunities for developing a readiness to seize future opportunities more intuitively and 
open-mindedly (Myers 2011). 
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simplification (which the postulation of a common problem undoubtedly leads 
to) can ultimately result in ontological simplification. The task of speculation, 
in this setting, is to resist the tendency that the practices of conclusion and 
proof—and the postulation of a common problem in the first place—have 
towards the eventual eradication of possibility and difference. Against this 
background, slowing down would denote a hope of developing ways to 
appreciate and conserve rather than eliminate or black box the vague and 
messy aspects of research (Articles 3 and 5; Gero 2007; Caraher 2016; 
Sørensen 2018; Stengers 2018, 120). 
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In the social sciences, the recent decade has seen an incredible increase in 
interest in conceptualising speculation and uncertainty as relevant for 
imagining the variety of the possible and the unpredictability of the future as 
forces of creation and as loci for understanding differently rather than as 
points of elimination. This has generated a large body of literature towards 
inventing speculative methods in social sciences, anthropology, sociology, 
ethnography, art, and design (e.g. Dunne and Raby 2013; Smith et al. 2016; 
Salazar et al. 2017; Wilkie et al. 2017; Wilkie 2018; Pink et al. 2018; c.f. Moffat 
2019). In archaeology, however, as we saw in Part Three, attempts to 
conceptualise the methodological relevance of speculation beyond proposition 
and as a matter of the future rather than the past have been sporadic and, as 
we saw in Chapters One and Two, theoretical rather than practical. Obvious 
reasons for the lack of engaging in thinking the future include the concrete 
nature of the subject matter of archaeology as well as its strong and increasing 
reliance on the methods of the natural sciences. More important, however, is 
the fact that archaeology—and heritage studies for that matter—have, for 
obvious reasons, been conceptualised as disciplines of the past rather than the 
future, or that the future has been seen as an extension or a development of 
the past (c.f. Högberg et al. 2017; Ståhl et al. 2017; Reilly 2019). Thinking of 
the future as relevant for future concerns rather than as relevant for present 
needs is particularly challenging in light of archaeology’s conservationist 
objectives. 
What practical possibilities do we have then to render speculation an 
epistemologically relevant concept beyond conjecture about the past and, 
more importantly, as a notion relevant for the future of archaeology itself? I 
propose two interrelated avenues. The first one is the deceleration of our 
scientific practices in order to reveal those intellectual, technological, or social 
processes that become concealed through those practices that aim at the 
systematic and constant evaluation of results, such as the above-discussed 
scientific paper. What this could mean in the case of the scientific paper, for 
instance, is the systematic reporting of the initial hunches, failed ideas, and 
intellectual dead ends that were entertained in the course of the research 
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process but which nevertheless remain unreported to our fellow researchers, 
at least in writing. Whereas the scientific article can be provided with 
supplementary material and detailed descriptions of the data or the materials 
studied, why not provide in the supplementary material an inventory of the 
aforementioned intellectual dead ends or those unsuccessful hypotheses that 
did not make it into the results chapter of the article (c.f. Good 1970)? 
Ultimately, the reporting of possibilities in connection with verified results 
could lead to a readiness to think of speculation as valuable for the future 
rather than as a threat to scientific credibility. That a hypothesis failed in 
inducing a belief in the present does not mean that the idea could not be 
further developed by others in the future (Good 1962). 
The reporting of disciplinary anxieties caused by uncertainty does not have 
to end at the scientific article. The same tactics could be adopted when 
arranging scientific meetings where the scientific presentation is too often 
structured with the intent of driving a point home, in as little as seven minutes 
(including discussion), and in “‘bullets’, no less” (Stengers 2018, 122). As an 
alternative to fast presenting, Stengers explores the possibility of organising 
slow meetings: 
As for us academics, what about introducing slow meetings, that is, 
meetings organised in such a way that participation is not only formal? 
What about slow talks, not just inviting people one really wishes to hear, 
but reading and discussing beforehand so that the meeting is not 
reduced to the ritual of attending a prepared lecture that ends with a few 
banal questions? What about demanding that when colleagues speak or 
write about issues that are beyond their field of expertise, they present 
the information, learning and collaborations that have allowed them to 
do so? What about ensuring, when expertise is needed on an issue of 
common concern, that co-experts are present and able to represent 
effectively the many dimensions relevant to the issue? From the point 
of view of fast scientists, all these proposals have a common defect. They 
all involve wasting time, or worse, breaking with the symbiotic relation 
that binds ‘true progress’ to industrial innovation. (Stengers 2018, 124) 
The sense in which Stengers’ industrial innovation should be understood is 
innovation for the sake of novelty, or the type of innovation characteristic of 
today’s consult economy (c.f. Hamilakis 2004; Cunningham and MacEachern 
2016). In this sense, the purpose of organising a slow meeting would be to 
resist the sophistic rhetoric of this economy and make visible to others—rather 
than obscure for reasons of convincing them—the personal insecurities 
involved in research. In this way we could make more visible to the audience 
that our, just like their, research process does not follow a clearly defined and 
predetermined protocol or logical schema. This intensification of the 
ambiguities, insecurities, and uncertainties of research could increase the 
sense of mutual understanding (Gero 2007). This should strengthen the idea 
that the progress of science does not hinge on methodological acceleration and 
innovation, but on the researcher’s ability to think otherwise in as many ways 
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as possible. This is also the sense in which Anna Tsing (2015, 17–25) calls for 
an “art of noticing”; a way to look around in order to detect the polyphonous 
assemblages of the world rather than a particular method of looking ahead in 
the name of progress. In other words, it is always better to postpone innovation 
than it is to solve the problem at hand for the sake of closure or general 
advancement of a unified agenda. 
In addition to publications and talks, more importantly, then, we can 
expand the issue of acceleration to pertain to the whole history of 
methodological and theoretical innovation in archaeology. As has become 
evident in the course of this thesis, we tend to conceptualise the discipline as 
a history of paradigmatic revolutions and intellectual turns, each designed to 
provide methods or theories that are better, more efficient, or more robust 
than the previous approach. In this sense acceleration is not only characteristic 
of the archaeological sciences but pertains the humanities as well. 
Archaeological theorising in particular is marked by the reinvention or 
borrowing of theoretical ideas from a multitude of other disciplines or 
philosophical schools in particular (Bintliff and Pearce 2011; Lucas 2015; 
Sørensen 2018). Often, however, counterproductive to their objectives, 
theoretical turns are motivated by innovation for the sake of innovation rather 
than innovation for the sake of increased understanding (Article 5). In 
archaeological theorising, structuralist and poststructuralist semiotic theories, 
for instance, were deemed flawed or lacking in the course of the material turn 
(Article 2; c.f. Crossland and Bauer 2017; Newell 2018). The same thing 
happened to positivism with the introduction of poststructuralism, and before 
that to cultural idealism after the introduction of positivism (Articles 1 and 4). 
Ironically, with the increasing development in scientific practices, genetics in 
particular, archaeology is facing a possible return to the essentialism of 
cultural history, only disguised in a form of a new positivism or a new 
methodological monism (Article 3). The purpose of slowing down in this 
context is to reconsider the effects of both methodological and theoretical 
acceleration and its tendency towards simplification for the sake of novelty.58 
What archaeological theorising then needs is a sense of hesitation in 
adopting the latest theoretical trends (Article 5; Ribeiro 2016; Sørensen 2018). 
How about staying with the positivism or staying with the structuralist 
theories of signification? Not for the sake of hesitation, but in order to subject 
these now downright boring intellectual traditions to a process of healing; a 
reclaiming of that which is too often abandoned as being too messy or too 
demanding (Stengers 2018, 120). In this sense, we might be able to separate 
the creative contents and contributions of these old and inefficient theoretical 
                                               
58 See, also, Hamilakis (2004) for a critique of instrumentalism in teaching in higher education. 
Hamilakis (2004, 296, emphases original) contends that, instead of teaching practical skills that have 
real world relevance in a world where relevance is defined in terms of economic efficiency, 
“[a]rchaeology’s main teaching aim could be to show that things could have been otherwise, that the 
present conditions are historically contingent and explainable. It can show how certain power relations, 
inequalities and asymmetries have been objectified, have been inscribed into the landscape and on the 
material world, so as to appear natural and eternal. It can also show how, often, these objectified material 
relationships have proven vulnerable, unstable, ephemeral.” 
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fields from their destructive effects. Granted, theoretical acceleration only 
becomes visible when observed at a distance, but because the image that we 
get from the distance is also the image we get when observing the narrow elite 
of archaeology’s theoretical development, and because that elite often has the 
most power in terms of the discipline’s historical self-understanding and in 
terms of ‘setting the agenda’ (Yoffee and Sherratt 1993), the procedures of 
slowing down should first and foremost concern the narrow but powerful elite, 
both scientific and speculative. 
The second sense in which I want to propose a deceleration of archaeology 
is directly connected to the methodological considerations discussed above, 
but it also connects more intimately with questions of interdisciplinarity and 
the possibility of developing common understanding. Even more important 
than arranging slow meetings or reporting the researchers’ personal anxieties 
in scientific publications for these objectives is the development of historical 
awareness in interdisciplinary research. In this sense, it is not enough to work 
towards a common language defined by a common problem (cf. Lidén 2017), 
but instead towards an understanding of the histories of the disciplines 
involved. Whereas the common language approach is aimed at the 
identification and eradication of the common problem, the historical 
awareness approach would aim towards the exposition of the reasons that led 
to the identification of that problem in the first place; to whom and why is the 
common problem a mutual concern? In this sense, the historical awareness 
approach aims to understand that which remains unsaid in collaborative and 
interdisciplinary situations. This is to say that the practices of any one 
discipline are historically meaningful and historically relevant and can be 
better understood with knowledge of the history of that particular discipline. 
The aims or goals of research to a large extent depend on the nature of previous 
research, its subject matter, as well as its methods and the results those yield, 
and in order to better understand the concerns of researchers in neighbouring 
disciplines we need a better understanding of the histories of those particular 
disciplines, both in terms of material and ideal intentions (Part Two; 
Descombes 2001; 2014; Preucel and Mrozowski 2010; Rathje et al. 2013; 
Herschend 2015; Piiroinen 2018; Ribeiro 2018b).  
For an archaeologist, this would mean that they first develop an 
understanding of the anxieties or matters of uncertainty that were felt and 
entertained in the course of the history of the discipline. What was the 
prevailing consensus or what were the alternative positions to the 
predominant one at any given instance? Why was a theory or a philosophy 
abandoned and replaced with another? This was my central aim in Article 4, 
in which I argued that the relative slowness of Finnish theoretical archaeology 
should not be seen as an atheoretical positions, but as a deliberate theoretical 
strategy to avoid those epistemological approaches that might end up 
simplifying the subject matter. The article then aimed to highlight that a more 
detailed study of the history of the epistemology of archaeology could be one 
solution to the problem of conflicting research objectives. In particular, the 
article shows that those archaeologists which the historiography of Finnish 
  113 
 
 
archaeology has tended to label as naive empiricists are in reality those who 
are concerned of preserving the multiplicity of interpretations as a research 
possibility rather than as an epistemological shortcoming. In other words, we 
tend to think that past scholars adhered to what now seems an outdated 
research position only because that position was replaced with a better one for 
reasons obvious to us. In this sense, the history of archaeology truly is 
emergent of its subsequent development, and the resulting view of the past 
will most likely be a distorted one. Interestingly, then, I have also noticed that 
those scholars who have knowledge or insight in the history of archaeology 
often have a lot to offer in discussions that nevertheless deal with topics not 
immediately connected to their field of expertise. This is to say that more 
important than detailed knowledge of particular theoretical trends or schools 
is the ability to evaluate those theoretical standpoints in the context of the 
history of the discipline more broadly. 
As to the geneticist understanding of the history of their discipline, I am 
afraid I have little to offer. Nevertheless, although aDNA research is 
considerably younger than archaeology, I believe that the writing of the history 
of the discipline is possible, and it has already been attempted (e.g. Der 
Sarkissian et al. 2015; Hagelberg et al. 2015). However, perhaps due to its 
short history, the historiography of aDNA research appears as a technical 
review of the merits, challenges, and potential applications of the method itself 
rather than as an exposition of the (possibly conflicting) concerns of individual 
researchers or research groups, not to mention possible solutions to the 
problem of (possibly) incommensurable research objectives. What this could 
entail for the relationship between archaeology and genetics first and foremost 
is a possibility of writing a common history of the disciplines or a history of the 
interdisciplinarity of archaeology that includes both the concerns of the 
geneticist and the archaeologists. In this sense, the writing of a common 
history could present itself as a possibility for slowing down for a deeper 
mutual historical understanding. Philosopher Martin Savransky’s description 
fittingly clarifies this challenge: 
It is a challenge that requires the remaking of existing practices and the 
invention of new ones in order to transform the milieus that they sustain 
and induce an experience of hesitation that may create the space for the 
crafting of a problematic togetherness of entities and relations, but also 
of solitudes, of dreams and hopes. A form of togetherness that can never 
be stabilized, but which constitutes a risk, and a possibility, for a 
practical and always partial construction of common worlds. (Savransky 
2012, 365, emphasis original) 
At the same time, then, one should again bear in mind that gaining a 
historical understanding is not only a matter of developing understanding or 
appreciation between disciplines for the sake of efficiency in eradicating the 
common problem. Ultimately, the development of mutual understanding and 
appreciation should be driven by the realisation that the community of 
practitioners is always anticipating the imminent arrival of further participant, 
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both human and nonhuman, who have concerns or needs that may have been 
unanticipated or unaddressed by present members of the community and that, 
in order to include those guests and attend to their needs, the community of 
inquirers will benefit greatly from a sense of attentiveness from behalf of the 
host of the party. Worth bearing in mind is also that the possible guests are not 
limited to the trained researchers, funders, or members of the public who 
remain outside the negotiations of the sciences but whose lives are always 
possibly affected by the results of science. There is therefore always that “vague 
‘beyond’, waiting for penetration in respect to its detail” (Whitehead 1956, 8). 
Because penetration into this vague beyond is simultaneously an act of 
discovery and an act of creation, and because the matters that concern the 
beyond are not simply dictated by the social or the human, in the commonly 
adopted sense of the terms, penetration necessitates a certain ethical 
understanding or consideration of the significance of speculation as a form of 
open-ended attentiveness towards the effects of our being in the world 
(Savransky 2016). This speculative sensitivity, it can be argued, can only be 
achieved through hesitation and deceleration; through the cultivation of a 
speculative attitude. 

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In place of a part conclusion, and partly as a response to the research questions 
presented in the introduction of the thesis, I want to return to the sixfold 
typology of archaeological inference presented in Part Three and offer a 
supplementary formulation for a speculative epistemology of archaeology. As 
we saw in Part Two, in recent archaeological theorising the role of speculation 
has mainly been discussed as ontologically rather than epistemologically 
relevant. Whereas the sixfold subgrouping of archaeology’s methodology given 
in Part Three highlights that the common epistemological strategy in 
archaeology has been the gradual elimination of speculation in favor of 
increased intellectual security, this thesis has aimed to find an epistemological 
relevance for speculation beyond conjecture. In other words, my intention has 
been to combine the empirically sensitive ontological concerns of speculative 
philosophy while also retaining a degree of historical understanding of the 
epistemology of archaeology as a genealogy of possibly conflicting 
epistemological concerns. In other words, in addition to developing a degree 
of ontological sensitivity, a speculative epistemology of archaeology would also 
have to be historically sensitive. Unlike some ontological approaches in 
archaeological theorising, a speculative epistemology is not iconoclastic of the 
methodology of archaeology but aims to situate itself in relation to and as 
responsible of the history of the epistemology of archaeology.  
I therefore propose a further addition to the sixfold typology, one that, for 
lack of better definition, could be called the speculative empiricist position. 
Insofar as the epistemology underlying this position pertains to the three 
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principal forms of inference discussed in Part Three, a speculative empiricism 
is inductive, but only insofar as induction is aimed at the identification of the 
habits of thinking, that is, at the perpetual anticipation of the summum 
bonum. A speculative empiricism of archaeology also finds relevance for 
deduction, but only insofar as deduction is not simply aimed at the 
identification of conflicting explanations, but at the separation between 
destructive and constructive modes of inquiry. The main thrust of the 
speculative empiricist position in archaeology, then, is towards the 
intensification of abductive inference, but only insofar as abduction is not 
simply aimed towards the creation of an idea for the sake of its eventual 
cementation through established habits of thinking, but also towards the 
preservation of thinking otherwise. On the contrary, then, for a speculative 
empiricist (epistemology) of archaeology, the preservation of the multiplicity 
of abductive inference becomes a responsibility because thinking otherwise is 
a function of the creation of the past. This takes us back to the beginning of the 
cycle, that is, the inductive identification of the habits of thinking. 
Importantly, the speculative empiricist’s position is not that of the relativist 
which claims no method of evaluation for prospective knowledge claims. 
Instead, speculative empiricism is a form of pragmatism that is always caught 
between the consideration of both sensed effects and those anticipated; a 
commitment to the possible “by means of resisting the probable” (Debaise and 
Stengers 2017, 18; c.f. Parisi 2012). The creation of the past then directly 
contributes to the creation of the scientific atmosphere in the present as well 
as to the possibilities that the discipline will find for developing responsible 
methods for continuing to research the past also in the future.
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Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophic thought has 
done its best, the wonder remains. (Whitehead 1956, 232) 
In the introduction of this thesis, I asked what significance speculation can 
have in the epistemology of archaeology beyond its role as the originator of 
testable hypotheses regarding past realities? In answering this question, I 
began with an ontological exploration that aimed to demonstrate how a sense 
of speculation permeates not only scientific knowing but all existence as a form 
of interpretation. In particular, I argued that interpretation is a form of 
creation; a pluralised mode of aesthetic translation. Furthermore, I claimed 
that that which in interpretation is emergent of its antecedent objects or 
aesthetic relations cannot be reduced to prior or more elementary parts. 
Instead, objects, archaeological or otherwise, exist as modes of anticipation; 
never quite finished and therefore never entirely knowable. In other words, I 
speculated that speculation is an ontological mode of existence as much as it 
is an epistemological reality. 
After having established the ontological principle, namely that a sense of 
speculation permeates all experience and not just human interpretation, I 
continued with an empirical exposition of the history of theorising on forms of 
archaeological knowledge production. I argued that the history of 
archaeology’s epistemology is a history of the elimination of speculation, and 
I also aimed to show that the elimination of speculation has hinged on a variety 
of ontological and epistemological constructs, all aimed towards the eventual 
elimination of false hypotheses and the cementation of true propositions. In 
other words, I argued that the sense in which the significance of speculation is 
understood in archaeology today as a point of elimination is a continuation of 
the history of the discipline, but not the full extent of the epistemological 
significance of speculation. 
In attempting to combine the ontological principle that speculation 
characterises all interpretative relations with the empirical observation that 
the history of the epistemology of archaeology has to a large extent been a 
history of the elimination of speculation, I concluded that, beyond its purpose 
as the originator of possible explanations of the past, speculation as an 
epistemological notion should be taken seriously and even cared for. I 
therefore argued that 
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This is particularly important in today’s multidisciplinary research 
environment, and I argued that in order to develop more intimate degrees of 
multidisciplinary understanding a sense of the importance of speculation is to 
be combined with a sense of historical understanding of the research interests 
of those disciplines that contribute to the totality of what we refer to as 
archaeology. I suggested that this could be achieved by seeing speculation as a 
form of slowing down. Because speculation also entails thinking of the future 
as the locus of methodological and theoretical innovation, slowing down—as a 
kind of failsafe—becomes a way to anticipate and evaluate the possible 
practical effects of acting on a speculation. What this type of deceleration does 
not entail is that the elimination of speculative hypotheses should not be 
considered an important aim of science; it simply means that hypotheses may 
become eliminated or confirmed for the wrong reasons (see Part Four), and 
that for that very reason speculation should be preserved as a perpetual 
anticipation of how things can be otherwise.
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